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With mounting pressure by the United States directly and through their strategic shift and 
slow abdication of leadership towards Asia and away from the transatlantic community, European 
states have growing incentive to cooperate more strongly and integrate their defense and security 
efforts. The absence of such a trend of integration points to internal barriers to growing cooperation 
countering the external dynamic. Utilizing the theory of security communities, this thesis explores 
German, French, and British understanding of leadership, defense, and their respective public 
opinions. Focusing on the security identities of all three nations and their visions for the 
community as well as defense interests, it is clear that these are too divergent to allow any of the 
three nations to take-over the position of core state within the security community, despite their 
economic, military, and political size and power. This leads to the conclusion that security 
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European defense since the Postwar years has been inescapably linked to the United 
States, their military capabilities, and their commitment to Europe through various bilateral 
agreements and, first and foremost, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Over time, the alliance 
enlarged, encompassing the greater part of the European continent as well as the whole of North 
America. Despite new members trickling in with various enlargements eastwards, and two member 
states being nuclear powers, too, the preponderant position of power and influence has been held 
by the United States. Capability parity between the U.S. and any other member state has never 
been achieved in NATO’s 70-year history, in fact it has never been a declared goal of the 
transatlantic alliance even though there have been repeated calls for European allies to strengthen 
or intensify their defense efforts and defense cooperation. With the loss of Europe as a strategic 
battlefield and area of strategic interest after the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 
criticism of NATO and its perceived inequalities has continuously grown louder. European defense 
integration within or outside of the transatlantic alliance, however, has not followed suit. The 
culmination of decades of European members of a European or transatlantic security community 
resisting external urges to cooperate and integrate more can be seen in the 45th U.S. president 
openly calling NATO obsolete. The number of European defense initiatives1 as well as a recent 
uptick in defense spending that coincide with the growing American critique of NATO2 and the 
 
1 Like the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) or the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence (CARD). 
2 Trump has repeatedly called NATO’s continued into question, calling it “obsolete”. Helene Cooper, “Defense 
Secretary Mattis Tells NATO Allies to Spend More, or Else,” New York Times, February 17, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/europe/jim-mattis-nato-trump.html. A sentiment that has fallen on 
fruitful ground in American public media, like fox news or Foreign Policy. See for example: Mark Galeotti, “Trump 




overall lack of member states military funding and development in recent years obscure the fact 
that the situation concerning individual member states defense efforts as well as international 
cooperation within the security community are not significantly changing. Alleged “unfairness”3 
in defense spending differences is one of the reasons Trump targets the alliance and member states, 
but he is not the first American president to call for higher expenditure. What is new with the 
current administration, however, is the vehemence of the criticism and the unconcealed threats4 to 
leave the alliance. As a great change towards more European commitment has yet to emerge5, it 
must be assumed that the continuously growing American discontent with European partners and 
the likewise growing political pressure by the U.S. to do more has not had a significant influence 
on European defense integration, despite the American preponderant position in European security. 
While it can be said that President Trump is among the most vocal presidents, he exemplifies the 
fact that as a security guarantor the USA does no longer want to ignore European inefficiency and 
inaction in defense efforts and has begun a shift in strategic focus away from the transatlantic area 
towards the Pacific and Asia. Any call for stronger NATO capabilities and interoperability, as well 
as for new technology and policy to react to new and emerging threats necessitates not only 
national-level expenditure boosts, but active steps towards cooperation and integration of different 
European security apparatuses. With the loss of strategic importance of the European continent for 
American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, the American willingness for continued 
extended deterrence, NATO cooperation and security promise is likely to diminish to a 
 
3 Louis Nelson, “Trump criticizes NATO members ahead of summit,” Politico, July 9, 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/trump-criticize-nato-summit-702296. 
4 Robin Emmott, Jeff Mason and Alissa de Carbonnel, “Trump claims NATO victory after ultimatum to go it alone,” 
Reuters July 12, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit/trump-claims-nato-victory-after-ultimatum-to-
go-it-alone-idUSKBN1K135H. 
5 The European Intervention Initiative that has been ratified last year and that had been emerging after Emmanuel 
Macron’s declaration of NATO as braindead following Trump’s unilateral actions and threats has yet to move away 
from the paper stage. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether this initiative will become a relevant player in 
European defense cooperation. 
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transatlantic break point, especially with an administration as transactional as the current one. In 
order to salvage the transatlantic security umbrella, it is necessary to understand the obstacles to 
further European defense cooperation and highlight the conditions under which European security 
commitments can be strengthened. The research question this thesis pursues and answers, therefore, 
is: what are the internal barriers to deeper European defense integration and security cooperation.  
The goal of this study is to highlight and understand the inner dimensions of security 
communities and understand their character vis-à-vis external or top-down pressures by the 
international community, geopolitical changes or the will of the United States. This thesis assumes 
that leadership of a single state does not have a civilizing influence, meaning that despite American 
will for more European integration or defense responsibility, it has not been able to adjust the other 
state’s understanding of defense to a similar outlook of itself in over seven decades of cooperation. 
Instead vast differences in leadership and defense understanding and domestic outlook on security 
and threats, ergo the security identities of the group of states most relevant for continued NATO 
and transatlantic cooperation, trump external pressures.  
Docking into the theory of security communities, this thesis shows that diverging security 
identities, national interests and visions and levels of trust are relevant barriers between European 
nations. These passively prohibit them from extending their cooperation and integration in 
accordance with the speed of American growing pressure and abdication of leadership. This thesis 
also shows that trust and identity are not as uniform as taken for granted by the theory, instead 
through continued internal competition obscured by the emergence of a leading core state, trust 
and identity appear in different layers within the transatlantic security community. This sheds a 
new light at the assumptions of the theory and evaluates the applicability of it to its main exemplary 
community, the transatlantic one. 
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I argue that leading European nations’ security identities, manifested in their leadership 
behavior, constitutional and practical understanding of defense and domestic outlook are 
incompatible with each other as well as with the foreign, American pressure, which effectively 
hinders further noteworthy cooperative defense policies and defense integration on the European 
continent or in the North Atlantic region.  
This thesis consists of two distinct parts, one on the conceptualization and the other on 
the operationalization of this work and the research question. The conceptual part will ground this 
thesis in the theory of security communities, as proposed by Deutsch et al. and established by 
Adler and Barnett following the constructivist turn. For this, first, the dynamic between the U.S. 
and its allies needs to be highlighted, showing the relevance of the element of trust for this specific 
example of cooperation. Following the concept of trust into the study of international relations, 
trust-based cooperation in the form of security communities are explored theoretically. Here a 
highlight on the seminal texts will ground the thesis in this theory and open up the later 
implications for discussion. Identifying the pillars of security communities, namely identity and 
its interaction with trust and leadership, the variables for the case studies are investigated. Lastly 
this conceptual chapter illuminates further theoretical branches concerning themselves with the 
decay or disintegration of security communities. While these are not uniformly accepted or spread 
within the research agenda, they are particularly relevant for the research question at hand. 
The second part of the thesis, the operationalization, brings the research question to life, 
utilizing the framework set out in the concept chapter. To begin the choice of cases needs to be 
explained. For this, parameters for operationalization of the research question and an 
understanding of the dimensions of the transatlantic security community are necessary. 
Additionally, understand the variables needed for leadership, the outgoing core state, the U.S., and 
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its interaction with the security community are investigated. With these parameters in mind, and 
through a comparative look at the existent member states of the community, Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom are chosen as focus nations. Their size, wealth, population and military 
expenditure as well as the fact that they are targets for the Trump administration’s criticism make 
them prime candidates for change actors in defense cooperation. Smaller nations, even if interested 
in active integration and further security cooperation, like Estonia or Poland, are not in a political 
position to vastly influence pan-European policy and are disregarded.  
The main part of the operationalization chapter is taken up by the case studies. With the 
focus nations as objects of interests, the case study chapters individually focus on the three issues 
identified as relevant to investigate security identities and trust in between these three nations: 
Defense, leadership, and public opinion. As any cooperation needs a common understanding of 
the main issue, the topic of defense needs to be highlighted from all three countries’ perspectives. 
This case study explores the constitutional and practical manifestation of defense in all three 
nations, through an in-depth look at official governmental regulations and policy. This serves as a 
foundational study of the respective security identities and their incongruence. Considering that 
the U.S. is hailed as the leader of NATO and the free world, any concerted issue for stronger 
integration with the United States or away from the transatlantic bond needs a shared 
understanding of leadership or new leadership to emerge. Leadership and unifying vision for the 
security community therefore need to be another focal point of this thesis. This case study 
examines and contrasts each nation’s attempts at defense and security integration and their extent 
of leadership behavior. Especially in democracies, domestic consensus building for foreign or 
security policy is mandatory, therefore public opinion and public understanding of defense and 
their own nation’s role in it constrains the governmental capabilities for action. As the final case 
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study, this chapter through its look at public opinion polls featuring all three nations to ensure 
comparability expands on the images of security identity explored before. Cementing the 
differences between all three focus nations and closing with an investigation on the existence and 
possibility of trust between these three nations, the case study chapter leads over to a final analysis. 
Here, the order of the case studies, looking at issue areas instead of nations will be reversed. 
Piecing together first the security identities and their incompatibility and then building on this with 
individual looks at community vision and the will to take over responsibility, it is clear that the 
differences between each of the focus nations is too great to translate into mutual trust enabling 
new security community leadership. 
As these findings cast doubt on central assumptions of the theory of security communities, 
the analytical chapter offers a new way of reading mature security communities. The element of 
stratification reintroduces relevant differences of interests, trust and identities into the study of 
security communities and helps understanding mature pluralistic security communities not in 





CONCEPTUALIZATION AND APPROACH 
2.1. Introduction 
“The word of the President of the United States is good enough for me.” 
 – President of France Charles de Gaulle, October 22, 19626 
 
“Looking at the latest decisions of President Trump, someone could even think: With 
friends like that, who needs enemies?” 
 – European Council President Donald Tusk, May 16, 20187 
 
When discussing transatlantic relations today, the shadow of the Trump administration 
looms large. The ‘America First’ President is often depicted as having wreaked havoc on the long-
established ties of trust between the U.S. and its allies in Europe. As an integral part of the complex 
that has developed around transatlantic security and cooperation trust needs to be seen in light of 
its entanglement with identity and community.  
This chapter highlights the current tensions between the Trump administration and European 
allies to anchor this thesis in time and illuminate the urgency of approaching the research question 
at hand. Extrapolating from narratives spun by the U.S. President and European counterparts, the 
loss of trust between both sides of the Atlantic is discussed. This serves to move away from the 
anecdotal nature of twitter feeds to a more robust understanding of the intercontinental state of 
affairs. This leads over to a general conceptualization of the role of trust in international relations. 
Trust has despite its intangible and elusive nature a place in international relations theory, 
 
6 Ted Sorensen, speech writer for President Kennedy, recounts this expression exemplifying the trust President de 
Gaulle had in Kennedy during a panel with Graham Allison, political scientist renowned for his work on the Cuban 
Missile Crisis among other works. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective,” John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum, last modified October 17, 2007, https://www.jfklibrary.org/events-and-
awards/forums/past-forums/transcripts/the-cuban-missile-crisis-an-eyewitness-perspective. 





especially in constructivism and literature on cooperation. How and why trust emerges and what 
its influence is thought to be is investigated before turning to a form of international relation and 
cooperation highly dependent on great and growing levels of trust: security communities. This 
concept, first elaborated in 1957 by Karl Deutsch et al. and rediscovered by Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett in the 1990’s after the emergence of constructivism, serves as the theoretical 
backbone of this thesis. In a concise subchapter, the two seminal texts are reviewed. A special 
focus lies on the pillars of security communities, namely identity, leadership, and community, all 
three of which receive due attention. Here, too, the debates and developments of the larger theory 
find their place and discussion.  
Having established the broader literature, theory and background, it becomes obvious that 
any established, mature security community faces major hurdles or even the threat of disintegration 
if trust is lost between the member states and especially towards the leading state. The final 
subchapter of this part focuses on existent theories of security community disintegration and 
contrasts them with the relevance of trust and identity as established in prior parts. With a potential 
loss of the leading state, this thesis investigates the potential of other member states to innovate 
and alter their security identities to make up for the prerequisite loss in order to maintain the 
security community or at least save it from complete disintegration. Finally, this part will tie the 
conceptualization this chapter has undertaken back to the research question and explain the 
operationalization of the next part and its case studies as influenced by the theoretical background 
laid out. 
Overall, this first part of the thesis highlights concepts, frameworks and theoretical claims 
surrounding security communities, trust, and security identities in order to create a thorough basis 
for the latter case studies as well as the research and argument of this thesis.  
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2.2. Tensions and trust between U.S. and European allies 
In October of 1962, the United States of America faced an unprecedented and until now 
unparalleled crisis. President Kennedy sent former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President 
Charles de Gaulle of France to brief the ally on nuclear missiles discovered to be stationed on Cuba 
by the Soviet Union. Accounts of that meeting report de Gaulle refusing8 the need of the American 
envoy to produce evidence of these grave allegations with the words: “The word of the President 
of the United States is good enough for me”9. A French account of the same event records de 
Gaulle’s assurance of French concerted action in case of greater conflict and repercussions even if 
France is not consulted on the path the U.S. would like to take.10 Widely held to be indicative of 
allied trust in the United States11, much has changed since. Trust in the United States from its 
European partners to “not exploit its superior power at their expense” 12  and include the 
transatlantic realm into its self-conception has been an integral part of the community developed 
and shared between both shores of the Atlantic. Today, however, the White House’s remarks tell 
a different tale. Already on the campaign trail Donald Trump unmistakably questioned the 
existence of the institutionalized arm of the transatlantic security community: NATO. One of the 
 
8 Sherman Kent, “The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad,” Studies in 
Intelligence 16, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 30, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP78T03194A000300010013-8.pdf. 
9 Ted Sorensen, speech writer for President Kennedy, recounts this episode exemplifying the trust of de Gaulle in 
Kennedy during a panel with Graham Allison, political scientist renowned for his work on the Cuban Missile Crisis 
among other works. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and 
Museum, last modified October 17, 2007, https://www.jfklibrary.org/events-and-awards/forums/past-
forums/transcripts/the-cuban-missile-crisis-an-eyewitness-perspective.  
10 “October 22, 1962: Meeting between General Charles de Gaulle and Dean Acheson, Elysee Palace, Paris,” History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Documents Diplomatiques Française, 1962, Tome II (1er Juillet – 31 
Décembre), transl. Garret J. Martin, (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1999): 315-319, 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115416.pdf?v=222f00c5c3cc288b5ecaf8ec59f11fc9. 
11 Senator John Kerry, among others, referenced this de Gaulle quote as an example of French trust lost since in his 
first presidential debate with President Bush in 2004. “Transcript: First Presidential Debate,” Washington Post, 
September 30, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html.  




earliest opinions on the alliance by Trump is: “I said here’s the problem with NATO: it’s 
obsolete.”13 And that the U.S. “support[s] NATO far more than we [the U.S.] should, frankly, 
because you have a lot of countries that aren’t doing what they’re supposed to be doing”14. In 
tweets on the social media platform twitter, which has evolved to an official medium for 
presidential communication, the President has called NATO “very unfair to the United States!”15, 
and depicted allied nations as “delinquent”16 and intentionally “rip[ping] us off on Trade [sic!]”17. 
Next to invoking enemy images of the world wars to pressure France and accepting follow-up 
tensions with another ally18, the President has actively threatened the European allies with release 
of captured IS fighters19 and has questioned the mutual defense principle at several points of his 
presidency20 both directly linking defense and American commitment in case of war to allies’ 
 
13 Taken from a rally speech on April 2, 2016 in Racine, WI. Shayna Freisleben, “A guide to Trump’s past comments 
about NATO,” CBS News, April 12, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-nato-past-comments/.  
14 Donald Trump in a joint media outing with Mike Pence at CBS News’ 60 minutes. “The Republican Ticket: Trump 
and Pence: Republican Presidential nominee Donald Trump and his running mate, Indiana Gov. Mike Pence, speak 
to Lesley Stahl in their first joint interview,” CBS News 60 Minutes, 17 July, 2016, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-trump-pence-republican-ticket/.  
15 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “.@NATO, very unfair to the United States!” Twitter, August 21, 2019, 
13:43, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164231651351617536.  
16 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Many countries in NATO, which we are expected to defend, are not only 
short of their commitment of 2% (which is low), but are also delinquent for many years in payments that have not 
been made. Will they reimburse the U.S.?” Twitter, July 10, 2018, 13:01, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1016729137409486853.  
17 All capitalizations as well as hyphenated words stem from the original poster. Donald Trump 
(@realdonaldtrump), “….And add to that the fact that the U.S. pays close to the entire cost of NATO-protecting 
many of these same countries that rip us off on Trade (they pay only a fraction of the cost-and laugh!). The 
European Union had a $151 Billion Surplus- should pay much more for Military!” Twitter, June 10, 2018, 21:29, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1005985339121504256.  
18 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe 
against the U.S., China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for 
France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S. came along. Pay for NATO or not!” Twitter, 
November 13, 2018, 06:50, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1062311785787744256.  
19 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “The United States is asking Britain, France, Germany and other European 
allies to take back over 800 ISIS fighters that we captured in Syria and put them on trial. The Caliphate is ready to 
fall. The alternative is not a good one in that we will be forced to release them……..” Twitter, February 16, 2019, 
22:51, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1096980408401625088.  
20 “‘Very aggressive‘: Trump suggests Montenegro could cause world war three,” Guardian, July 19, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/19/very-aggressive-trump-suggests-montenegro-could-cause-
world-war-three. Rosie Gray, “Trump Declines to Affirm NATO’s Article 5: Speaking in front of the leaders of its 
member-nations, the president fails to make clear the United States still has the alliance’s back,” Atlantic, May 25, 
11 
 
reaching of the two percent guideline in defense spending21 as well as to the trade relations between 
the U.S. and nations in question22. Defense and transatlantic security under President Trump 
appear to become transactional and tied to tangible allied monetary commitment or in Trump’s 
words “obligation”23, rather than being based on a relationship of cooperation and trust. Though 
these expressions have yet to culminate in an American retreat24 from NATO they have arguably 
already begun to wreak havoc on transatlantic trust created in over 70 years of cooperation since 
the end of World War II. French President Emmanuel Macron has reacted to these American 
developments with the assertion of “brain death” of NATO and a loss of American leadership25 
and questioning the U.S. reliability and commitment.26 German Chancellor Angela Merkel has 
voiced concern over U.S. American reliability, too, albeit in her typical calm and reserved style. 
After a breakdown of diplomatic debates at the 2017 G7 meeting in Taormina, Italy, she stated 




21 Aaron Blake, “Trump’s wild NATO display”, Washington Post, December 3, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/03/trumps-wild-nato-display/.  
22 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Europe has to pay their fair share for Military Protection. The European 
Union, for many years, has taken advantage of us on Trade, and then they don’t live up to their Military 
commitment through NATO. Things must change fast!” Twitter, November 25, 2018, 15:27, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1066790517944606721. 
23  Fred Dews, “Making sense of NATO on the US presidential campaign trail,” Brookings, July 29, 2016, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/07/29/making-sense-of-nato-on-the-us-presidential-
campaign-trail/. 
24 White House Aides have reported private utterings of President Trump musing about pulling the US from NATO. 
Julian Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concern Over 
Russia,” New York Times, January 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-
trump.html.  
25 Katie Rogers and Anni Karni, “In Tense Exchange, Trump and Macron Put Forth Dueling Visions for NATO,” New 
York Times, December 3, 2019 (updated December 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/us/politics/trump-nato-summit.html. Steven Erlanger, “Macron Says NATO 
Is Experiencing ‘Brain Death’ Because of Trump,” New York Times, November 7, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/europe/macron-nato-brain-death.html.  
26 Angelique Chrisafis, “Europe can no longer rely on US for security, says Emmanuel Macron: French president to 





refer to the United States, are over.27 And while more direct quotes like these from both sides of 
the Atlantic can be found with ease, these anecdotes alone should show a significant public discord 
between members of the oldest alliance on this planet. These anecdotes, however, leave room to 
question whether this situation is in entirely Trumpian, or whether the current President is not the 
cause, but a symptom and amplifier of a longer history of eroding trust. And indeed, when diving 
deeper into transatlantic relations it becomes clear that discord is nothing new, even if it has 
intensified greatly. A Pew Research Center study of 2018 shows a plunge in European confidence 
in the Trump administration to do the right thing regarding world affairs following a high level of 
confidence during the Obama administration. But, the study also shows that a similar yet not as 
extreme lack of confidence persisted and deepened under the 43rd President, George Bush.28 
Additionally, the majority of surveyed European populations report a significantly lower level of 
U.S. concern for non-U.S. interests. German, French and U.K. respondents show a decline between 
13 and 31 percentage points of confidence since 2013.29 This trajectory has been fueled by several 
events. Andrew Kydd, for example, highlights the Iraq war and the way the U.S. reasoned for and 
pushed the invasion through as one accelerator of trust erosion between the U.S. and European 
allies.30 The preference for multilateral and cooperative politics harbored by European domestic 
 
27 At an election event in Munich following the G7 summit in Italy, in which different states tried and failed to bring 
President Trump back to the nuclear deal with Iran, she said: “Die Zeiten, in denen wir uns auf andere [sic!] völlig 
verlassen konnten, die sind ein Stück vorbei. Das habe ich in den letzten Tagen erlebt“. The above translation in 
the text is my own. “Merkel sieht in den USA keinen verlässlichen Partner mehr,“ Welt, May 28, 2017, 
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article165008816/Merkel-sieht-in-den-USA-keinen-verlaesslichen-
Partner-mehr.html. 
28 The study begins with confidence levels of 51% of respondents in GER, 30% U.K., 20% FR in 2001 and shows 2018 
levels of 10% GER, 28% U.K. and 9% FR. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Janell Fetterolf 
and Kat Devlin, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies: Most still want U.S. as top 
global power, but see China on the rise,” Pew Research Center (October 2018): 8, 
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PewTrumpIntl.pdf. 
29 Wike et al., 2018: 9. 
30 Andrew Kydd, “In America We (Used to) Trust: Hegemony and Global Cooperation,” Political Science Quarterly 
120, no. 4 (Winter 2005/2006): 634, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20202601. 
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policy making elites was brought into light and sharp contrast with the prevailing American foreign 
policy outlook and identity. This fueled a crisis of trust in 2003, as Risse shows.31 Another element 
furthering an erosion of trust certainly has been the National Security Agency spying scandal of 
2013 and the revelations published by Edward Snowden.32 The end of the Cold War, too, had 
adverse effects on trust and the perception of reliability. The question towards increase in burden-
sharing by European partners had long affected the transatlantic relationship, with the removal of 
the main antagonist of the alliance and coupled with the a diversification of NATO deployments 
and issue areas risk-sharing inequalities between the U.S. and allies added to the dynamic of 
mistrust, as Pesu and Sinkkonen point out.33 Therefore, it is safe to say that the anecdotal loss of 
trust between the U.S. under Trump and European allied nations such as Germany and France, is 
both nothing new in transatlantic relations and very real. And the Trump presidency is not the root 
of the problem, but rather another symptom of a growing transatlantic rift. Of course, it must be 
said that the 45th President has added another level of intensity to the process, with various 
instances that could intensify the loss of trust. Sudden departures from treaties and institutions, 
like the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accords, the UNESCO, the WTO, the INF treaty, to 
name just a few. The latest sign, as of summer 2020, of American dismissal of cooperation and 
communication with allies is the sudden declaration of reduction of armed forces personnel 
 
31 Thomas Risse, “Beyond Iraq: The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community,” Die Friedens-Warte 78, no. 2/3 
Schwerpunktthema: Amerikanische Weltpolitik (2003): 173-193, http://www.jstor.com/stable/23773694.  
32 French and German reactions were strong, even if later a level of data-mining cooperation between European 
and American intelligence agencies came to light. For a short assessment of short-term and medium-term effects 
of the scandal see: European Union Center of North Carolina EU Briefings, The NSA Leaks and Transatlantic 
Relations, University of North Carolina (June 25, 2014). 
https://europe.unc.edu/files/2016/11/Brief_NSA_Leaks_Transatlantic_Relations_2014.pdf. Long-term erosion of 
trust in German political elites with a historic pro-American outlook are covered by Philipp Brugger, “The Erosion 
of German Elite Trust in the United States of America,” German Politics 28, no. 4 (2019): 521-540, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2019.1594785.  
33 Matti Pesu and Ville Sinkkonen, ”Managing Transatlantic (Mis)Trust: The Trump Era in Perspective,” Finnish 




stationed in Germany, an action widely seen as intended on punishing the Federal Republic for 
noncompliance with American demands or even the perceived slight of Merkel’s refusal to attend 
a short notice G7 conference in Washington DC in person due to the ongoing pandemic situation.34  
Whether the trust lost during the Trump administration is something of a hiccup in 
relations which will return to normal with the next president or not should not be speculated about 
here, but it is obvious that transatlantic trust has been chipped at over the past decades long before 
the election of Donald Trump. With the successive worsening of trusting relationships between 
both sides of the Atlantic, one must ask what role trust can play in international and especially in 
transatlantic relations. The following chapter introduces the scientific approach to trust in 
international relations studies and its effect on and importance for cooperation. 
2.3. The role of trust in international relations 
Relatively novel on the IR research agenda, trust had been dismissed as a factor worth 
studying for the greater part of this fields research history. Governed by the conception of the 
anarchy of the international system, it was assumed that mistrust was a necessary, systemic 
precondition of interstate relationship. Every state vying for its own survival simply could not 
allow itself to trust. Yet, as Ruzicka and Keating note, even Mearsheimer’s realist thinking could 
not completely rule out the existence of trust, but just assert rarity.35 Prevalence or acceptance of 
models such as the security dilemma or game-theoretical approaches like the prisoner’s dilemma 
further solidify the assumption of systemic restrictions for the existence of trust. With the advent 
 
34 Philip Oltermann, “German ministers hit back at Trump plan to withdraw US Troops,” Guardian, June 17, 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/17/german-ministers-hit-back-at-trump-plan-to-withdraw-us-
troops. Jonathan Landay, Andrea Shalal and Arshad Mohammed, “Trump’s troop cut in Germany blindsided senior 
U.S. officials, sources say,” Reuters, June 8, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-germany-military-
trump/trumps-troop-cut-in-germany-blindsided-senior-us-officials-sources-say-idUSKBN23G0BE.  
35 Jan Ruzicka and Vincent C. Keating, “Going global: Trust research and international relations,” Journal of Trust 




of constructivism following Wendt’s Anarchy is what States Make of it36 the potential role of trust 
in international relations was able to emerge in research. Where prolonged cooperation was 
thought to be based on a common threat, such as the Soviet Union posed for the Western world37, 
now newer approaches gained traction placing trust as the necessary ingredient in successful and 
continued peaceful cooperation.38 Since it has gained more prominence in research, trust has 
eluded definition to a certain degree. An intangible and evasive concept that is certainly difficult 
to measure39 that is widely considered as a basis to continued international cooperation40 entails a 
variety of different understandings and approaches. As evasive as trust is, the following consensus 
of its concept exists:  
First, scholars agree that trust refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate 
of one’s interest under the control of others. This willingness is based on a belief, for 
which there is some uncertainty, that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to 
harm the interests of the first. […] Second, scholars agree that trusting relationships are 
behavioral manifestations of trust [that] develop when actors grant others discretion over 
their interests based on the belief that those interests will not be harmed. […] Third, the 
intensity and scope of trust and trusting relationships are capable of variation. […] Fourth, 
trusting others involves making predictions about their future actions […] which 
introduces calculations of risk into the decision-making process. […] Finally, actors 
assess the risks of entrusting their interests to others using subjective estimates of the 
probability their trust will be honored.41 
 
36 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858. 
37 Stephen Walt, “The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart,” National Interest 54 (Winter 
1998/1999): 4, http://www.jstor.com/stable/42895279. 
38 Hoffmann does connect trust research to writings of Karl Deutsch in 1958, but later clarifies that the major 
developments in this area follow after Wendt’s piece is released. Aaron Hoffmann, ”A Conceptualization of Trust in 
International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 3 (2002): 375. 
39 As Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten assert in 2013, the IR scholarship realm still misses appropriate tools to 
measure trust and even lacks a unified definition of it. They present a good overview on the literature on trust in 
different IR schools of thought. Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever and Lukas Kasten, “Vertrauen lohnt sich: 
Über Gegenstand und Potential eines vernachlässigten Konzepts in den Internationalen Beziehungen,“ Zeitschrift 
für Internationale Beziehungen 20, no. 2 (December 2013): 65-104, http://www.jstor.com/stable/24587948. 
40 Adler and Barnett, for example, assert cooperation as a by-product of trust. Michael Barnett and Emmanuel 
Adler, “Studying security communities in theory, comparison, and history,” in Security Communities, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 438. 
41 Aaron Hoffmann, ”A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” European Journal of International 




Broadly speaking, three approaches with varying degrees of overlap classify trust either 
as part of a rational choice calculation also referred to as strategic trust, or as a phenomenon hailed 
from psychology and often associated with generalized trust or , thirdly, as a social construction 
of particularized trust between ego and other.42 As will become clearer in the following, rationalist 
approaches or strategic trust is often discredited due to the calculating and hedging background to 
placing strategic trust in each other.  
The conceptual consensus presented by Hoffmann already points to the necessity of 
partners in trust needing to be aware of each other’s interests and sharing them to a certain degree. 
For trust to emerge, understanding and transforming the identities of trustor and trustee through a 
“process of positive and mutual identification”43 is vital. Applied to the example in the previous 
subchapter above, the apparent loss of trust between the United States and select European allies 
necessitates a prior existence of both trust and mutual identification. The process of identification 
Wheeler refers to, is also found in Adler and Barnett’s writings and referred to as positive social 
learning experience. Their understanding of dependable expectations of peaceful change is 
“unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena”44. Trust is grasped 
not only as a result of positive social learning experiences between individual or groups of states, 
but also as a precursor to the development of shared identities. Trans- and interactions between 
states in various degrees of trusting relationships as well as in common institutions as elements of 
long processes of social learning directly influence the emergence of mutual trust and collective 
 
42 See: Brian C. Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics 
and American Multilateralism, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 121, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. Ch. 1 & 2. Ruzicka and Keating, “Going global,” 6-16.  
43 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2018), 2. 
44 Barnett and Adler, “Studying security communities,” 414. 
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identities.45 And while the authors point to “leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered 
by organizations”46, others criticize their lack of exploration of primary emergence of trust. Most 
notably and recently, Nicholas Wheeler critiques the constructivist assumptions of trust and its 
development. Pointing to the divergent understanding of the trust-identity relation in 
constructivism, where Wendt constitutes shared identity as a precursor to trust47 and Adler and 
Barnett in their work on security communities propagate a vice-versa approach48, Wheeler intends 
to fill the gap between these authors as well as other approaches in International Relations utilizing 
trust as a variable by introducing the interpersonal bonding between state leaders or their 
representatives in international bargaining situations as incentive for trust to form. This trust on an 
elite-level then can be dispersed to the domestic public and be built upon to develop shared 
identities as necessitated by Adler and Barnett. In the regard that trust always includes the risk of 
defection of the trustee49 that is exacerbated by the fact that trust also entails a lack of anticipation 
or rather hedging towards this potential defection50, loss of interstate trust makes trustors suddenly 
and unexpectedly vulnerable. Rationalist, strategic trust approaches cannot account for this 
vulnerability. Contrasted with the outlook of states in a trusting relationship onto states outside of 
this community of states, which per definition still includes the usual expectations of anarchy and 
potential military conflict, and which members states have anticipated and prepared for, a breaking 
 
45 Barnett and Adler, “Studying security communities,” 422. 
46 Barnett and Adler, “Studying security communities,” 414. 
47 Wendt argues that mutual restraint may lead to shared interests, which inform identities needed for trust to 
grow. See: Nicholas Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), 36. 
48 “[A] minimal measure of trust is needed for a collective identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to 
identity”. Adler and Barnett, “A framework for the study of security communities,” 45-46. 
49 Barbara Mistzal, Trust in Modern Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996: 19. Cited in: Adler and Barnett, “A 
framework for the study of security communities,” 46. 
50 Keating and Ruzicka identify lack of hedging or reduction of hedging between two states as the variable 
necessary to identify relationships of trust between states. See: Vincent C. Keating and Jan Ruzicka, “Trusting 
relationships in international politics: No need to hedge,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 4 (October 2014): 
753-770, http://www.jstor.com/stable/24564319.  
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away of a trusted state through loss of trust must be considered as more important and potentially 
dangerous than continuously existing external challenges.  
Collectively, a shared identity mutually constituted with trust, among other elements, 
between a group of states, is conceptualized as a security community. This concept, part of the 
constructivist approach to International Relations studies, not only serves as one if not the prime 
example of an interstate relationship of trust but is also provides a basis for understanding the 
historic and current transatlantic relationship. Below, this particular form of cooperation and 
interstate relationship is further explored. The application of security communities to the research 
question not only raises questions about how an abrogation of leadership, as hinted in the example 
of the U.S. in transatlantic relations, affects the remainder of the security community’s members, 
but it also allows a look at mechanisms or elements of maintenance of a security community or 
incentives for erosion.  
2.4. Trusting international relations: security communities 
The concept of security community is inherently constructivist and developed alongside 
the emergence of constructivism, albeit some roots to an earlier work. The following subchapter 
explores the basic assumptions surrounding security communities based on the two seminal texts 
that defined them.  
Security communities have first been theoretically explored in the 1950’s, most notably 
by Karl Deutsch in his study Political Community and the North Atlantic Area51, published in 1957. 
 
51 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichtermann, Raymond E. Lindgren, 
Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North American [sic!] Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (1957; repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2015). Deutsch et al. note that their concept was first defined by one of the co-authors, Richard Van Wagenen, in 
Richard W. Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes one a Possible Focus, 
Publications of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1952). Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5.  
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The concept was largely forgotten, before it was revitalized by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 
and incorporated into the constructivist research agenda around the turn of the millennium. Adler 
and Barnett’s Security Communities52  is the second seminal work in this field. It includes a 
framework for analysis and an array of articles by others critiquing and operationalizing the titular 
security communities. Deutsch et al. define their view of security communities as such: 
A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become “integrated.” 
By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” 
and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 
“long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. 
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that 
they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems 
must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change.”  
By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by 
institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.53 
 
Deutsch et al.’s study not only tries to explain the absence of war in certain geographically 
linked areas through the above understanding of security communities, it further differentiates 
between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. The former describes a full integration 
of formerly independent states, including the dissolution of sovereignty of each member nation 
and the emergence of a new state. The latter is defined as a group of states, all remaining formally 
independently governed states, which, however, have attained a degree of integration in terms of 
security, through shared identity, institutions and the expectation of peaceful change between each 
other.54 While the study at hand is often criticized for the lack of a reproducible framework, 
Deutsch et al. lay out the groundwork for later studies. They point to the necessity of a core of 
states, that serve as drivers and active shapers of integration and can serve as magnets for other 
 
52 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 62 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
53 All capitalization and quotation marks are taken from the source. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5. 
54 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 6-7. 
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states.55 Their highlighting of the procedural character of the emergence of security communities, 
is mirrored in Adler and Barnett’s later classification of three distinct phases of security 
communities. Especially for pluralistic security communities, which are still understood to be more 
easily attainable than amalgamated ones, Deutsch et al. identify shared values, adequate 
responsiveness and communication between each member state, as well as the predictability of 
behavior as necessary elements for integration. 56  All three of these terms remain somewhat 
underdefined in the study, nonetheless, a following short recapitulation will serve to highlight the 
evolution of the theory in later texts. Values to Deutsch et al. are “common propositions”57 shared 
by the politically relevant part of a state’s population. These can be habitualized and enshrined in 
institutions, and Deutsch et al. point to the size of the intersection of values between states as a 
main enabler of integration.58 It should be noted that the values deemed relevant for integrative 
processes by Deutsch et al. are only those that manifest themselves in political influence, like the 
value of democracy. Responsiveness, to Deutsch and his co-authors, is “the capacity of the 
participating […] governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, 
adequately, and without resort to violence.”59 Ergo, a well-established method of communication 
between the security community-to-be’s member states and a shared understanding and acceptance 
of what is deemed an adequate response. The final condition deemed necessary for the formation 
of pluralistic security communities is tied to the second one. Behavioral predictability, as a 
function of responsiveness, is necessary to be able to reach consensus concerning areas of 
integration or problems regarding the sphere of community, in this case security.60 These three 
 
55 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 28. 
56 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 66. 
57 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 36.  
58 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 46-47. 
59 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 66.  
60 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 67.  
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elements are integrated by Deutsch et al. into their model of “way of life”61, which with its 
inclusion of values and habits, can be understood as a different term for what is known as state 
identity.62 The relevance of identity in the discourse of security communities is discussed further 
down. While Deutsch et al. do not identify a scalable framework or set forth measurable thresholds 
for the variables they identified, the historic case studies they evaluate in their book point toward 
a number of elements relevant to the development of security communities. One such element is 
leadership, which they were able to observe as a crucial element in the early stages of new waves 
of integration63  Reliant on coalitions and their ability to strike compromises, leaders appear 
historically relevant in moves attempting a change in the status quo either towards integration into 
a security community or in disintegration.64  
The research implications opened by the now seminal, yet through its descriptive 
character not readily applicable work by Deutsch et al. are large. The field of international relations, 
however, moved into a different direction and focused on different variants of realism, and then 
the grand debate between newly emerging liberalism and realism. When the concept of security 
community was revisited by Adler and Barnett during the formative decade of constructivism as a 
new school of thought in IR, beginning with the publication of Wendt’s Anarchy is what States 
 
61 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 47. 
62 Simply put, identity is “how one understands oneself in relation to another”. Ted Hopf, “Making Identity Count: 
Constructivism, Identity, and IR Theory,” in Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database, ed. Ted 
Hopf and Bentley Allen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5. National or state identities are mutually 
constitutive to domestic and international norms as well as state interests. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms 
and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
Alexander Wendt argues for international pressure as identity formative, whereas other like Thomas Berger see 
the roots for state identity in domestic culture. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in 
Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 




Make of it 65  in 1992, security communities received a revival, theoretical framework and 
vocabulary. In the following, the framework by Adler and Barnett will be highlighted, directly 
followed with newer developments in the field as well as differences, critique and spin-offs 
relevant for modern use of the framework.  
Their first addition to the complex Deutsch et al. introduced in the 50’s is an 
operationalization of the process of security community building the earlier text had identified. 
They divide this process into three distinct phases: nascent, ascendant, and mature, and further 
distinguish mature security communities into loosely and tightly coupled ones. The nascent phase 
exhibits an increase in coordination of the relationship of two or more states. Primary motivation 
is not the creation of a security community, but rather the maneuvering of smaller milestones, like 
increasing mutual security or reaction to a mutual security threat, encouraging exchange (economic 
or otherwise). This initial phase can then set the states on a path-dependent way towards steadily 
growing mutual trust and the construction of a mature security community. Cooperation and 
interaction are aided by the existence or simultaneous development of institutions that encompass 
norms and foster accountability, reciprocity, the identification of shared interests or identities and 
that manifest or realize the growing cooperation. Adler and Barnett, like Deutsch et al. argue that 
there are core states functioning as leaders or magnets that unify and guide towards a shared vision 
of the future.66 
The ascendant phase then showcases a tighter network of institutions, increased 
cooperation and trust, especially in the field of military cooperation or a through a decreased level 
 
65 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858. 
66 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in Security 
Communities, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50-53.  
23 
 
of fear vis-à-vis each other and most importantly “the emergence of collective identities that begin 
to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change”. 67  Trust in terms of security is 
operationalized through the observance of interdependent military decision making, sharing of 
intelligence information and other areas. The degree of common identities shared by member states 
at this phase can be observed in narratives68 led within and in-between the states in question. 
National security of ascendant security communities’ member states will have observably changed 
in its form once states enter this phase, as does the definition of threat, which is at this point not 
thought to be emanating from the other member states anymore, as well as the expectations of use 
of violence to settle disputes. Between member states, violence and forms of military action are 
no longer seen as the ideal problem solver, instead other means are increasingly sought. 
When the final phase, the mature phase, is reached, member states “share an identity and, 
therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now 
comes into existence”69. The loosely coupled variant Adler and Barnett distinguish is characterized 
by positive identification with other member states and a shared way of life, collective identity and 
shared meanings, the expectation of self-restraint, trust manifested in multilateralism, unfortified 
borders between member states, changes in military planning, common understanding of the threat 
and lastly identifiable discourse and language of community. 70  In contrast, tightly coupled 
security communities “mutual-aid becomes a matter of habit and, thus, national identity is 
expressed through the merging of efforts.”71 In addition to the above list of characteristics, tightly 
 
67 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 53.  
68Works of narratives and narrative analysis include: William Sewell, “Introduction: Narratives and Social 
Identities,” Social Science History 16, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 479-488. Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of 
Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 1-21. 
69 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 55. 
70 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 55-56. 
71 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 56. 
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coupled mature security communities feature cooperative and collective security and a high level 
of military integration, policy coordination against internal threats, free movement of populations, 
internationalization of authority and a multi-perspectival polity, meaning shared rule at national, 
trans- and supranational level.72 
With the exclusion of amalgamated security communities from their framework, Adler 
and Barnett refocus the debate to the constructivist research agenda and away from what has in the 
few historic instances where it has happened amounted to state-building.73 Constructivism, in 
contrast to previous schools of thought in international relations, works with the understanding of 
interstate relations and reality as socially constructed and acquired through mutual constitution. 
The seminal assumption enabling the school of thought of constructivism is that anarchy of the 
international system is what states make of it. This outlook explains and enables the possibility of 
community and lasting change and peace in the international system. Where realism and liberalism 
approach international relations from a material and rationalist angle74, the English School and, 
later, constructivism follow an ideational approach, and with the theoretical complex of security 
 
72 Adler and Barnett utilize John Ruggie’s coining of the term in: John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 139-174, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706885. 
73 Deutsch et al. consistently give the United States as the best example of an amalgamated security community. 
But, given the fact that amalgamation has erased the individual American states as state actors on the 
international relations stage, successful amalgamation must be seen as the process of unification towards a single, 
new state. 
74 For a discussion of neorealist and neoliberal approaches to security studies in contrast to constructivist 
approaches see: Peter J. Katzenstein, “Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz01.html. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. 
Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and 




communities the possibility of change in the international system and a new paradigm in 
international relations theory is created.75 
Security communities are conceptually arranged around three pillars, which have been 
alluded to in the previous subchapters. They are trust, (shared) identity and leadership, all of which 
lead to community. A deeper focus on the debates surrounding these pillars, as well as their 
interplay features in the next section. 
2.5. Pillars of security community: identity and its interplay with trust and leadership 
Through the process of evolution towards the third phase of security communities, the 
mature phase, preconditions and elements identified in the previous chapter can be boiled down to 
distinct complexes. These complexes or pillars make up the fabric of the security community and 
without them and their interplay a security community could not have matured. They are the 
previously discussed trust between different states, compatible state identities and a collective, 
shared identity derived from both, and finally leadership of a core state or states that actively 
pursue integration and serve as magnets attracting other nations to the community. In the 
surrounding literature on security communities, these elements are discussed, redefined, and 
critiqued. Visiting these critiques helps illuminate the pillars. 
As shown above, both Deutsch et al.’s and Adler and Barnett’s thought on security 
communities feature collective identity as a necessary element in the development of said 
communities. Collective identity, as derived from research in psychology and social science, is 
 
75 Arend Lijphart, “Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations,” in From National 
Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch, ed. Richard L. Meritt and Bruce M. Russett 
(London: Allen and Unwinn, 1981). Adler and Barnett also write: “The Deutschian challenge and promise is to 
conceptualize international politics as holding out the possibility of international community and to consider how it 
might imprint international society”, pointing to the paradigm-challenging nature of the Deutschian discovery. 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security communities in theoretical perspective”, in Security Communities, 
Cambridge Studies in International Relations 62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 13.  
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defined in constructivist works as the “positive identification with the welfare of another, such that 
the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent”.76 This positive 
identification does not preclude the possibility of conflict or discord between the concerned states, 
as collective identity formation is not to be equated with the simultaneous loss of interests of nation 
states.77 Of course, as interests are understood to be dependent on endogenous factors as opposed 
to the realist assumption on exogenous, system-dependent sources for interests78 and, therefore, 
state identity, changes in state identity following the emergence of a collective identity must be 
thought of as affecting the interests of the state. Identity is a social construct created and maintained 
through intersubjective interactions, both within the actor itself and between endogenous and 
exogenous influences. This refers not only to single individuals and their self-identification, but 
also to any form of collective identity. A state identity as constituted by the population of said state 
is a form of collective identity, even if from an International Relations point of view, the state is 
often considered as the smallest and only relevant unit of relevance.79 Additionally, it is relevant 
for the study of security communities to investigate the scope of the shared identity. This is tied to 
the degree of integration of a mature security community, with more loosely coupled ones having 
overlap in their security identities, which refers to the dominant understanding within either a state 
or a group of states of security and the narratives and acts surrounding and following from that 
understanding80, and tightly coupled security identities sharing broader understandings, possibly 
surpassing their respective security identities. Rieker for example posits that NATO is exemplary 
 
76 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 
88, no. 2 (June 1994): 4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711. 
77 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 31-32. 
78 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 31. 
79 For an in-depth discussion of the term identity see: Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology 
of International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 69 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).  
80 Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU and the changing security identities of the 
Nordic states (London and New York: Routledge, 2006): 9.  
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of a loosely coupled security community, bound by a degree of shared security identity, the EU 
however is a tightly coupled security community, with significantly more shared identities,81 
though others like Adler and Barnett do place NATO further down on the spectrum towards a 
tightly coupled security community. Following her causal chain, security identities of different 
states inform security interests, which inform security policies or other tangible acts perceivable 
by other states, these in turn directly influence the environmental structure of the security 
community.82 This causal chain is of course applicable to the development of shared policies in a 
security community, stemming from shared collective security identities, as well. 
When thinking of collective identities spanning all member states, the literature implies 
sameness of this identity across all member states of the community. Through sharing a self-
identification as a group member contingent on sharing collective values and understandings, this 
implication is strengthened, yet Adler and Barnett also point to dependence on “actor’s interaction 
with and relationship to others […] and place within an institutional context”83. Coupled with the 
expectation of core states to perform more actively, it must be assumed that despite member states 
understanding themselves as members there still exists a hierarchy or at least diversified identities 
of different states within the security community. A core state not only functions as a core but is 
also understood and identified by the others and itself as a core state. This is a complex the 
literature leaves yet unexplored. Now, if there can be assumed to be different variants of identity 
derived from the collective one, this means that in case of change of membership or values or 
identity of a member and especially a core state other states have to ameliorate the internal shock 
produced by this change. Applied to the research question at hand, it has been shown in the thesis 
 
81 Pernille Rieker, “Security, integration and identity change,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working 
Paper 611 (December 2000): 16, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27346/611.pdf. 
82 Rieker, “Security, integration and identity change”, 21. 
83 Adler and Barnett, “A framework for the study of security communities,” 47. 
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introduction  that the United States as the historic core state of the transatlantic security community 
has voiced an interest in other member states taking over stronger leadership and commitment and 
therefore assimilating their identity more closely to the one currently held by the US as core state. 
This thesis illuminates the individual variations of the member states in their understanding of 
themselves and each other as members of the transatlantic security community and investigates 
potential inhibitors to the emergence of a new and accepted core state of the security community.  
To several researchers, including the authors of the pieces disseminated above, part of the 
values forming state identities must be a liberal or democratic understanding of self84. This is 
criticized by Amitav Acharya, Alexander Bellamy and others who argue that the necessary 
similarity in identity of states can also exist in non-democratic states and outside of the classical 
example of the European or transatlantic realm. To them, community is not dependent on the 
existence of democracy, but on the general likeness of domestic values.85 Similarly, because the 
most prominent and widely known security communities are regional and geographically 
connected, a good example is the security community located in Western and Central Europe or 
that of the USA and Canada, this geographical closeness is often assumed to be constitutive of 
security communities. However, following the argument of Benedict Anderson and Ernst Haas 
 
84 Other than Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett, Thomas Risse-Kappen is another example of the democratic-
value-camp in security community research. See: Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic 
Community: the Case of NATO,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter 
J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 292-326, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz10.html. 
85 See: Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional 
Order 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and their Neighbours 
[sic!]: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators (Houndsmill and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Michael 
Barnett and Gregory Gause III, “Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State and the development of a 
community in the Gulf Cooperation Council,” in Security Communities, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 161-197. Simon 
Koschut, “Regional Order and Peaceful Change: Security Communities as a Via Media in International Relations 
Theory,” Cooperation and Conflict 49, no. 4 (2014): 519-535. 
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among others 86 , national identity, which was above defined as a main enabling factor in 
community development, is socially constructed and community can be imagined even between 
individual actors unknown to each other and not direct neighbors, security communities, too, can 
be cross-regional and geographically non-contingent. Examples could be not only be the 
transatlantic security community, which is divided by the Atlantic Ocean, but also the case of 
Australia and New Zealand being thought of as part of the Western security community of 
democratic states. A different example could be the case of Israel and the United States. 
Pointing back to trust, if trust is thought as a process of social learning as Adler and 
Barnett formulate it, the cumulative experience of a core state as a leader, norm entrepreneur or, 
to more concretely link the theory to the thesis at hand, as the main supplier of deterrence, defense 
and therefore security, it can be assumed that this position of leadership informs the identity and 
image of the leader state as well as the expectations and trust into said leadership of the other 
member states. Referring back to the scientific consensus on trust promoted by Hoffmann 
illuminated above, to the degree that trust is related to both the interests of trustor and trustee and 
the fact that despite a certain amount of common interests each security community member state 
continues to harbor individual interests related to differing national capabilities and identities, trust 
and expectations following from this trust cannot be equal towards all member states of the same 
security community. Therefore, loss of trust also has different effects on the security community 
depending on the position of the related member state.  
To recapitulate the above and form a more concise mental image it can be said that 
security communities are socially constructed and develop over three phases in which states 
 
86 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and 
New York: Verso, 1991). Ernst B. Haas, “Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 22, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 505-545, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298930220030201. 
30 
 
develop mutual trust without hedging, share security identities, which are mutually constitutive 
with trust and malleable to endogenous as well es exogenous influence and have distinct core states, 
which lead, maintain and draw in other states as part of the security community. Identities inform 
interests, norms and values, which in turn lead to policy decisions. Collectively, these communities 
are integrated to a certain degree in terms of security and defense planning as well as policy 
coordination. The identities of member states do neither necessarily overlap completely with the 
other members, nor are they restricted to liberal or democratic identities. Identities and therefore 
state interests, too, do not get completely absorbed by the growing shared identity, but cannot only 
coexist with the collective identity as a related but distinct formation, but even within the collective 
identity there can be hierarchical and accepted different variants of the shared identity. This is best 
exemplified by core states and their security identity vis-à-vis other member states without a 
leading role. Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and the following researchers concerned with 
security communities developed a comprehensive framework that helps understand prolonged 
cooperation, especially without exogenous threat. What has been missing from their view and the 
research conducted by them, quite curiously, is the opposite of emergence: disintegration. The next 
subchapter illuminates first theoretical approaches to disintegration and contrasts them with the 
perceived problem at hand and how that relates to the research question of this thesis. 
2.6. Maintenance or disintegration: whither without trust or leadership? 
Scholars such as Dytrich noticed the insufficiency of the prevalent research agenda in 
security communities concerning the potential demise of them. 87  Others such as Müller and 
Koschut have ventured into theorizing and proposed two different models of disintegration or 
decay. Both were written before the Trump presidency was even thought possible and therefore 
 




do not investigate internal shocks to a security community or the possibility of maintenance 
through other members. With the current President being historically exceptional in his “open 
hostil[ity] to its [the transatlantic security community’s] core institutions”88, however, a look at 
the potential for maintenance of security communities once a core state loses the trust of its fellow 
member states or loses the interest in the leadership position is necessary. This chapter, first, 
highlights the existent approaches to disintegration. As a second focus, this chapter contrasts these 
assumptions with the situation at hand and then illuminates how the rest of the thesis attempts to 
approach the investigation of the potential of emergence of new core states. 
With the renewed interest in security communities and the relative scarcity of security 
communities in existence as compared to the number of nation states, it should be no surprise that 
scholars focus more closely on the emergence of security communities than on the maintenance or 
disintegration of them. Deutsch et al. point to some historic examples of disintegrative reasons, 
without drawing theoretical implications from them. 89  Adler and Barnett, too, mention the 
possibility of disintegration, and link it to the mutable nature of values and identity, stressing their 
point that identities are the glue that hold a security community together. The further mention that 
“The same forces that ‘build up’ security communities can ‘tear them down.’”90 This rather vague 
description appears to apply to both endogenous as well as exogenous influences on the security 
community in question. Yet, here as in Deutsch et al., the processes of disintegration are not 
explored on a theory-building level. Since identity is adaptable or better yet constantly in need for 
reconstitution, collective identity has the option to devolve, therefore neglecting the possibilities 
 
88 Susan Glaser, “How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe: The German Chancellor and other 
European leaders have run out of patience with the President,” New Yorker, December 17, 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-
europe/amp?__twitter_impression=true.  
89 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 59. 
90 Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, 58. 
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for disintegration in the larger part of the literature appears puzzling. This lack of research has 
driven new scholarship by Harald Müller and Simon Koschut, who are investigating how external 
shocks to security communities as well as internal normative change impact the coherence of 
security communities.91 Müller proposes a three stage model of decay flowing from system and 
state-level challenges to common values or perceptions, over diminished responsiveness to the 
tipping point of a disappearing collective identity.92 Koschut’s approach is similarly procedural, 
writing that “the path of security community disintegration is similar to its foundation but under 
opposing signs: external change sets off social and internal change that leads to the degeneration 
of community norms”93 Focusing on normative change of the common norms of the member states, 
and differentiating roles for norm leaders upholding the status quo and norm challengers, this piece 
as well as Müller’s propose a useful entry into the understanding of disintegrative processes. Both 
test their models on historic cases before applying it to NATO, which they use interchangeably 
with the transatlantic security community, as well as the European security community. While 
both ultimately argue that the transatlantic alliance, despite norm challenges and external shocks 
like the fall of the Soviet Union or the Iraq war, is still a functioning security community at the 
points of publication of the pieces, recent developments cast a shadow over that assumption. The 
drastic changes in intracommunity trust towards the core state alone warrant another look at the 
potential disintegration of the transatlantic security community. As has been pointed to in the 
introduction of this thesis, the United States as the security guarantor or in the language of security 
communities the core of strength of the community has increasing doubts and calls for changed 
 
91 Harald Müller, “A Theory of Decay of Security Communities with an Application to the Present State of the 
Atlantic Alliance,” Working Paper (Berkeley: University of California, 4 April 2006), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/95n4b4sp. Simon Koschut, Normative Change and Security Community 
Disintegration: Undoing Peace (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).  
92 Müller, “A Theory of Decay,” 9-11. 
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behavior of European partners. The above models do point to the increased power of norm leaders 
in form of core states concerning norm promotion and sanctioning of norm breakers94 but they do 
not explicitly handle the case of the internal shock of the core state abrogating from its position of 
leadership and trust and the need for the emergence of new core states. Müller in fact assumes the 
core states would attempt to maintain or strengthen the community. He does not account for a loss 
of leadership. Furthermore, the utilization of norms as the main variable changing obscures the 
fact that the individual states do not necessarily share the exact norm and interest set, as well as 
have individual identities that are overlapping but not fully amalgamated with the collective 
identity. This is especially true in the case of the transatlantic security community, where the 
United States have played a role larger than life and other member states have not been on equal 
footing, neither in terms of material dimensions, nor in the ideational realm. One example could 
be that of burden-sharing. As a norm in NATO, all members adhere to it, but not in equal ways. 
Germany is a nuclear host, as are other non-nuclear member states of the alliance, with the US as 
the donor of nuclear weapons and therefore extended deterrence. The assumption that all member 
states adhere to all norms in equal or common ways is misleading. When a core state and its 
magnetic effect disappear or retreat to an extent, upholding of the status quo by other members 
might not salvage the community. Instead, these states would have to themselves become a new 
core of strength. Another element these two models do not explore deeply is that of identity despite 
its centrality to the theory of security communities. Koschut criticizes the wideness of Müller’s 
working paper and intentionally narrows his approach down to nothing but norms.95 He, however, 
leaves room for other additional and interactive explanations for disintegration. Müller’s macro 
approach identifies values, identity, responsiveness, and trust as the main pillars of security 
 
94 See core states subchapter in: Koschut, Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration, 52-54. 
95 Koschut, Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration, 9-10. 
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communities. This thesis however argues that values are a part and derivative of identity. 
Responsiveness, as a way of interacting with other states could be seen as a function of identity 
and interest, therefore, this work does not elevate responsiveness as its own distinct pillar. Security 
communities as proposed by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and others are deeply dependent 
on the existence of mutual trust, core states in leadership positions and shared identity. Change in 
these three pillars, therefore, should hold a place in models of disintegration or decay of security 
communities. Both models do focus in their analyses on the actions of the relevant core states and 
assert an automatic, cascading disintegration process, without regard for the actions and potentials 
of non-core states, or the potential variants in security identity due to different roles in the 
community.  
As the narrative of brain death in NATO and American loss of reliability and trust 
advances the need for changed identities and interests of European member states, utilizing a 
security communities approach to the thesis at hand allows to capture not only the element of 
identity but also that of trust in the analysis of the transatlantic community of states. Coupled with 
disintegrative tendencies identified in the two models above, the possibility of quick and 
coordinated identity change and the potential of emergence of new core states in security 
communities can be investigated. This emergence is dependent on state identities available or 
evolving to a point where the collective identity threatened by the loss of trust into the leading 
state of the security community can be upheld. While Deutsch et al. as well as Adler and Barnett 
have written about likeness of values and norms, I argue that for a security community specifically 
the identity concerning security is of importance96. While security communities are expecting 
 
96 Security identity is the term used for the dominant understanding of security by the politically relevant portion 
of a state. See: Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU and the Changing Security 
Identities of the Nordic States (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 9. 
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internal peaceful change, they do not expect peaceful cooperation with states outside their 
community. In case of the transatlantic security community, the United States have served as 
security guarantor for the entire community and as such have fulfilled the leadership role and 
adopted a self- and outside image of the leader in this particular community. The vulnerability of 
non-leader states such as Germany, France and the U.K. to external threats is directly dependent 
on the continuation of the status quo. Undesirable as this status quo is to the leading state under 
President Trump, identity and interest change of these three states is necessary to uphold the status 
quo. The breakdown of trust to this specific member state as well as its apparent defection from 
the position of leadership, but not yet the overall community, means one pillar of the security 
community is shaky. Now, as identities are able to change and adapt, it must be possible for other 
states to take over the position of leadership. If, however, it is assumed that security communities 
are more diversified, in their identities as part of a security community or in their trust towards 
other members of the community, the emergence of a new leader state could be severely inhibited.  
As this pertains directly to security, the security identity and the security interests and 
their compatibility need to be compared and contrasted. For this thesis and pointing back to 
research question, the nations of France, Germany and Great Britain, through their material, 
geographical as well as ideational position within the transatlantic as well as Western European 
security community could be contenders for a successful new core of strength. Looking back at 
the growing pressure from the U.S. side, the question what has hindered these states so far to 
become leaders and more integrated becomes pressing.  
For the understanding of security identities and in relation to the above, the narratives and 
discourse concerning security in any nations need to be understood. In order to operationalize the 
security identities for this thesis, three different investigations will take place. First, the prevalent 
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domestic understanding of defense, their security narratives, must be illuminated. White books and 
defense doctrines of the three focus nations show the similarities and differences in the security 
identities of the decision-making strata. Second, the willingness to lead, as well as the potential for 
acceptance of other’s leadership of all three nations is examined. Thirdly, as is implied in the 
understanding of collective identities, a concerted effort of member actors produces it. As national 
identities are, too, a collective identity of the population of the state, for an understanding of the 
security identities of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom their domestic and public 
understanding of security must be highlighted 97 . These three complexes security identity, 
leadership and domestic (non-elite) identity together can highlight what has barred France, 
Germany, and the U.K. from further integration so far, and whether the leadership pillar can be 
salvaged or propped up.  
  
 
97 The importance of domestic values for collective identity and collective security is elaborated in: Andrej 
Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” International Political Science Review 




OPERATIONALIZATION: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
3.1. Introduction 
Following the conceptualization part, this part of the thesis approaches the 
operationalization of the research question through the setting of parameters and their exploration 
in three case studies. This part is split into three distinct elements.  
First, the conceptual thinking of the previous part is condensed into necessary variables 
for continued security community cooperation, and then the state of the object of interest, the 
transatlantic security community, is illuminated. For this, this first chapter of part II looks at the 
extent of the community and the necessary variables for community cooperation in the example of 
the first leader of the community, the U.S. In light of the potential dynamic of decay, this chapter 
will close with an investigation into and a choice of focus nations for the following case studies, 
explaining why Germany, France and the U.K. were chosen and how the parameters explained 
before will be applied to the individual case study nations.  
Second, the focus nations are studies in three case studies, each one illuminating either 
the understanding of defense, leadership behavior or public opinion. Grouping the focus nations 
together for each of these topics simplifies their contrasting for the later analysis.  
Third, this operationalization part comprises the analytical chapter, which compares and 
contrasts the findings of the case studies. This points to the centrality of trust in intercommunal 
cooperation and the lack of it currently existing between the focus nations being a major 
impediment to cooperation and integration in European defense initiatives.  
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With the analysis concluding the inquiry related to the research question central to this 
thesis, a short conclusion chapter summarizing the conduct and results of the research presented 
here will follow the end of part II on operationalization and the thesis. 
3.2. Case choice and operationalization 
3.2.1. Parameters for operationalization 
Before the choice for focus nations is explained further down, the theoretical dimensions 
of security communities need to be translated into a view of a practical example. The ideal mature, 
pluralistic security community as theorized by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and later 
researchers is a construct from upon which the transatlantic security community needs to be 
superimposed to understand its imperfections and be able to analyze its dynamics in light of the 
theories of decay proposed above. For both the superimposition as well as the later focused analysis 
of three nations able to step up to a leadership position, the parameters and variables to be 
highlighted are in need of explaining. 
Recapitulating the ideal or stereotypical security community in the mature phase, the 
basic tenets are the loss of war as a reasonable means of conflict management between community 
members and a common identity and sense of community materialized in a degree of integration.98 
Additionally, there is a leader state or group of states around which the community manifests and 
the member states harbor trust in each other and rely on the others to not act in detriment to their 
interests, especially pertaining to issues of security. Regarding said leading state, as an agenda 
setter the leading state introduces a vision to the shared community. Following the premise of not 
acting in the disinterest of member states, a leading state necessarily has to consider foreign 
security interests and make them its own. A leader within a security community can therefore be 
 
98 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5. 
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said to have to give up some of its foreign and security policy decision- and agenda-making power 
and instead be cognizant of foreign interests. Protecting these, when a member state cannot, means 
leading states need to provide a public good, that of security, for the whole community and 
shoulder a larger part of the burden. Vulnerability of the leading and more powerful state for the 
sake of the community is a central tenet of security communities. In an ideal mature security 
community, trust exists between each and every single member state to a high degree and the 
shared security identity, too, is all encompassing. This would mean that a leading state is also 
somewhat interchangeable, given that the follow-up states have been integrated into the 
community. As the magnetic nature of the leading state that has been described in the literature 
implies that over time more states could join, it can be assumed that newer states procedurally 
take-over the collective identity and therefore are not necessarily sharing the same scope of the 
identity as older members.99 The security identity shared between all states would ensure that not 
only would the norms and interests in regard to the scope of the security community be the same, 
the understanding of the different states of what the community is as opposed to any outside other 
as well as the goals and needs of the community as implied in the shared identity would be known 
and inherent to all member states. As manifestations of shared identity, norms and interests, mature 
security communities also share institutions. These materialize and enshrine the norms and 
agreements of the community. Member states equally participate in them, sharing responsibilities 
and burdens connected to these institutions as well as equally profiting from their existence. A 
mature security community does not function transactionally. The trust existent between member 
 
99 The idea of security community building through slow assimilation of identity is developed with the example of 
the OSCE in mind. See: Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model” 
in Security Communities, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119-160.  
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states means nations are not in a zero-sum game or quid pro quo cooperative situation, but rather 
in a form of limited100 partnership without expected immediate or action-based returns.  
Concluding from the above, the variables to be looked at are the individual security 
identities of the member states in question and their overlap, signifying commonality and shared 
identity, mutual trust, displayed in the willingness or readiness of states to be influenced by foreign 
interests in security potentially making them vulnerable, and the existence or emergence of a group 
of leading states, setting a vision and agenda for the community, taking over responsibility and 
willing to provide the public good of security without an expectation of transactional returns of 
the same or similar value. Conversely, one could assume that a lack in any of these elements could 
severely hinder the further development or even the status quo of a security community.  
3.2.2. The transatlantic security community - dimensions 
In order to be able to make educated decisions on the choice of focus nations and display 
the urgency of the research question, the transatlantic security community, its dynamics and its 
imperfections when compared to the ideal type of a mature, pluralistic security community need 
to be illuminated. Beginning with Deutsch et al. the emergence of a pluralistic security community 
was equated with the geographic area of the North Atlantic,101 an area largely congruent with the 
extent of NATO at the time. Other institutions and organizations sharing a similar space as well as 
the foundational goal102 of diminished intracommunal international conflict were the Council of 
 
100 Limited in terms pertaining to the scope of the security community. As total amalgamation is not present in 
even tightly coupled mature security communities the member states retain sovereign governments and are 
coupled solely in terms of security expectations between each other and as a group vis-à-vis the outside world. 
101 They define the community in question as consisting of: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. They purposefully do not equate the community with NATO 
membership alone to be able to include nations like Sweden and others, which are geographically linked and 
would therefore likely be included in identity building and sharing. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 9-10. 




Europe, the European Economic Community of 1957 or the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Now, with subsequent enlargements of both NATO and the European Union, the spatial 
dimensions of the transatlantic security community span from North America to Eastern Europe, 
and if one includes the OSCE reach as an instrument of identity building well into Asia103. As the 
formal security organization of the area, the extent of NATO provides a good first understanding 
of the current dimensions of the transatlantic security community. As entry into the European 
Union can be seen as “tantamount to backdoor access to NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee”104, 
the EU too must be seen as a central part of the transatlantic security community. Additionally to 
the slow growth towards the East, there have been attempts to integrate Ukraine, Georgia and even 
Russia into the security community. 105 While it can be tempting to equivalate the transatlantic 
security community with the broad term the West, states like Australia or New Zealand who are 
both part of the global Anglosphere and the West cannot be defined as part of the transatlantic 
security community. War between these two and any Atlantic riparian state can be seen as unlikely, 
the sense of community that is expressed in institutional membership like NATO, however, is 
considered missing still106.  
 
103 Member states like Russia, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan are firmly situated in Central Asia or even the Far East. 
104 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001): 26. 
105 The example of the OSCE as an active contributor to widening the community has been mentioned. Other 
attempts include the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative: Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security 
Community (Moscow, Brussels and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2012), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/EASI_FinalReport.pdf. Matthew Rojansky, “A Euro-Atlantic Security 
Community for the 21st Century,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 06, 2011, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/06/euro-atlantic-security-community-for-21st-century-pub-44949. 
106 Instead, researchers like Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal study the potential Australian ascension to 
membership in an Asian or South-East Asian security community. See: Richard Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, 
“Australia and the search for a security community,” in Security Communities, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations 62, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 265-294.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, it is not imperative to clearly delineate the borders of the 
transatlantic security community. It is imperative, however, to identify the core of the community 
and its security identity in order to make judgements about the state of the community in general. 
It should be safe to assume that members of NATO, bound by a security guarantee, are part of the 
security community. Additionally, EU membership, through large congruence with NATO and the 
EU security cooperation and backdoor to NATO security, must also be considered as a signifier 
for the extent of the transatlantic security community. For the thesis at hand the major actors within 
the transatlantic security community are of relevance, and due to the nature of identity and its 
evolution, longer-term community membership as well as prominence within the community are 
to be expected with states that fall into the category of NATO and/or EU member state. 
3.2.2.1. Leadership, responsibility, and imperfections – the U.S. case and community conflict 
President Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and, turning towards the U.S. 
Senate for ratification, declared his conviction “that the North Atlantic treaty is a great advance 
toward fulfillment of the unconquerable will of the people of the United States to achieve a just 
and enduring peace”107 and that the power of the United States has imbued it with a responsibility 
for the freedom of people around the world. The following year, the American vision of extending 
peace and freedom to partner nations in NATO was further enshrined in the definition of a 
democratic, free Europe as a vital U.S. interest in National Security Council policy paper 68108. Of 
course, the urgency of the agenda setting was tied to the American understanding of the Soviet 
 
107 Harry S. Truman, Speech Asking the Senate to Ratify the North Atlantic Treaty, April 12, 1949, Teaching 
American History Online Library, accessed September 28, 2020, 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-asking-the-senate-to-ratify-the-north-atlantic-
treaty/. 




Union and its threat to the West.109 The U.S. continued to project this vision for Europe and the 
transatlantic security community, as a free, liberal-democratic and peaceful sphere throughout the 
Cold War and in the early Post-Cold War period, both in Republican and Democratic 
administrations.110  
This vision or agenda extended over the entirety of Europe and, importantly, was not tied 
to direct transactional reciprocal action on the side of the European partners. Another element 
necessary for leadership within a mature security community is the acceptance of responsibility 
for the public good of security, and in connection to that a degree of vulnerability through sharing 
risks of members and accepting infringement upon one’s own sovereign decision-making through 
valuing foreign interests. In this area, too, the U.S. has fulfilled the criteria set out above. The most 
prominent example for risk-sharing on behalf of member states and producing a common good is 
certainly the extended nuclear deterrence, coupled with American troop presence on European soil. 
Not only is the U.S. basing nuclear weapons as deterrents on European soil, in bases in Central 
and Southern Europe, but also giving European states limited access to them in an arrangement 
known as nuclear sharing. Nuclear sharing evolved out of the concern of European partners over 
American nuclear strategy and their vulnerability to it without potential influence. The U.S. 
ameliorated this concern through the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group in NATO, and 
models of risk and burden sharing with host nation militaries.111 The Nuclear Posture Reviews of 
the U.S. are heavily influenced by allied sensibilities112, which shows the U.S. concern for the 
 
109 U.S. Department of State National Intelligence Estimate 15, “Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present 
Situation” 11 December 1950. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 1. U.S. Government Printing Office: 
Washington DC (1979): 4-7. Par. 8-9. 
110 Mike Winnerstig, A World Reformed? The United States and European Security from Reagan to Clinton, 
Stockholm Studies in Politics 75 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2000), 252. 
111 Helga Haftendorn, Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO-Krise von 1966/67 (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994), 166, 174. 
112 The latest one with a known influence by NATO perceptions and interests is the Obama administration one. 
Steven Pifer, Richard Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, “U.S. 
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wider interests for the security community underneath its nuclear umbrella. At the same time, 
through the nuclear security guarantee and attached policy and doctrine, Washington was 
communicating that it was willing to risk its own security in a nuclear war. Trading New York for 
Berlin, an allied but foreign city and strategic target of the Cold War adversary, shows U.S. 
accepted vulnerability as a leading state within the transatlantic security community. For the sake 
of the partners and without said partners being able to reciprocate through a similar capability, 
only two other nations in Europe have nuclear weapons, the U.S. has exhibited the leadership 
properties expected within the theoretical framework.  
This previous level of leadership, and the trust it has built over time, has been waning. 
American troops on European soil are continuously being reduced, lately as a direct response to 
perceived allied misbehaviour113. The U.S. has shifted its strategic view to Asia with a so-called 
pivot, moving away from the previous U.S. foreign policy agenda of bringing and guaranteeing 
freedom and democracy to Europe. In other areas like trade, energy and climate change, the U.S. 
and European partners are seeing eye to eye less and less, further eroding the trust between both 
shores of the Atlantic Ocean. 
Following the assumptions of the ideal security community, within mature pluralistic 
ones all members equally share common values, interests and identity. This ideal would mean, any 
member could ascend to the leadership position, as the nations share enough similarities. American 
retrenchment should therefore not play the fracturing or deteriorating role for the community as it 
appears to do. It can therefore be assumed that the transatlantic security community, which in 
academic debate is seen as one of if not the only mature pluralistic security community in existence, 
 
Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Brookings Arms Control Series 3, May 2010, 18, 
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internally veers away from the ideal set out in the theoretical chapter above. Exploring this degree 
of imperfection is necessary to better frame the case choice selection criteria later on. 
As proposed above, an ideal security community asserts equal participation and equal 
sharing of the collective identity, the transatlantic reality, however, is far from ideal. Some member 
states are flirting with open authoritarianism, like Turkey under Erdogan or Orban’s Hungary114. 
Populism in Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States has appeared on mainstream 
politics and a number of nations openly struggle with surging populist movements linked to 
nationalist or far-right extremist parties and views.115 Populism by way of its narrative nature pits 
an imagined homogenous community against an outsider group like certain elites, foreigners or 
others. This has a negative effect on institutional and international trust and cohesion.116 Not only 
does a shift towards populist or even authoritarian domestic politics strain international 
cooperation, such a shift also raises questions about the compatibility or sharedness of collective 
identity. While the literature debates whether security communities need to be democratic and 
liberal states in nature or not, a community between democratic and non-democratic or illiberal 
authoritarian states is questionable. While no state has yet left NATO, even if the current 
 
114 The ongoing global pandemic has recently been utilized to formalize authoritarian rule for Viktor Orban. Eszter 
Zalan, “Orban granted indefinite ‘authoritarian’ power,” EU Observer, March 31, 2020, 
https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147933. 
115 A statistical visualization of populist vote share surge between 2008 and 2018 can be found here: “Populist vote 
share in the national elections of selected European Union (EU) countries as of March 2018,” Statista, last modified 
February 24, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/883893/populism-in-europe/. Thomas Greven, “The Rise of 
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of populism see: Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for 
analysis,” in Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, ed. Cas Mudde and 
Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-26.  
116 Bart Konikowski, “Three Lessons of Contemporary Populism in Europe and the United States,” Brown Journal of 
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Papaioannou, Sergei Guriev and Evgenia Passari, “The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism,” Brookings 




administration has heavily criticized it as obsolete, populist movements in the United Kingdom 
have prompted the nation to leave the European Union. Other member states’ publics are also 
flirting with EU secession. This underscores an assumption that member states’ collective identity 
adherence is not as equal and pervasive as is presupposed in an ideal security community. 
Another example concerning diverging collective identity concerns nuclear deterrence. 
Mentioned above as the prime example for American leadership, within European member states, 
nuclear weapons are approached in a variety of ways despite their centrality to their security 
guarantee. Three transatlantic nations have developed and possess nuclear weapons, another five 
participate in direct nuclear sharing despite popular antinuclear sentiments.117 Only France does 
not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group. The majority of member states is not nuclear armed 
and there is a significant difference in popular and elite attitudes, ranging from aversion over 
pragmatic acceptance to “true believers”, 118 throughout Europe. Nonetheless, they benefit from 
the extended deterrence structure provided by these weapons. This example alone points to 
problems with the presumption of mutually shared collective identity. Also, this is only one 
element of the wider burden-sharing as well as risk-sharing point of contention in transatlantic as 
well as intracontinental European debate. Probably the most prominent and widely known element 
 
117 Nuclear member states are: The U.S., France and the U.K. States in a nuclear sharing arrangement are: 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey. It needs to be mentioned that the status of Turkey is 
debated. While Incirlik airbase is still officially counted as a base used for the stationing of nuclear weapons, there 
are reports of a covert removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey due to security concerns. Hans Kristensen and 
Matt Korda, “United States nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (April 2019): 131, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needAccess=true. 
118 See the research report: Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma and Nick Witney, “Eyes Tight Shut: European 
attitudes towards nuclear deterrence,” European Council on Foreign Relations New European Security Initiative 




is the strongly debated119 and often titled as “arbitrary”120 two percent of GDP spending guideline 
for member states of NATO. This was unanimously agreed upon as a formal goal at the 2014 
Wales summit by NATO members following decades121 of debate. Framed as an effort to reengage 
equitably in defense spending, make states more accountable within the community and illustrate 
their continued commitment to intra-community burden sharing122, the two percent were seen as a 
remedy for conflicts of interest. With only a minority of states meeting the pledge since its 
inception, and with otherwise equally unequal military spending or direct NATO funding levels123, 
it is quite clear that there is a discrepancy between the members states in terms of material 
commitment to collective defense. The question here is not whether there can be an equitable 
sharing of responsibilities within the security community and how that would look like, the 
question is whether this currently exists. Since it is a vital part of a contentious narrative, the debate 
on and the realities of burden sharing illuminate that there indeed is a level of inequality between 
the members of the transatlantic security community. Different defense initiatives and 
cooperations within the community, be it through NATO, EU or other frames, reveal a mosaic of 
 
119 Prominent critics of the pledge include Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. See: Anthony Cordesman, “NATO ‘Burden Sharing’: The Need for Strategy and Force Plans, Not 
Meaningless Percentage Goals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified August 16, 2018, 
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180816_NATO_Burden_Sharing_0.pdf.  
120 Claudia Major, “Time to Scrap NATO’s 2 Percent Pledge?” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 
April 28, 2015, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/59918.  
121 Fist tabled in the 1990’s and brought forth at various summits, the pledge was first enshrined in a summit 
communiqué in 2014. Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Myths Surrounding the Two Percent Debate – on NATO defence [sic!] 
spending,” Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik Security Policy Working Paper no. 9 (2019): 2, 
https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2019_9.pdf. 
122Contrasted with the “conceptual shortcomings“ inherent in its design, the 2% pledge is seen as a political tool as 
opposed to a practical tool for increased burden sharing within the alliance. Jan Techau, “The Politics of 2 Percent: 
NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 2015): 10, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf. 
123 For an overview of the funding structure and principles, as well as percentage distribution of direct funds of 
NATO of the ongoing year, please see: “Funding NATO,” Funding Policy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last 
updated May 05, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm. For a concise overview of 
defense expenditure of member states see especially pages two and three of: “Defence [sic!] Expenditure of NATO 




security institutions. The Permanent and Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) is short two EU 
members (Denmark and Malta) and there is mixed project adherence within. The European 
Intervention Initiative, a recent foray by French President Emanuel Macron into a different form 
of coordinated security cooperation, has eleven member states, 124  most notably the United 
Kingdom despite its exit from the European Union. Bilateral agreements like the treaty of Aachen 
add another layer of stratified, unequal distribution of security cooperation in the transatlantic 
realm. While these on the one hand can be understood as a large interwoven construct that through 
its cross connections strengthens the security community, another reading is that of collective 
identity not deeply interconnected and thorough enough to satisfy the member states’ needs. While 
the theoretical assumptions laid out by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett allow for a leader state 
and a group of non-leaders, the fracturing of defense cooperation into smaller piecemeal elements 
point to imperfect distribution of roles and responsibilities between the members of the 
transatlantic security community.  
These more material representations of the collective identity can be rounded off with a 
look at the distribution of shared norms within the security community. An ideal security 
community would equally share collective norms that are informed by the collective identity. 
Central norms relevant to the working of mature security communities in general have been known 
to be eroding or have been on shaky grounds since the inception of the transatlantic security 
community. The consultation norm necessary for any coordinated and understanding communal 
action has been followed as well as ignored throughout transatlantic history. The United Kingdom 
has been its foremost user, with nations like France and Germany abstaining from communication 
and in effect influence on the security community leader depending on the issue area by choice 
 
124 These are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom. Sweden, Italy and Romania. 
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rather than community design125. The United States, too, has knowingly strayed from the norm, as 
early as the Suez crisis126 and as late as the 2020 decision to halve the size of troops stationed in 
Germany without consulting the host nation or the greater community dependent on the security 
provided by the forward deployment of American troops. Another norm visibly under duress is 
the norm of multilateralism. Tied closely to the need for consultation, in post-Cold War times the 
United States has increasingly turned to unilateral decision making with regard to security policy. 
Prominent examples are the Iraq War in 2003 or the 2018 withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action followed by unilateral pressure and threats against Iran among 
other unilateral foreign policy decisions with direct impact on community members security and 
interests.  
Taken together, it is undeniable that the transatlantic security community is an imperfect 
mature pluralistic security community at best, or an eroding one at worst. The ideal of collectively 
shared identity, values and norms, needs to be called into question, however. With the United 
States as the leading state and preeminent guarantor of security pivoting away from Europe and 
from the position of leadership within the community one has no choice but to wonder about the 
future of the transatlantic community as well as European security. European nations through their 
membership in the security community have become reliant on the American security guarantee 
and a possible U.S. withdrawal from the continent and its defense could have grave consequences. 
This growing leadership vacuum has not been addressed so far, and European integration and 
cooperation is struggling to take off.  
 
125 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995): 210-215. 
126 The Cuban missile crisis is also considered a prime example of missing consultation between the allies, but 
Risse-Kappen argues that the Kennedy administration knew the European positions and acted upon them during 
the initial phase of the crisis, ergo despite a lack consultation, the allies perspectives were not ignored and the U.S. 
stayed within the normative frame. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 207. 
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3.2.2.2. Focus nation choice 
In order to narrow down the list and make an educated guess of member states’ relevance 
vis-à-vis continued existence of the security community and with regard to European security 
cooperation, the following subchapter highlights measurable criteria for selection and selects three 
states as most relevant for new leadership structures. These are the focus nations which will be 
investigated in the thematic case studies later. 
A first group of nations to be excluded from consideration must be the newest members 
of the community. As was argued above, identity develops over time. Leaders, who need to 
represent and anchor the collective identity, need to have thoroughly accepted the collective 
identity and it can be argued that newly joined member states, especially those of previous Soviet 
Union membership, have had less time for assimilation and have started from a very different set 
of values and identity. Therefore, newly joint NATO members like North Macedonia, or the 
newest additions to the European Union are excluded from consideration.127 Furthermore, as the 
security structure on the European continent is still dependent on NATO, membership of this 
institution is considered vital for any leading state. The community itself certainly has spilled 
outside of strict NATO boundaries, but current policy and defense shaping power is in the hands 
of NATO members. All non-NATO have to be disregarded for that reason. 
Leadership under the United States has had a strong material component. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that this material element needs to be taken into account for new leadership 
candidates. In terms of population the largest members of the community are in descending order: 
the U.S., Turkey, Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Spain, Poland and Canada, with major jumps 
 
127 The latest formal additions to both organizations are: North Macedonia, Croatia and Albania. 
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in population between these nations as well as to the remainder of member states128. In terms of 
wealth, measured in Gross National Product, the U.S. and Canada lead, followed by Germany, 
France, the U.K., Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.129 As defense spending has been narratively 
tied to responsible stakeholdership within the community a look at a country’s wealth and defense 
budget, which can be indicative of its capability for security leadership through potential 
investments, is necessary, too. As the famed guidepost of the two percent defense spending pledge 
was only reached by four nations in 2018, namely the U.S., the U.K., Estonia and Greece, and is a 
problematic tool to measure readiness, leadership or commitment, a different approach is taken. 
The following graphic serves to illustrate the direct monetary involvement in the administration of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through a look at the latest direct budget proportion 
shouldered by individual members. It includes the adjusted percentage rates following the March 
2020 ascension of North Macedonia to NATO. It must be noted that for the coming time period of 
2021 to 2024, the U.S: commitment will shrink to roughly 16% following a decision by the Trump 
administration to match the second highest contributor.130 Germany and the United Kingdom will 
be taking over a greater share of the overall direct budget.131 While this budget is used for the 
general administration, rather than for financing NATO field missions, partaking in it could be 
seen as a measure first and foremost related to the consolidation and upkeep of the premier 
institution of the security community. Therefore, it can be assumed as a valid metric to gauge 
 
128 Population estimates follow: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: The Annual 
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: The International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 2019). Aggregated in Appendix I. 
129 GNP data follows: IISS Military Balance, 2019. See Appendix I. 
130 Ryan Browne, “Trump administration to cut its financial contribution to NATO,” CNN Politics, November 28, 
2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/27/politics/trump-nato-contribution-nato/index.html. 
131 Germany is projected to provide 16.3% of the budget, the U.K. 11.2%. See Appendix I. Data from: “NATO 
Common-Funded Budgets and Programmes Cost Share Arrangements: Valid from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 




information on security community member commitment and integration into the community. 
Figure 1 represents the percentage each NATO member state contributes to the NATO budget.  
 
  




Following the U.S., the states contributing most are Germany, France, the U.K. and then 
with gradually falling percentage points the other member states. If this figure is read as an 
 
132 The percentage values depicted in the figure have been rounded mathematically by graphics program in use. 
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indicator for interest, integration and commitment, one could assume that the top donors are 
contenders for the burden of leadership.  
Leading states are ultimately in need of policy shaping potentials and in a security 
community it is safe to assume that they must be able to take over portions of the security guarantor 
position. Therefore, a look at the members’ defense expenditure as an indicator of existing defense 
capabilities helps further consolidate the selection. Figure 2 serves as a visualization of this.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Defense expenditures totaling over 1 billion U.S. $ in the year 2018 by non-U.S. NATO members as reported 




As depicted above, and somewhat corresponding to the expectations built from looking 
at GNP and figure 1, the security community member states with the highest defense expenditures 
again aggregate around Western Europe. While the defense budget gives no indication on intended 
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or actual use of the funds, the existing budget of the United Kingdom, France and Germany stands 
in stark contrast to the next in line, Italy, and could mean greater wriggle room for these three 
nations vis-à-vis realization of defense and security policy. 
Following from the above and reviewing the indicator metrics set out, France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom have been singled out as contenders for closing a leadership vacuum the 
U.S. has been creating. These three nations serve as the case study focus nations for the remainder 
of the thesis at hand. 
3.2.2.3. Operationalization of parameters 
As was set out above, the transatlantic security community is suffering from an 
increasingly reluctant leader. Simultaneously there has not been a successful transfer of leadership 
or growing cooperation and integration on the European continent, despite the necessity to go 
further than the status quo to ameliorate the American retrenchment. Investigating what internal 
barriers hinder closer cooperation and with it the halting of further erosion of the transatlantic 
security community is necessary. 
Extrapolating from both the theoretical chapter above, the variables necessary for 
successful leadership and security cooperation are shared security identity and the degree of 
commonality between the cooperating parties. Following from the identities in existence, there 
needs to be an agenda or vision for the community, which the other members can identify with 
and follow after. Since this alone does not mandate leadership, the willingness to shoulder 
additional responsibility in order to create the public good needs to be present. Lastly, the element 
of mutual trust, as the glue that holds communities together, warrants investigation. In order to 
tackle this element, three case studies are conducted. The first one sets out to highlight each focus 
nations’ understanding of defense, both in terms of policy practice as well as in constitutional 
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realities. As identity manifests in action as well as in codified form, like in constitutions or law, 
this chapter investigates the constitutions and white books and governmental practice related to 
defense and security policy and decision-making. The second case study is concerned with 
instances of defense leadership, portrayed by each focus nation in recent years. This will shed light 
on leadership behavior, responsibility as well as the necessary element of a security vision for the 
community. Lastly, public opinion in all three nations is approached. As Tusicisny shows in his 
work on security communities and mass values134, the domestic mindsets present within security 
communities, especially democratic ones, is another element playing into security identity, 
therefore it cannot be disregarded. Additionally, public attitudes also reflect the element of mutual 
trust that is vital for the functioning of a security community.  
3.3. Case study 
“And we also got the White House memo that Europe shouldn’t take the US [sic!] for 
granted […]. We know that our allies must do more to carry the burden of collective 
defence[sic!].” 
 – Defence Secretary of the United Kingdom Ben Wallace, March 5, 2020135 
 
“We can’t sleepwalk to a diminished Europe. We can’t remain in the routine of business 
as usual and wishful thinking.” 
 – President of France Emmanuel Macron, March 4, 2019.136 
 
“I understand your desire for disruptive politics. […] But I’m tired of picking up the 
pieces. Over and over, I have to glue together the cups you have broken so that we can 
then sit down and have a cup of tea together.”  
 – Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, November 23, 2019.137 
 
 
134 Andrej Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” International Political 
Science Review 28, no. 4 (2007): 425-449. 
135 Ben Wallace, Speech to the Atlantic Council, March 5, 2020, Transcript, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-ben-wallace-gives-a-speech-to-the-atlantic-council. 
136 Emmanuel Macron, “Dear Europe, Brexit is a lesson for all of us: it’s time for renewal,” Guardian, March 4, 
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/04/europe-brexit-uk. 




Having chosen the three focus nations as laid out above, the following part of the thesis 
proceeds in three individual steps. The focus nations are not highlighted individually but are looked 
at through three individual lenses. Each case study subchapter focuses on one lens or aspect and 
illuminates all three focus nations under this chosen aspect. This serves to bring the individual 
nation’s characteristics into view and to contrast these subthemes of the respective security 
identities early on. An early contrasting enables this thesis to home in on the barriers between the 
focus nations without the need for reiterating and re-contrasting the earlier findings. The analytical 
chapter that follows focuses on and explores the meaning of these different identities for European 
defense cooperation and integration and for the transatlantic security community.  
The thematic differentiation of the latter case studies is as follows. First, the 
understanding of defense of all three focus nations is scrutinized. This chapter focuses on the 
structural basis for defense, as portrayed in national constitutions, and the national understanding 
of the realm of security and the boundaries and goals each country sets for itself in official 
governmental communication. Coupled with an overview of strategic culture differences, this 
subchapter highlights the political and structural boundaries each nation has developed regarding 
security. As direct representations of the norms and values their respective security identities hold, 
this is a relevant entry point into the understanding of the security identities of France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom. 
Second, domestic values and public opinion pertaining to national security and security 
cooperation is highlighted. Drawing from the structural set-up of security institutions and decision-
making as elaborated in the preceding chapter, not only is it necessary to highlight the public 
outlook on security and defense and military interaction each country has been engaged in, but it 
is also important to follow the public debate on threats to national, European and transatlantic 
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security. As democratic states, the public will as well as the public image of security are 
constitutive parts of security identities and potential options of political and military action of the 
three nations in question. 
Third, the topic of leadership is addressed. As the United States of America are in a 
process of shifting towards Asia and the Pacific regions, and their continued leadership of the 
transatlantic security community is questioned both by the U.S. itself as well as a number of 
European partners, the leadership vacuum needs a country or a group of countries in bilateral or 
trilateral cooperation to exhibit interest in leadership, as well as a vision for the goals and direction 
a community under their guide could follow. Illuminating ongoing trends and actions, as well as 
their respective visions for security, this chapter highlights the French, German and British 
potential regarding cooperation and the leadership vacuum in the transatlantic security community.  
Taken together, the three lenses of leadership, public opinion and understanding of 
defense enables this thesis to elaborate on the extant individual security identities and contrast the 
three contenders. Following these three explanatory investigations, the analytical chapter will 
summarize the findings, narrow down the security identities of all three nations and show their 
synergies as well as barriers to further cooperation and integration based on ideational differences 
that have yet to be overcome.  
3.3.1. Speaking defense 
As the initial foray into representations of French, German and British security identities 
and as the structural basis underlying manifestations and options for the respective identities 
mirrored in the following two lenses, leadership and public opinion, the way defense and security 
are spoken, understood, framed and politically manifested in all three nations needs the first 
spotlight. Beginning with the very basics, constitutional constraints, this chapter follows the 
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security and defense realm manifested in governmental publications as well as public speeches by 
relevant security shaping individuals representing the states, such as Ministers of Defense or heads 
of state. As documents, like white books, national security strategies and others, represent the 
official norms and values the policy making elite of a nation wishes to express, they can be seen 
as representations of the elite understanding and public portrayal of the inherent security identity.  
3.3.1.1. Constitutional constraints: does accountability matter? 
Beginning with the primary source for a nation’s self-understanding, constitutions portray 
the very basic and foundational values and norms any society has agreed upon. The way these kind 
of documents speak about defense or security, as well as related elements like military force or 
decision making informs the reader about the initial and enduring understanding of the division of 
power within a state, as well as the way and means a state deems legitimate in international action 
and national security. 
Turning towards the most elusive case of the three, the British constitutional stance on 
security is somewhat intangible precisely because there is no British constitution in the sense of a 
single, legally binding foundational document. Instead, the United Kingdom draws on a number 
of laws, acts and similar legal texts as well as on unwritten norms and practices138. Especially in 
the field of security, the non-codified elements are of major importance. Through a practice termed 
the royal prerogative a vast number of executive powers are still vested in the reigning monarch, 
but practically executed by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and its Ministers.139 These include 
powers in the executive, legislative and judiciary branch. In relation to security matters these 
 
138 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual, October 2011, 2-3, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60641/cabin
et-manual.pdf.  
139 Gail Bartlett and Michael Everett, The Royal Prerogative, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 03861 
August 17, 2017, 4-6, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03861/SN03861.pdf. 
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powers envelop: creation, ratification as well as leaving of international treaties, diplomacy, 
acquisition of territory, war-making powers, command over the armed forces and others140. There 
is no legally binding decision-making process enshrined in documented or even practical form 
when it comes to decisions related to conflict, the use of force or the deployment of armed forces, 
whether in a peacekeeping, policing, training or armed combatant missions. The British 
government can choose to engage in conflicts or military missions worldwide, without the need to 
inform or consult with the democratically elected parliament or the public at large. That decisions 
made to commit to active engagement or interventions are seen as potentially lacking not only 
accountability, but also a degree of legitimacy is shown in the fact that constitutional reform and 
certainly the issue of parliamentary influence on governmental war-making capabilities are 
recurring themes in post-Cold War U.K. policy debates.141 In recent years, it has become more 
common for a cabinet to inform and sometimes debate security actions in parliament. The epitome 
of parliamentary influence was reached when military action in Syria was voted against in a non-
binding vote in 2013.142 The only other time in modern British history a government has both put 
a war-related decision to a vote and lost was in 1782 on the U.S. war of independence.143 As Mills 
 
140 Bartlett and Everett, The Royal Prerogative, 9, “Select Committee on Public Administration Fourth Report,” 
Report on ministerial prerogative, Parliament, last modified March 16, 2004, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmpubadm/422/42204.htm. 
141 Some examples illustrating the efforts at constitutional reform and reigning in of prerogative powers are: 
Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain: Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, 
October 2009, https://www.peerage.org/genealogy/royal-prerogative.pdf. The Cabinet Office, The Governance of 
Britain, Green Paper, July 2007, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228834/717
0.pdf. Claire Taylor, Parliamentary Approval for Deploying the Armed Forces: An Introduction to the Issues, House 
of Commons Library Research Paper 08/88, November 27, 2008, 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP08-88/RP08-88.pdf. Reasons for and against 
constitutional reform are summarized in: House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A 
new Magna Carta?, 2d Report of Session 2014-2015,The Stationary Office, July 10, 2014, 19-28, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpolcon/463/463.pdf. 
142 Claire Mills, Parliamentary approval for military action, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 7166, May 08, 
2018, 28, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7166/CBP-7166.pdf 
143 Mills, Parliamentary approval, 30. 
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points out, this instance is now often seen as the breakthrough of a new constitutional paradigm, 
normalizing parliamentary inclusion and setting up a precedent for a new constitutional practice. 
She cautions the enthusiasm with a nod to the continued non-legal status and vast and ill-defined 
powers of the prerogative executive. 144  It appears that formal codification of the executive 
prerogative and the legal involvement of parliament has been struck down by the Cabinet as 
recently as 2016 to protect governmental decisions from legal recourse145 and therefore, effectively, 
accountability.146 And even within the Cabinet, a decision-making process concerning security 
policy, including military deployment, is not formalized.147 The Blair government has been known 
to work on such an informal level concerning the Iraq war that even Cabinet ministers reported 
concern over legitimacy of decisions.148 
A significant step in the development of security policy decision-making can be seen in 
the 2010 establishment of the National Security Council. This new Cabinet committee is the latest 
iteration of a century of development in defense decision-making committees in the U.K. In 
 
144 “While many commentators concur that it would be politically difficult for any future government to move 
away from what is becoming adopted practice, as the recent limited action in Syria demonstrates the Government 
retains considerable freedom of action in determining the threshold for parliamentary involvement. It remains the 
case that Parliament has no legally [sic!] established role in approving military action.” Mills, Parliamentary 
approval, 40. Also see her chapter 3 for further elaboration on the emergence and boundaries of this novel 
convention. 
145 In questions of national security British courts are thought to have no jurisdiction over prerogative power 
usage. Bartlett and Everett, The Royal Prerogative, 7. 
146 The explicit intent to have prerogative powers with regard to military deployment or conflict stay outside of the 
formal and legal influence of both parliament and the judiciary of the United Kingdom was shown in the remarks of 
Michael Fallon, 2016 Secretary of State for Defence. “[He] said that the Government would not be bringing 
forward legislation to codify the convention into law, in order to ‘avoid such decisions becoming subject to legal 
action’”. Bartlett and Everett, The Royal prerogative, 20. 
147 A report by the House of Lords states: “We are concerned, however, that the Government’s internal 
mechanisms in this area are not well understood. In particular, we note that the Cabinet Manual does not contain 
a detailed description of the processes we have set out. […] it would be clearer and more transparent if the 
Cabinet Manual covered the whole advisory and decision-making apparatus […] it [should] include[…] a detailed 
description of their internal arrangements for advising and deciding on the use of armed force.” [bold type by 
source] House of Lords Constitution Committee, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force, 2d Report 
of Session 2013-2014. The Stationary Office Limited, July 24, 2013, 13, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldconst/46/46.pdf. 
148 House of Lords, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force, 10.  
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contrast to previous meeting and consultation formats, this includes a greater bandwidth of Cabinet 
ministers and resorts, portraying a new outlook on security. The National Security Council is 
concerned with “matters relating to national security, foreign policy, defence [sic!], international 
relations and development, resilience, energy and resource security”149 and includes as of 2020 the 
Prime Minister and Deputy, the Chancellors of the Duchy of Lancaster and of the Exchequer, the 
Attorney General and the Secretaries of State for Defence, Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, International Trade, International Development, Home Department and for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs.150 Through the inclusion of these different areas of policy, the realm of 
security is widened. This council is now responsible for creating and publishing the National 
Security Strategy as well as the Defense White Book or Strategic Review, but has received 
continued criticism due to shortsighted or reactionary behavior and lack of strategic vision and 
action.151 Sub-committees fluctuate in existence and could be considered of a transitory nature. 
The ability of ad hoc establishment of new sub-committees points to a character of reaction and 
crisis management inherent in the structure of the National Security Council.152 Currently, there is 
only a dedicated subcommittee on nuclear deterrence and security.153 
The ease by which such ad hoc arrangements can be made is rooted in the constitution 
but gains traction through additional British voting and governmental practice. The first past the 
 
149 “List of Cabinet Committees and their membership as at 29 June 2020”, Cabinet Committee list, British Cabinet 




151 Catarina Thomson and David Blagden, “A Very British National Security State: Formal and informal institutions 
in the design of UK security policy,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20 No. 3 (2018): 580, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148118784722. Joe Devanny and Josh Harris, The National 
Security Council: National security at the centre [sic!]of government, Institute for Government, November 04, 2014, 
30-31, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NSC%20final%202.pdf.  
152 Devanny and Harris, The National Security Council, 25. 
153 “List of Cabinet Committees and their membership as at 29 June 2020”, 2.  
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post voting system in the United Kingdom leads to a relative power imbalance between the 
winning party and smaller ones in comparison to the portion of votes they receive.154 This leads to 
single party governments without the need to form a coalition and a majority of the public’s vote 
not seeing a political representation relative to share in votes. While simple and straightforward, 
this system does not faithfully represent the votes cast and new developments in domestic public 
opinion does not easily come to political relevance in terms of governmental participation. 
The winning party of national elections is artificially inflated in power, can expect less 
restraint politically and does not need to exercise political cooperation and compromise. The leader 
of the winning party will become Prime Minister by convention and has a free hand to create his 
cabinet. Additionally, the U.K. has a regular reshuffle of chosen ministers, between different Prime 
Ministers even of the same party, and within the term of any Prime Minister. For the post-Cold 
War period, this practice has led to an average duration of office-holding for the ministers relevant 
to security policy of 2.8 years for Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and 
1.6 years for Secretaries of State for Defense155. Compared to the maximum term length of five 
years for a British Prime Minister, Ministers relevant for the security realm and especially 
Ministers for Defense, usually do not stay in office very long, certainly not as long as the Prime 
Ministers who put them into the office. While this might partially be due to the practice of 
governmental reshuffle, it does not portray too much confidence into the office holder on the part 
of the Prime Minister and it must be questioned how powerful and relevant a ministerial post with 
a turnover time of under two years is, especially with regard to long-term planning and strategic 
 
154 For a short introduction and discussion of first past the post voting system see: Gavin Thompson, “Keeping 
things in proportion: how can voting systems be fairer?,” Significance (September 2010): 128-132, 
https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2010.00440.x. 
155 This has been calculated by the author on the basis of official dates of inauguration into office and final day in 
office of all secretaries in office starting with the office holder at the time of the final dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in December of 1991 until the time of writing of this thesis. 
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outlook. Instead, with one of the only constants in security related executive offices, the Prime 
Ministers gain relatively more importance as decision makers. Yet, this office, too, is somewhat 
volatile and practically removed from public influence. Four out of the six Prime Ministers156 of 
the post-Cold War period came into office without a public election but as the result of resignation 
by their respective predecessors. While they tend to stay in office in follow-up general elections 
as leaders of the winning party, the dynamic of ascension to power does not leave much room for 
democratic participation.  
With the Commander-in-Chief being the British monarch and the loyalty of troops being 
solely to the monarch and their interest, as well as matters of defining security and acting upon it 
without public right to influence it, the constitutional understanding of defense shows a low regard 
for democratic values or influence as well as formality. The security realm appears to be removed 
from the wide public debate, influence and consensus and even governmental debate, making it 
highly dependent on the individual world views of the Prime Ministers and Cabinets in power. 
With the frequency of personnel changes in certain expertise areas, the practical influence of office 
holders is questionable. Ongoing attempts at constitutional formalization and furthering of security 
policy accountability and legitimacy point to a degree of unease or mistrust within parliament 
towards the vast prerogative powers of the government and especially the Prime Minister. Recent 
developments define security as a broad field, but the notable organ of political advice to the 
security policy makers is reportedly lacking a grand vision and has a more tactical rather than 
strategic outlook. 
 
156 Major followed Thatcher’s resignation, Brown Blair’s, May followed Cameron and Johnson followed May’s 
resignation after a snap-election kept her in office but with a diminished parliamentary representation. Only Blair 
and Cameron became Prime Ministers initially following a general election. While Major got into office before the 
fall of the Soviet Union, he continued on as Prime Minister until 1997. All office holders with a continued position 
that started before and led into the post-Cold War period have been considered for the argument towards 
governmental practice with the whole duration of their time served in said office. 
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French constitutional restraints are similarly loose, and the French president enjoys vast 
executive power in the security realm, albeit in a more documented and codified way. Article 15 
states: “The President of the Republic shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall 
preside over the higher national defence [sic!] councils and committees.”157 The French Parliament 
can influence defense through “statutes [which] shall also lay down the basic principles of: the 
general organization of national defence [sic!]”158  Parliament, too, has the sole authorization 
discretion over declarations of war. The same article granting the power over such declarations to 
Parliament furthermore states that: 
[t]he Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces 
intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It shall 
detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise to a debate, 
which shall not be followed by a vote. 
Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall submit the 
extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the 
final decision.  
If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall express its decision 
at the opening of the following session.159 
 
This addition was part of a 2008 amendment of the constitution. With regard to the 
changed strategic landscape and the growing number of military interventions or deployments as 
part of military assistance to allies, which seldom include formal declarations of war, this article 
still gives the French President vast leeway in utilizing the armed forces and applying them to their 
view of security policy interests nearly unrestrained, even with the recent additional conditions. 
While these changes portray an understanding of the power differential between the President and 
other political institutions in France, the President is understood and defined not only as the Head 
of State, but also as the bedrock of national defense and, therefore, the only adequate political 
 
157 National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title II art. 15, http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly#Title1. 
158 National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title V art. 34. 
159 National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title V art. 35. 
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office to be in charge of security related affairs.160 Another constitutional opportunity for the 
President is that while a number of international agreements need authorization or ratification by 
Parliament, international interventions as part of defense agreements do not.161 One might go so 
far as to argue that the French National Assembly has lost its power in practice162 through the 
global change of military conflicts.  
Additionally, the French President can harness emergency powers when “the institutions 
of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its 
international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper 
functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted”163. Noteworthy in this article is 
the allusion to an international dimension of the French executive. Even during times of 
cohabitation, when the National Assembly majority is not of the same party political background 
as the directly elected President and, in effect, the President has to choose a Prime Minister from 
this opposing majority and jointly create a government, the area of foreign policy remains 
practically in the sole executive power of the President.164  
Being legally unconnected to the French National Assembly and with nearly unlimited 
control over the course of foreign and security policy and international relations, including the use 
of force short of declarations of war, the French President enjoys a constitutional executive power 
 
160 Elisabeth Zoller, “The War Powers in French Constitutional Law,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 90 (March 1996): 50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25659005.pdf. 
161 National Assembly Service des Affaires Internationales et de Défense, The National Assembly in the French 
Institutions, February 2013, 324, http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/connaissance/fiches_synthese/septembre2012/national-assembly.pdf. 
162 Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters and Cosima Glahn, Parliamentary War Powers Around the World, 1989-2004: A 
New Dataset, Occasional Paper no. 22, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010, 26, 
https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/OP_22.pdf. 
163 National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title II art. 16. 
164 National Assembly, The National Assembly in the French Institutions, 2013, 22. 
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in the realm of security that is vast and outside of democratic control or oversight. Security and 
international actions are, therefore, highly dependent on the person inhabiting the office. 
Through its system of direct suffrage and two-round run off voting, it is ensured that the 
French President indeed is voted into office by a majority of votes cast. And, in the time period of 
choice for this thesis, all Presidents stay in office for the duration of their term, which has been 
reduced to five from formerly seven years in 2000. National assembly elections are held directly 
after the presidential elections and forming of government, in order to reproduce the public 
political opinion of the time of the presidential vote and reduce the likelihood of cohabitation. This 
way a rough alignment of Parliament with the President’s political background through party 
affiliation is ensured, strengthening the President’s already strong position, and also diminishing 
the need to form coalition and find policy consensus. This relative presidential stability is not 
directly mirrored in ministerial stability. The average tenure of both the Minister of Armed Forces 
as well as the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs is just shy of two and a half years, with a 
median tenure of 2.1 years in office. The mean tenure shorter than the presidential term tenure is 
popularly linked to presidential needs to strengthen their domestic position, especially before 
upcoming presidential elections or following defeats in municipal ones.165  As such, one can 
assume, like in the British case, that the constant foreign and security policy actor within a term is 
 
165 “FRANCE: President Jacques Chirac meets new Government ministers following reshuffle caused by local 
elections,” Reuters, April 04, 2004, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/284283. Angelique Chrisafis, “Francois 
Hollande brings Greens to government in cabinet reshuffle,” Guardian, February 11, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/11/francois-hollande-appoints-new-cabinet-in-bid-to-unite-party. 
Peter Humi, “Chirac shakes up cabinet, keeps prime minister [sic!],” CNN World News, November 07, 1995, 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/france_juppe/. Christina Okello, “France left wondering what’s driving 
Macron’s reshuffle to the right,” Radio France Internationale, July 08, 2020, 
https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20200708-french-left-wondering-what-s-driving-macron-s-reshuffle-to-the-right-





more likely the President than the individual ministers. The ministers partially function to project 
a domestic image and to follow the foreign and security goals and strategy outlined by the President.  
In direct contrast to the above two nations, in terms of constitutional defense and security 
structures, Germany is following a Sonderweg. With a paused but not abolished conscription,166 it 
is the latest of the three nations to move towards fully voluntary, professional armed forces. The 
position of Commander-in-Chief is not tied to the Head of State but the Minister of Defense. Only 
in case of self-defense or the threat of an imminent attack does the commanding position switch 
to the Chancellor.167 The German constitution, passed in 1949, defines the German armed forces 
as purely for defensive functions in article 87a168, with very specific restrictions for domestic 
deployment and no legal provisions for aggressive capabilities. This same article of the basic law 
also provides fiscal control, and therefore ability to oversee procurement and employment of the 
armed forces, to the German Parliament. 169  Furthermore, the basic law provides for the 
establishment of both a Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces, the Wehrbeauftragter, 
and a defense committee, which is to be distinct from a committee for foreign relations.170 This 
committee of defense additionally acts as an investigative commission or inquiry committee, 
 
166 Conscription of males over the age of 18 is still existent, but the effect of conscription, namely becoming a 
member of the armed forces and being taught war fighting for a period of time, has been paused in 2011. In case 
of war, this pause is nullified. “Aussetzung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht beschlossen,” change of conscription law 
2011, Deutscher Bundestag, accessed August 1, 2020, 
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33831649_kw12_de_wehrdienst-204958. France and 
Great Britain have dissolved peacetime conscription practices in 1996 and 1960 respectively.  
167 Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, May 23, 1949, art. 115b, 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html. 
In the following text, the German citation style for the basic law will be utilized. The basic law is abbreviated as GG. 
The article in this footnote would be cited as §115b GG.  
168 §87a GG. 
169 “Der Bund stellt Streitkräfte zur Verteidigung auf. Ihre zahlenmäßige Stärke und die Grundzüge ihrer 
Organisation müssen sich aus dem Haushaltsplan ergeben [the federal level creates armed forces for defense. 
Their strength in numbers and their basic organizational structure have to be derived from the federal budget]“, 
§87a GG. The German federal budget is planned and passed annually by the German Parliament. 
170 §45a GG. 
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which has to publicly open a case of parliamentary investigation if a quarter of its members call 
for it. 171  Its main function is the oversight and control of the Ministry of Defense. The 
Commissioner of the Armed Forces is both the “lawyer of the soldiers”172, advocating for their 
rights, as well as a via media of parliamentary control and oversight into the inner workings of the 
armed forces, bringing annual reports of the state of the forces into parliament. 
A final article of importance in the German constitution is article 24. 
“(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations.  
(1a) Insofar as the Länder [federal states] are competent to exercise state powers and to 
perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer 
sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in neighboring regions.  
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual 
collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign 
powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of 
the world.  
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to 
agreements providing for general, comprehensive, and compulsory international 
arbitration.”.173 
 
Not only does this article of the Basic Law provide for the cessation of partial sovereignty 
if ever the need may arise, this article also explicitly mentions collective security systems. At the 
time of passage of this law, NATO had just been founded, but Germany was not yet a member 
state. With Germany joining into the premier institution of what is now the transatlantic security 
community in 1955, the area of operation of the German armed forces, namely the geographical 
extent of Germany, had to be amended to follow NATO article 5 responsibilities. Known as the 
so-called “out-of-area”-debate, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared in 1994 that 
German armed forces were allowed to participate in missions and deployments within NATO, UN 
 
171 Ibid.  
172 “Wehrbeauftragte,“ Commissioner of the Armed Forces, German Parliament, last accessed August 15, 2020, 
https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/wehrbeauftragter#url=L3BhcmxhbWVudC93ZWhyYmVhdWZ0cmFndGVyL3
dlaHJiZWF1ZnRyYWd0ZXItNjk3NzIy&mod=mod697708.  




or (at the time) Western European Union as needed by these collective security systems to ensure 
security and peace.174 At the same time, the court tied any deployment of German forces under 
arms to a prior authorization by German parliament. In the Parliament Participation Act of 2005, 
the conditions surrounding the parliamentary influence were fleshed out and formalized, including 
the need for the government to clearly delineate the missions, manpower, area of deployment, 
capabilities, duration and cost prior to parliamentary consent and the right of parliament to recall 
authorization of already ongoing missions, effectively ending them.175 
These regulations make the German constitution not only the most explicit, but also the 
most restrictive one. The constitution displays a deep mistrust of armed forces, centralized 
authority and leadership, and the use of force. As the only one of the three focus nations Germany 
has created a system of oversight firmly in the hands of parliament, not the government or the 
Chancellor, and of democratic control, making German armed forces, their spending and 
deployment wholly accountable to a wider public. Additionally, the constitution differentiates 
defense from foreign affairs, through the establishment of separate commissions, indicating a value 
set trying to remove the use of force from international relations and the German foreign conduct. 
This should not come as a surprise, given the historic background of this state, yet in regard to 
decision making abilities in multinational systems of collective security, like NATO, further 
 
174 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,“ Public 
announcement of the German Federal Constitutional Court, press release no. 29/1994, July 12, 1994, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/1994/bvg94-029.html.  
175 Later amendments to the law include easier processes for missions of low intensity, for example scouting. In 
case of crucial reaction time, deployments can be ordered without prior parliamentary consent, but consent needs 
to be petitioned for immediately. Parliament can still stop deployments if consent is denied. Bundesministerium 
der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, “Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über 
den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz)“, Parliament Participation Act, 
March 18, 2005, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/parlbg/BJNR077500005.html. 
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restriction of executive power is unusual176 and is considered a hindrance to alliance capabilities177. 
New members of NATO’s eastern expansion tended to relax parliamentary control in order to gain 
membership, as multilateral decision-making with a restricted executive is not favored by the 
alliance in question.178 Defense and security in the normal political realm, outside of direct war on 
German soil, points to a very different understanding of defense and norms and values surrounding 
this political realm. Decentralization, accountability, public consent and mistrust of military and 
power-political tools are guiding values underwriting the German constitution in the realm of 
security. 
Looking at political practice, the Federal Republic is characterized by considerable 
political stability and continuity. The only focus nation of the three to have a representational 
voting system, German governments are almost exclusively formed through political coalitions. 
Habit has it, that the senior party, meaning the one with a larger portion of votes, picks both the 
Chancellor and Minister for Defense, the junior partner usually appoints the Vice Chancellor and 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs179. This means that for only seven of the past 30 years, the Defense 
Minister was not a Christian Democrat Party (CDU/CSU) member. Despite the shortest term limit 
within the three case study nations, Germany has only seen three different Chancellors in the past 
three decades, with two of them being in office for four terms, meaning 16 consecutive years.180 
 
176 Wagner, Peters and Glahn, Parliamentary War Powers, 25.  
177 See Ekkehard Brose, Parlamentsarmee und Bündnisfähigkeit: Ein Plädoyer für eine begrenzte Reform des 
Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetzes, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2013, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2013_S18_bre.pdf. 
178 Dirk Peters and Wolfgang Wagner, “Zwischen Effizienz und Legitimität: Die Parlamentarische Kontrolle von 
Militäreinsätzen im weltweiten Vergleich,“ Die Friedens-Warte 87 no. 2/3 Die parlamentarische Kontrolle von 
Militär und Sicherheitspolitik (2012): 81-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23774040.pdf. 
179 Other ministries are similarly prepicked, or, if they fall into the specific policy realm of certain parties, are 
expected to end up in that party’s hold. Examples could be: the Social Democrats (SPD) always hold the Federal 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, whether they are the senior or junior partner. 
180 Angela Merkel is in her fourth and last term. She has been in office for close to 15 years and as she is not 
expected to leave office before the 2021 General Election, she will have a combined tenure of 16 years. The only 
other Chancellor to be in office this long was Helmut Kohl, also a Conservative and preceding Merkel’s predecessor 
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At the onset of each term, the coalition partners agree to a coalition treaty, in which certain reform 
plans or vetoes to certain policies are pre-determined, restricting some executive freedom of all 
ministers. The Chancellor, as with the President and Prime Minister discussed before, does have a 
policy guideline competence, meaning they can set the policy frame in which the Ministers can 
act, but they usually retain the management right of their policy resort. Over the course of the post-
Cold War period, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs fulfilled the duration of their one term tenure, 
the Ministers for Defense, however, saw both fluctuations due to a resignation as well as tenure 
for over the usual term duration. Overall, the latest three ministers of the defense resort have been 
regarded as very close to Merkel, with potential to become the next party leader as well as 
Chancellor candidate. This political closeness gives credence to the assumption of policy action 
favored by the current Chancellor, ergo the past one and a half decades of security policy. With 
the comparatively long tenure of each German Chancellor, it should come as no surprise, however, 
that the interests and role of the Chancellor in international relations with neighbors as well as 
general security policy are considered to be greater than that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Sometimes titled leader of the free world in international public media, the question of her 
successor in the Chancellery is discussed more seriously as the next person in the Foreign Ministry. 
This perception of power and importance of the Chancellor within political practice larger than the 
constitutional boundaries would suggest still have to be seen in relation to the parliamentary 
approval necessity, when it comes to the use of military force even in non-war settings, like training 
or peace-keeping missions or even within the realm of allied territory, as seen in the AWACS 
discourse. German security political practice is characterized through continuity, the constant 
 
Schröder. Germany had only been without a Conservative member of the government for seven years under 
Schröder from 1998 to 2005. 
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presence of the Chancellor if they wish to invest themselves in the foreign and security realm, 
coalition-building necessity and a conservative, non-adventurous habit. 
When comparing these three nations side-by-side, several things concerning security 
identity, cooperation potential and the ability to trust and be trusted should become obvious. 
Through constitution and practice, all leaders, be it President, Prime Minister or Chancellor play 
an important role. The French President, however, constitutionally must be the lead on foreign and 
security policy. The office has little legal oversight and can normally only be held accountable by 
the citizens at the next presidential election. The French security identity developed in such a way 
as that the state and populace envision a strong leadership position of the President as the right 
course for security. This means that not only does the President not need to consider domestic 
coalitions to bring about his foreign and security policy, but has the chance to direct the military 
apparatus and relevant governmental policy in any way he or she sees fit personally. The lack of 
coalition-making practice and singled-out role within French politics could be a problem for 
cooperation and integration, as that hinges on considering other interests and the ability to make 
concessions to partners. This is in stark contrast with the Presidential self-understanding within 
French politics. Also, as the security policy acted out by the President is highly dependent on the 
personal character of the office holder, effective cooperation might be hampered. Additionally, 
after a five-year term, if another candidate is elected, the security priorities and projects could 
easily change due to personal preference. Germany, a state whose security identity revolves around 
the deep mistrust of leadership authority and military power and about accountability and control 
measures in the hand of the people through Parliament, must  be rather cautious and mistrustful of 
such in their view uncontrolled leadership. While France provides political stability in practice, 
the United Kingdom, with similarly empowered Prime Minister, coupled with a volatile and 
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quickly changing governmental reality as well as the element of character-dependent policy, stands 
in even starker contrast to the stable, unmoving security practice of the Germans and their system 
of parliamentary control. In fact, when approaching this from a French or British side, not only 
can they not solely rely on the personal opinions of the Chancellor, they also have to expect the 
coalition partner to dampen any security adventures incompatible to their party outlook, but they 
also have to expect whatever agreement they might have reached in a bi- or trilateral setting 
including Germany to be struck down by a critical German Parliament, including the political 
opposition of the German government. Trust, defined as lack of necessity to plan and anticipate 
potentially negative outcomes in cooperation with another, certainly needs to exist in abundance 
for cooperation to overcome this constitutional German hurdle. On the other hand, the stability of 
German political habit in the past 30 years, especially in the figure of the Chancellor, makes it 
easier to approach the German government as its interest and acceptable frame of action have been 
staked out before. The inherent need to calculate German domestic reaction must be considered a 
serious impediment to cooperation and trust towards the Central European state. The British 
combine the outstanding role of the executive with a very opaque decision-making process. 
Practically, the Prime Minister could however not be able to really steer a national policy, as the 
continuous flux of the senior governmental positions mean that the Prime Minister can be flooded 
with decisions from all policy areas, putting him in a reactionary position. While the recent changes 
might be mainly attributable to Brexit, the propensity and ease with which posts and office holders 
change can seriously impede cooperation attempts and long-term planning ability not only of the 
U.K. but also of its partners. 
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3.3.1.2. Realms of influence and strategic vision  
The previous section illuminated the constitutional framework all three nations base their 
security policy on. Guiding norms and values have manifested in the existence and form or absence 
thereof of the constitutions of the three focus nations. The norms and values of a security identity 
also express themselves in the states’ security goals of each nation. Strategic vision, as publicized 
in white books and security strategies, not only expresses how a nation portrays itself in terms of 
areas of interest and means, understanding of threat and other elements inherent in the 
aforementioned types of document, but also shows what a nations expects its own place in the 
international system as well as security communities to be. This chapter analyzes the latest 
strategic documents of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, illuminating the interests and 
goals inherent in the three security identities. 
The literature as well as policy commentators largely agree that Europe as a whole does 
not share a common strategic culture, but this is arguably also the case for the United States and 
its European allies and yet NATO has persisted for over seven decades under American leadership. 
However, a shared identity and trust linking the U.S. to the rest has kept the community together. 
Part of the shared identity, next to norms and ideas, established and propagated by the U.S. was a 
clear strategic vision. The NSC 68 set forth an American approach to Western Europe that served 
as an umbrella under which the community could come together. With the Soviet Union dissolved 
and the Cold War rationale, too, reduced in relevance, any new leader, too, needs a strategic vision 
not only for itself, but for the wider European or transatlantic realm.  
A look at the most recent publicly available strategic document highlights the approaches 
and umbrellas each focus nation has developed. Since its reunification Germany has published 
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three181 white papers as the chief governmental work on the orientation and capabilities of its 
armed forces. Jointly devised and published by the German government and the Ministry of 
Defense, and in its latest iteration the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well, the irregularly published 
white paper focuses on military planning and a security policy framework as a roadmap for future 
decision-making and as a mirror of the security situation Germany imagines itself in. The latest 
version was published in 2016, a decade after its predecessor, and in direct reaction to the changed 
security environment and the “Zeitenwende”182 since 2014. Arab Spring and mass migration, the 
annexation of Crimea, Brexit and the prospect of a Trump presidency following Obama era 
pivoting away from Europe, all these influenced the creation of this newest of white papers, leading 
to a qualitative caesura in security policy. Where the 2006 white paper was mostly concerned with 
terrorism, WMD proliferation and other threats and followed a more global, external security 
approach, promising preemptive and preventative strategic engagement, the new iteration appears 
almost introspective. The introductory works by both then Minister of Defense von der Leyen and 
Chancellor Merkel acknowledge the perception of insecurity and instability and its direct influence 
on the European continent. Pointing to external pressure, rather than domestic political will, the 
white paper acknowledges the need for Germany to grow more active in the security field. It says: 
“Deutschland wird zunehmend als zentraler Akteur in Europe wahrgenommen. Diese 
Verantwortung schafft ihre eigene Realität – im Sinne wachsender Handlungsmöglichkeiten, aber 
auch auf die daraus resultierende Verantworung.“183But with regard to ways of further leadership 
 
181 The years of publication are: 1994, 2006 and 2016. 
182 Can be translated as: turning point, change of times. Christoph Schwegmann, “Von Strategiebildung, 
Strategievergewisserung und Strategischer Kommunikation,“ in Das Weißbuch 2016 und die Herausforderungen 
von Strategiebildung, ed. Daniel Jacobi and Gunther Hellmann (Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2019), 41. 
183 Official translation: “Germany is increasingly regarde as a key player in Europe. With this new reality come more 
options to exert influence but also increased responsibilities.”. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Weissbuch 2016: Zur 
Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, July 2016), 22. Official English translation: Federal 




and action by the German state the white paper portrays a continued role of a mediator within EU 
and NATO communities. It points to the high necessity of coordinated cooperation in multilateral 
settings to be able to take over responsibility184 and the intention to balance and reconcile between 
diverging intra-community policy goals185 While the intention to lead is addressed, this white 
paper does not clarify how and in what areas. PeSCo and the FNC are highlighted as examples for 
German leadership, but the white paper does not illuminate how both the NATO and the European 
Union community can be bridged. Intent on peddling to both groups, this publication remains 
vague on concrete prioritization of either. Willingness to increase defense spending is signaled and 
later relativized.186 The strategic concept of crisis stabilization and helping others help themselves 
is pervasive, both with regard to areas of conflict outside of the transatlantic realm and within187, 
shedding a light on continued unwillingness of conducting long-term, high-stakes military 
engagements and taking over broad responsibilities for other nations. 
A main concern of the government releasing this white paper has been the economic 
stability of Germany. Security of resources, trade routes, communication, and knowledge, as a 
“strategic resource”188, are addressed right at the beginning of the work, pointing directly to what 
is encompassed in German interests. Cooperative security arrangements appear as a means to the 
end of national economic stability. Of course, as this white paper makes abundantly clear with its 
very first sentence in chapter one, “[u]nser sicherheitspolitisches Selbstverständnis ist geprägt 
durch die Lehren aus unserer Geschichte. Diese sind Teil unser nationalen Identität und in unserer 
 
184“Damals wie heute ist die Bundeswehr ausgerichtet auf ein Handeln im multilateralen Rahmen. Bei der 
Wahrnehmung von Verantwortung für die internationale Sicherheit sind wir in hohem Maße auf das abgestimmte 
Zusammenwirken mit unseren Partnern angewiesen.“ Weissbuch 2016, 23. 
185 Weissbuch 2016, 70. 
186 Weissbuch 2016, 69, 57. 
187 Weissbuch 2016, 71. 
188 Weissbuch 2016, 22. 
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Verfassung verankert.“189 Referring to the constitution with its strong character of mistrust towards 
German leadership and military engagement and power at the onset of the white paper frames the 
later proclamations of willingness to lead in a dimmer light. 
Despite situating Germany in a web of international, multilateral institutions like the 
OSCE, NATO, the UN and EU, this publication misses a truly European or transatlantic angle. 
National security naturally takes center stage, but a vision for Germany as a leading part of any 
one of these institutions is missing. Ad-hoc coalitions of the willing are explicitly bound to national 
interest190 and not to the defense of common goods of any of the overlapping communities the 
German state defines itself as a member of. While there is a willingness present to infringe upon 
German national sovereignty191 in order to strengthen the bigger whole, the government is not 
willing to let go of overall technological sovereignty.192 This points to an inherent level of distrust 
in the capabilities and willingness of partners and allies.  
Speaking of a new degree of whole-of-government approach, linking defense and foreign 
affairs budgets for the first time, this white paper portrays a wider understanding of the term 
security. Particularly the new focus on the cyber and information realm is subject to this. Spread 
between the Ministries of Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs, the control over policy is 
moved into the hands the junior coalition partner, who habitually heads the Foreign Affairs and 
has been critical193 of this white paper and its professed goals. A government in part critical of its 
 
189 “Our identity and the way we see security is influenced by the lessons we have learned from our history. They 
form part of our national identity and are enshrined in our constitution.” Weissbuch 2016, 22. 
190 Weissbuch 2016, 81. 
191 Weissbuch 2016, 130. 
192 Ibid. 





own publication does not shed a positive light on the reliability of German aims professed in the 
white paper. 
Overall, the latest iteration of Germany’s most relevant strategic paper shows an 
understanding for the dynamic of American retrenchment and the external pressure on the German 
state to do more in terms of community responsibility and burden sharing. Yet it also portrays a 
continued unease with concrete security leadership from a governmental perspective. Rather, the 
German government narrates itself as a mediator and staunch multilateralist. As the main concerns 
and therefore strategic interests revolve around German prosperity in economic terms, it is 
questionable in how far this identity lends itself for leadership positions putting the interests of 
other states first. With the underlying distrust of hard power and power politics, the white paper 
2016 shows a Germany more attuned with stabilization and cooperative prevention of crises rather 
than an ambitious security trailblazer. As a status-quo interest is furthermore explicit in the 
juggling of both NATO and EU responsibilities, while conflict between these two communities 
had been apparent by then, the existence of a willingness to lead, as well as a vision for the 
community remains questionable. Additionally, the stress on keeping all possible technologies at 
hand, even if that means spreading the available defense resources very thin, displays a distrust in 
the direct and most intimate security partners of the time. These are identified as the United States 
of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland and Israel, in that order.194 
The United Kingdom has had a variety of differently named governmental strategy papers 
concerning security and defense.195 The latest iteration of a comprehensive national review or 
 
194 Weissbuch 2016, 80. 
195 For a brief overview of the most relevant studies, reviews and white papers see: Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-
Holland and Nigel Walker, A brief guide to previous British defence [sic!] reviews, House of Commons Library 




strategy paper for security and defense is the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and 
Security Review published in November 2015. Planned to be published every five years, the next 
iteration of this white paper was due to arrive in early 2020 but has been postponed by the Johnson 
administration due to the ongoing global pandemic. As the 2015 national security strategy was 
published before the vote on Brexit and before the election of President Trump, and the uncertainty 
in transatlantic relations furthered more strongly in the ensuing presidency as has been discussed 
in earlier chapters, these elements do not yet play into the paper. A later addendum in the form of 
the 2018 National Security Capabilities Review, which briefly evaluates the progress made since 
the previous review and adds a narrow outlook on U.K.-EU security relations, is taken into account 
in the following analysis of British strategic vision and realm of influence.  
The 2015 review presents a willful Britain with a strong global vision. Like in Germany’s 
white paper, national security is tied to the economic stability of the country. The entry statement 
by Prime Minster Cameron begins with: “Our national security depends on our economic security, 
and vice versa. So, the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and 
remains, strong”196 and thus clearly establishes a main security interest of the United Kingdom. 
As an island nation reliant on trade for its economic safety and sitting at the center of a vast global 
trade network based on their Commonwealth, the security strategy places great emphasis on a 
global reach and global interest and relevance of the British nation. The need for global power 
projection 197  is stressed from the beginning of the paper and puts special emphasis on the 
relationship towards the Middle East, notably the Gulf Region198, Asia Pacific and North as well 
 
196 British Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, 5. This will henceforth be shortened to NSSSDSR. 
197 NSSSDSR 2015, 9. 
198 NSSSDSR 2015, 55. 
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as Sub-Saharan Africa, remarkably a vision for Europe or the European Union is quite absent 
somehow foreshadowing the Brexit campaign of the following year. 
While the SDSR stresses cooperative engagement, especially through diplomatic or soft 
power tools, cooperative arrangements are portrayed as one-way streets working solely in favor of 
the United Kingdom. The strategic review visibly points to the perceived outsize importance of 
the United Kingdom, proclaiming it “sit[s] at the heart of the rules-based international order”199 
and also inhabits a strategic geographic positioning through a “time zone [that] allows us to 
connect with the Americas and Asia in the same working day”.200 The evocation of the image of 
an empire on which the sun never sets must come to mind. And in further allusion to a continued 
position of hegemonic dominance, this paper makes it abundantly clear that cooperation works not 
towards common goals, but goals of the United Kingdom:  
Our influence, across foreign, defence and security policy, development, business and 
academia, and through our cultural and people-to-people links enables us to attract and 
persuade other countries to work for the same outcomes as we do, and to deter and enforce 
in support of our goals.201 
 
With regard to the role of alliance members or any form of cooperative partner, the U.K. 
government quite clearly defines that it “need[s] allies and partners who support us, and an 
international system which reflects our values and helps us to protect our interests.”202 Certainly, 
the United Kingdom expresses their willingness to lead, or rather their already existent high level 
of leadership or control within communities,203 yet, this leadership is not based on or reliant on a 
relationship of mutual trust. Instead, the strategic review stresses the importance of predictability 
 
199 NSSSDSR 2015, 14. 
200 NSSSDSR 2015, 13. 
201 NSSSDSR 2015, 47. 
202 NSSSDSR 2015, 10. 
203 See for example the way the EU is portrayed as being steered towards U.K.’s interests. NSSSDSR 2015, 53. 
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in cooperation.204 As was stressed in the conceptualization chapters, trust cannot be based on 
calculated predictability. The necessity to calculate a partner’s reaction portrays inherent distrust 
in their actions and the lack of great commonality of their respective security identities. This 
characterization of the British national interests as superior and all cooperation in favor of only the 
British interest questions the willingness to take foreign interests into account, which is a 
prerequisite of trust-based leadership in security cooperation. 
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015 does 
identify major partner and allies of the United Kingdom. First of all, there is the United States, 
bound to the U.K. in a special relationship. The U.S.-based NATO defense guarantee makes up 
the major part of a reliable and continued U.K. defense. Another partner identified throughout the 
paper as a central ally is France. Both France and the U.K. are “the two European nations with the 
full range of military capabilities and the political will to protect our interests globally”205 and have 
agreed to an “exceptionally close”206 relationship. Germany, however, is portrayed in a different 
light. In most instances when the U.S. and France are named, Germany does not appear, and when 
it is addressed as a subchapter it is characterized as an essential but rising partner207, implying 
Germany has not yet reached the felt importance and global level the United Kingdom has. 
As a further development of the image of preponderance of British interests and global 
vision, the 2015 security review stresses the importance of British sovereignty, for example when 
addressing the control over migration through abstention from the Schengen agreements. 208 
Furthermore, the continued importance of unilateral military action, if no coalition of the willing 
 
204 NSSSDSR 2015, 20. 
205 NSSSDSR 2015, 52. 
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or cooperation of partners for the good of British will can be created, is made very clear.209 The 
relevance of strategic autonomy and maneuverability of British forces becomes furthermore 
apparent through the continued specification of concrete investment plans into armaments and 
technology throughout the course of the paper. While the 2018 addendum repeatedly expresses the 
will to preserve positive relations with the European Union, the repeated mentions appear 
formulaic, repetitive and without concrete substance. British sovereignty is the recurrent theme to 
dampen potential European influence on United Kingdom security decision making210.  
The British government identifies the entire globe as its realm of interest and influence. 
More concretely, in 2015 the British government focusses its intentions on the world outside of 
the European continent, portraying the EU and to an extent NATO, too, as acting on British behalf 
and therefore in no need of a distinct British vision for these communities. Great Britain portrays 
itself as in a position of global preeminence only outshines by the United States but in close 
cooperation with them. Their leadership is seen to enable them to draw in other states to follow 
their British designs, without a need to lend an ear to foreign concerns or interests and values. 
Through military and soft power and the British membership in the UNSC, NATO and (formerly) 
the EU, as well as their extended Commonwealth, the United Kingdom envisions itself as a steerer 
of global destiny and does not shy away from theoretical unilateralism. This strategic vision 
certainly contrasts with the German one highlighted previously. 
Turning now to the remaining focus nation for this subchapter: France. Shortly after the 
last presidential election, newly elect President Macron whipped out the 2017 Defence and 
National Security Strategic Review. It had been four years since the release of its predecessor, 
another two had been published in 1994 and 2008. This strategic review chronologically is the 
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latest one of all three focus nation papers and reflects both on the changed security surrounding, 
Brexit as well as on the first year of the Trump presidency and the accelerated dynamic of 
American isolation from transatlantic partners. 
From the onset, this paper highlights the ambitions of France’s security understanding 
and policy despite the alarmist undertone concerning the growing global uncertainty and crises. 
President Macron begins his introduction to the review with the words: “France’s military power 
lies at the core of our national ambition. Living up to this ambition requires financial and human 
resources, as well as strategic vision.”211 This strategic vision with regard to the transatlantic 
sphere and cooperation or leadership, combined with highlighting the French realm of interest is 
the basis of the remainder of this subchapter. 
The introductory texts by both the President and the Minister of Armed Forces situate 
France both in the heart of Europe and as a necessary driver of European defense development, as 
well as in a global position. “France and Europe are now directly at risk”212 is one of the themes 
woven through the publication. With this sentence, the strategic review points to the strong 
connection of France with Europe. Risks and challenges addressing France are simultaneously 
linked to the whole of Europe through a continuous placement of the European whole next to 
analyses affecting France.213 Pragmatically, the text understands potential bottlenecks in French 
capabilities in addressing the entirety of challenges it perceives, therefore prioritization of threats 
as well as cooperation with, firstly, European and, secondly, American partner nations is called 
 
211 Government of France, Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017, October 13, 2017, 5. Henceforth 
shortened to DNSSR. 
212 DNSSR 2017, 5. 
213 Examples like: “These events have emerged so suddenly and on such a scale that they have had a direct impact 
on France and on European Societies” are dispersed evenly throughout the whole paper. For this concrete one: 
DNSSR 2017, 13. 
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for.214 This prioritization then quickly introduces that France, despite the repeated linkage to 
Europe throughout the text, has a global outlook with roots in its colonial past. Committed to 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia and the Pacific area215 on top of the European continent, The 
second area of foremost interest and commitment at that point of time was the Sahel region,216 
following defense of the nation and its people and overseas territories. Reasons for this are given 
as the fight against terrorism, protection of French expatriates or even climate change217, but the 
colonial dimension to the French territorial expansion at the current time or through a historic link 
cannot be ignored. Presence of overseas territories both in the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean 
are described as an asset as well as a reason for the global outlook and importance of the French 
Republic.218 Additionally, the French seat as a permanent member of the UNSC involve France in 
any world crisis by default, argues the security review.219 Therefore, France professes the globality 
of its realm of influence by virtue of both honest commitment to the provision of public goods and 
national interest as well as by virtue of its position in and relevance for global institutions like the 
UN.  
Alluding to the growing problem of instability even within Europe, through the Brexit 
challenge to the European idea220 and rising doubts in the transatlantic alliance221, this security 
strategy sets out to formulate ways for a French shaping of European defense, as “Europe is the 
natural framework for our security and the protection of our border.”222 The authors of this work 
place great emphasis on France as a facilitator of European strategic culture development or rather 
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emergence. And while this strategic review leaves the possibility for change of interests open,223 
it states that any development of European shared strategy must follow after a clear articulation of 
French interests.224 Given that France is not only a member of the UNSC, NATO and the EU, but 
also the only remaining nuclear power within the latter organization, France intends to capitalize 
on this global preeminence and build and shape Europe, given the political will of the partners, 
into an autonomous, strong and relevant player225. As these potential partners, France identifies 
Germany and the United Kingdom foremost, the order of appearance likely affected by Brexit. 
Towards the middle of the work, the paper states:  
France must supplement these two major bilateral defence relationships by paying greater 
attention to its other European Partners and by giving proper consideration to both their 
expectations and their contributions to European security.226 
 
This passage illuminates a potential willingness to act in partner’s interests, rather than 
only in the domestic interest alone and shows a basic consideration by France for the fact that 
partners might have not only diverging but still relevant interests, but that partnerships are also 
mutual. Especially with the global agenda France has set for itself in terms of military involvement, 
contributions by partners are portrayed as an essential.  
However, France explicitly intends to retain the option for unilateral action and 
interventions.227 For this, and the global presence it boasts, France intends to uphold all military 
capability areas.228 The paper argues that even a short term loss of control over a tactical or 
strategic military capability, could lead to long-term capability loss 229  and, therefore, to a 
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diminished role of France and even French autonomy. While an earlier passage has listed the 
international military cooperation, like the French-German Brigade, this necessity to not loose 
control over any capability ultimately points to the unwillingness of France to trust any ally with 
sharing capabilities or reliance to a capability France might want to outsource in an alliance setting. 
Even in cooperative settings, this paper envisions French autonomy, asserting that “only a strong 
France, in control of its own destiny, can provide answers for today’s major crises, promotes its 
values and assert its interests.”230 And for the projected European security autonomy France has 
put at the heart of its vision in this paper, French sovereignty shall not231 be infringed upon. Newly 
developed technologies are explicitly to be kept for France, to assess their potentials, before allies 
might access them.232 Precluding cooperation concerning emerging technologies because their 
potentials are yet unknown not only deprives France of the knowledge and expertise of potential 
partners in sharing, but also points to a level of distrust into France’s allies. Calculating that a 
technology in the hands of an ally might strategically disadvantage France, points to the level of 
calculation and prediction of behavior that need not exist in relationships of trust as needed 
between security community leaders and their followers. Another two elements in need of 
highlighting are French doubts about the utility of multilateral security arrangements, international 
institutions, and policy tools. As they are perceived to lose global legitimacy and are through 
bureaucratic-process slow and cumbersome, their ability to address global crises, too, is alluded to 
as diminishing.233 This points to the necessity for France to remain capable across all military 
sectors in order to react to any global, and therefore French, crisis. The second element that needs 
mention is the narrow outlook of this security review. As this Defence and National Security 
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Strategy Review aptly highlights diplomacy234 as a tool to prepare legal frameworks for military 
action, this whole review is very strictly focused on the military aspects of security. Other areas, 
like energy security, that the other focus nations discuss at greater length are glossed over at best, 
or simply nonexistent in the scope of this review. 
Overall, this particular text portrays the French security identity as a global one. France 
perceives itself as a relevant global player that needs to assert itself in the coming uncertainty but 
has understood the need to coordinate to an extent with European partners. It intends to push a 
European security community, rather than a transatlantic one, into a direction France defines. Risks 
and challenges to France are automatically related to a wider European public, highlighting a 
French self-image as the heart of Europe. While there are notions of considerations for allied 
interests or concerns, this review illuminates a level of distrust in even the strongest partners 
necessitating a continued and absolute autonomy of French military capabilities across the whole 
armed forces spectrum. 
Taken altogether, very distinct strategic self-images are present in the three focus nations. 
Both France and the United Kingdom see themselves, and to a degree each other, as global powers 
with interests spread across the planet and with values to be shared. Regarding Germany, only 
France identifies its neighbor as an equal when it comes to cooperation in Europe. Germany 
certainly does not propose a global realm of influence, instead the most recent strategic paper 
focuses more strongly on national defense. Global military interaction, even in the form of 
Peacekeeping operations or training missions, needs multilateral approval and engagement for 
German participation. And where France imagines itself as bound to any global crises through its 
seat at the UNSC table and military interaction as the most important asset in the foreign and 
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security policy toolbox, Germany favors the military the least, instead giving space in the white 
paper to diplomacy and aid frameworks. Great Britain, too, puts great emphasis on British soft 
power and the diplomatic apparatus.  
A common theme in all three papers is the occurrence of autonomy and sovereignty. Yet, 
here too, there are stark differences between the focus nations. Germany explicitly favors a 
diminishing of its national sovereignty if the overall cooperation that ensues strengthens 
community sovereignty. France and the United Kingdom do not favor a diminished autonomy. 
Their respective needs for autonomy shroud an inherent distrust in the partner nations that could 
find themselves in a decision-making position. One could go so far as to say, these strategy texts 
betray an inherent mistrust in each of the other two focus nations, as all three nations identify each 
other as potential major players in the transatlantic or European security realm.  
The only nation of all of them to continuously address some form of leadership vision for 
the community is France, but only through equating European with French interests and challenges. 
Germany points to a willingness to lead, but the propositions remain very modest and limited and 
do not reflect the importance for hard power engagement the other two nations seem to favor. 
Overall, in terms of constitutional and publicly portrayed narratives and understanding of 
security and defense, three very different security identities emerge. Germany can be said to be 
deeply mistrustful of military means and individual leadership authority, yet it is proclaimed to be 
ready to address common interests or help supply public goods even at a disadvantage to itself. 
France enjoys the strongest executive of all three and values strategic autonomy above all. While 
it has very strong ideas about its relevance for Europe, its strategic interests lie around the globe. 
Interested in the legitimacy though not the efficiency of multilateral security solutions, France has 
pointed to its understanding of the importance of foreign interests in a security community. French 
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constitutional looseness, however, makes unilateral action easy and tempting. Great Britain, while 
employing and valuing a well-developed diplomacy as an asset for security, cooperation for the 
U.K. is a one-way street in which all consideration and help must move towards the U.K. and not 
vice versa. With opaque constitutional arrangements, it too, has and values vast unilateral 
possibilities. 
These previous parts have illuminated constitutional arrangements in the security realm, 
shedding light on cooperative potentials or barriers. Combined with the latest strategic publications 
of the respective governments, a rounder picture of the institutionalized, official side of the security 
realm has been illuminated. However, these two elements, constitution and policy papers, must be 
considered as the theoretical framework each nation moves inside. As a next step, the practical 
dimension is focused on. Through a look at the actual instances of leadership, through research 
and development cooperation or bilateral security agreements, their previous proclamations about 
leadership, as well as their actual existent cooperation or integration can be evaluated. 
3.3.2. Understanding leadership 
Security communities thrive through the path their leaders prepare and through the trust 
members put into these leaders to not only take their interests into account but also to face a larger 
burden or risk for the sake of their community members. Membership of a security community 
means to impede on national sovereignty to a certain degree. Valuing others interests and 
becoming vulnerable for the sake of the common good and therefore having other members 
influence one’s own security behavior is a defining quality of leadership within a security 
community. This chapter highlights recent developments in terms of leadership behavior of the 
three focus nations.  
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With the background explored above, the three focus nations appear to have a varying 
degree of interest in allies or partners. Ranging from the security identity of the United Kingdom, 
whose security review does not see many equals on the European stage nor does it portray much 
value in security cooperation lest it be outside of declared British interest, to German alleged 
willingness of infringing on national sovereignty for the greater good, the study of the official 
public side of security identity has illuminated some barriers to further security cooperation. Yet, 
in practice these three nations could have exhibited a behavior different from what can be 
extrapolated from their public declarations. Therefore, the following chapter highlights and 
evaluates instances of intra-communal leadership in the realm of security and defense and contrasts 
them with the results from the previous discussion of formal manifestations of security identity. 
The United Kingdom has a reputation as the most ardent Atlanticist among the three focus 
nations. Defined as a special relationship by Winston Churchill in his ‘sinews of peace’ speech of 
1946, the United Kingdom is seen as the closest partner the United States have ever had.235 As 
such, it comes as no surprise that the United Kingdom has not only been the inroad for the U.S. 
into EU internal affairs and policy, but has also been backing the leadership of the United States 
in the transatlantic context and dampening attempts at developing security cooperation or 
integration within the European Union.236 The Lancaster House Treaties of 2010 between the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of France appeared to be a comprehensive step towards a 
European security dimension to the U.K. outside of NATO and U.S. engagement. Previous 
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bilateral cooperation between these two states had been on an ad hoc basis,237 but were now to be 
put on a 50-year planned footing. Focused mostly on concrete capability planning, rather than 
strategy or common goals, the treaties define areas of cooperation, such as in the nuclear arms 
realm, and set out concrete objectives, like the establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary 
Force, pooled research and development on the Future Combat Air System for both nations and 
satellite systems among other things.238 This set of treaties has been unprecedented in Franco-
British history, especially since it focuses on very precise capabilities. Conversely, it does not 
delve too much into ideational preferences and differences. In this regard it does not display a 
convergence of security identities or the attempt to unify the two nations or set a hierarchy, instead 
is functionally focused. Through elements like article eight it sets out to manifest access to each 
other’s defense markets and facilities, but not necessarily for shared, cooperative use, but rather 
for individual but parallel use or more competition and choice. Of course, a joint expeditionary 
force or the cooperative development of combat systems show a potential and willingness to 
cooperate. The question with these elements is how they fare over time and if they achieve to 
generate and solidify trust between the security community members. The CJEF and the other 
Joint Expeditionary Forces of the United Kingdom that were developed over the same period, 
namely the last decade, are purely voluntary, and each nation retains full sovereignty over their 
forces. The JEF system constructs a “force pool” through which other nations can add some of 
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their forces if they want to join British military deployments.239 Touted as an addition to NATO, 
Joint Expeditionary Forces of the United Kingdom are formally and practically apart from NATO. 
Deployment and use of JEF is not even dependent on the participation of foreign militaries. Instead, 
it is a British expeditionary force with an opt-in ability for select partners.240 This means that the 
United Kingdom has preselected nations it trusts enough to allow them to cooperate with them, 
while at the same time this optionality of participation means that the goals of the individual 
deployments are fundamentally British and without an initial regard for the interests of partners. 
The pick-and-choose approach of any JEF mission manifests mini-coalitions of the willing. 
Whether they can translate into interested leadership for a shared interest and identity, rather than 
as a propping up of British interest and identity, remains doubtful.  
The other front, that of research and development and economic defense cooperation, 
with France faces challenges, too. With the advent of Brexit and the struggle between the EU and 
the United Kingdom for any form of regulated future relationship, cross-border defense 
developments in the private and governmentally funded sector are in peril. The Future Combat Air 
System forged on until roughly 2018, when industry representatives declared a halt of the related 
projects from the British side.241 France has since moved on to develop a FCAS with Germany. 
The British, too, moved on to their own sovereign project, the Tempest, which is trying but 
struggling to attract committed partner nations.242  A similar dynamic can be observed in the 
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example of the Galileo satellite system. Previously a heavy investor in the European GPS 
alternative, the United Kingdom faces an ouster from the secret component of Galileo that will 
be243 available to all EU member militaries, polices and other governmental agencies. As security 
concerns by the EU244 keep third countries outside245 the British withdrawal from the Union 
tangibly diminished trust into the U.K. and handling or access to classified systems previously 
shared. The British continue to be able to access the American-led GPS structures, including 
certain non-free information, as has been the case before the installation of the first Galileo satellite 
in 2016. The U.K. has pledged to and already begun to invest in its own sovereign satellite 
system.246 This further fragmentation of the security infrastructure in the transatlantic realm not 
only exemplifies the British interest in being at the decision-making table but also its lack of trust 
in both the U.S. GPS and EU Galileo system, and an unwillingness to accept a diminished role in 
critical systems. While there are certainly some who might take this as an excellent example of 
leadership through technological innovation, a security community needs a leader willing to 
provide a common good and accept the influence of other members in exchange.  
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With a nod to the previously mentioned preference of NATO over EU cooperation, the 
U.K. has contributed only modestly to the EU defense budget. 247  The active dynamic of 
establishing alternative systems of cooperation or defense infrastructure in recent years without 
inclusion of the other major players in the transatlantic security community speak to a relationship 
of “negative leadership”248. The growing lack of European integration of the U.K. has prompted 
analysts to call for a new regulation of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(DSACEUR) post, which is traditionally held by a Briton.249 Despite British professed willingness 
to be a global power, the past decade has shown that with the shadow of Brexit, the U.K. has 
retrenched further from transatlantic leadership through losing Europe. With the loss of training 
and exercise opportunities connected to EU CSDP and influence on EU internal defense 
mechanisms and dynamics, building a solo leadership position that would draw NATO members, 
most of whom are also members of the EU, to follow alternative British systems set out in direct 
competition to continental European and American initiatives in the case of GPS must be 
considered impossible. The existing cooperation in form of the JEF cannot be considered as a 
means of security community leadership, because the JEF is quite frankly a means to harvest 
foreign support without reciprocal British commitment to British global defense ends. If these 
missions and deployments do coincide with NATO or UN missions or an interest of a member, 
cooperation is certainly possible, but it cannot be considered as a functioning mechanism of a 
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security community. The identity of a global but singular power portrayed in the Defense Review 
of 2015 finds itself again in the narratives of going it alone in defense systems development. 
Moving from negative leadership to the nation often portrayed as the reluctant partner in 
foreign policy, Germany. The current president of the United States is not the first national 
figurehead to call for more German ambition or to end the apparent free riding off of American 
security guarantees. And if defense and security engagement is only measured with the near-
mythical two percent threshold in mind, even the comparatively large defense investments and 
budget increases250 of the previous years do not show a change in perceived German free-riding. 
A look at unique security initiatives started by the German state both within NATO and the EU, 
however, lightens the negative image.  
Two major instances of German initiative in the defense and security realm stand out to 
illuminate the German take on leadership in security communities. The first one is the Framework 
Nations Concept (FNC) introduced into NATO and adopted from a framework established 
between Germany and the Netherlands and the European Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PeSCo), an EU initiative to cooperate on research and development in the security realm backed 
by European Defense Fund contributions. 
The FNC was first proposed by Germany in 2013 and officially adopted in NATO the 
following year.251 It is a platform that facilitates the cooperation between a framework nation, 
providing the bulk of the lead, coordination and military resources, and smaller nations that plug-
in to clusters of their interest. Focusing on two pillars, capability development addressing NATO 
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or framework nation defense capability gaps and multinational force creation under the lead of the 
framework nation,252 this concept has already attracted 20 member states253 that cooperate in 
different sized clusters with Germany. Not all parties participate in all clusters, but each nation can 
join coalitions of the willing on the development of certain core capabilities that are of interest to 
them. Through active participation in the development of capabilities, not only can interoperability 
be strengthened, but small nations can contribute and influence the development or purchasing 
decisions of the framework nation, in this case Germany, and reap direct capability benefits for 
their own national armed forces. So far, no enforcement mechanism binds smaller states to the 
clusters, and potential deployments of the multinational corps have an opt-out possibility. Out of 
the 21 nations active in Germany’s FNC only a third have agreed to join the second pillar of 
German-led and based multinational force creation. 254  The potentially most notable non-
participants in the German FNC are the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. 
Decision-making as to the thematic development of each FNC cluster is formally reached through 
annual ministerial meetings of all cluster members, but since the German armed forces provide the 
framework, gaps and interest first and foremost is given by Germany itself. While FNC was 
adopted at NATO and Germany currently pledges to adjust its defense spending according to 
NATO needs, there is no formal link between the direction of FNC clusters and NATO. Most 
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impulses within the FNC system therefore are shaped by domestic German outlook on security 
and the ties that constitutionally bind it. Linking this initiative back to the capabilities conception 
of the German armed forces, the focus on territorial defense and collective territorial defense 
becomes obvious.255 Inclusive and interdependent in its idea, the German FNC is restricted by the 
foreign policy, constitutional and conceptual outlook on the position of the armed forces. But, as 
participation in research and development or procurement cooperation infringes less on national 
sovereignty and is less contingent on high levels of trust256, the FNC could have a wider appeal in 
the long-run than similar incentives as is already mirrored in current participation. 
The second noteworthy large-scale initiative of Germany is the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation. A PeSCo fact sheet describes the initiative as such:  
PESCO is a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst 
EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop 
defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. This will 
enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection 
of EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending257 
 
With 25258 member states, including France, this is a European project that has a sizable 
overlap with the transatlantic community membership and has received significant push by the 
German government. Tilting the scales to the inclusive, open and less strategically or rather less 
operationally ambitious PeSCo that came to pass in 2017 was Germany’s insistence and a France 
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compromising. 259  Since the establishment of this inclusive process and framework for 
development cooperation 47 different projects have begun in three waves. Germany participates 
in 16 of them, leading seven, but France, Italy and Spain have higher numbers of participation and 
leadership within the framework.260 The projects led by Germany oscillate around facilitation or 
coordination projects, such as logistics hubs or training centers.261 With member-driven project 
initiatives, PeSCo is decoupled from a larger defense and security policy mechanisms within the 
EU, although nominally gaps identified in the CSDP should be addressed through PeSCo. 
Monetary incentive through EDF funding marries the lack of a defined and definable goal of 
PeSCo with the interest of national states eager to use these funds to relieve their defense 
budgets.262 With the number of nations attracted to PeSCo, one can certainly say that the adopted 
approach of inclusivity has worked in its favor, but other than cooperation for the sake of itself 
this framework led by Germany is lacking a vision for the European community. 
Germany has been trying to reframe its own participation in NATO, for example through 
beginning to lobby for a new measurement other than the two percent threshold to better 
encapsulate German efforts.263 The two initiatives that have been proposed and greatly influenced 
by Germany in a way reflect the willingness to change the German narrative. Yet, while they offer 
smaller states to pursue defense and security cooperation with a larger magnet nation, they offer 
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only a modest vision for the future. German leadership attempts to uphold or reinstate a status-quo 
level of capabilities, through pooling of resources and cooperation, that is ultimately bound to the 
unambitious German security identity and constitutional restraint that relegates defense and 
security to a territorial or collective defense area. If the British leadership can be termed a negative 
one, the German one could be named pro forma leadership. 
France, on the other hand, appears to have a very clear idea of where it sees Europe or the 
transatlantic security community and is willing to steer it into that direction. President Macron has 
stirred the European Union and the United States since his ascension to the presidency with a 
number of speeches disruptive of the usual political sphere, two of whom are of special relevance 
and significance for the debate of this thesis. Early on in his presidency, in September 2017, 
Macron visited the Sorbonne university and held his New Initiative for Europe-speech264 in which 
he outlined his understanding of the challenges Europe faced and his proposals as French President 
on how to approach them. Macron highlights the necessity to build a political community, 
beginning in the field of security. He states that “Only Europe can, in a word, guarantee genuine 
sovereignty or our ability to exist in today’s world to defend our values and interests”265 stating 
that the double challenge common to all of Europe is the disengagement of the U.S and the threat 
from terrorism. European autonomy in defense is his remedy for both problems and his vision for 
Europe. A European Intervention Initiative, armed forces exchange with the French military, 
common defense budget and doctrine are Macron’s means to the end of development of shared 
strategic culture, which will in turn create the possibility to have lasting European autonomy. 
Accompanying his observation of American retrenchment from Europe, Macron identifies 
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Germany as the main partner to “inject decisive, practical momentum”266  into the European 
defense debate. Three years later, in 2020, Macron develops his vision for defense further in a 
speech at the Ecole de Guerre, the French War College. Pointing to a triple paradigm shift in the 
modern security realm, namely a strategic, legal-political and a technological shift, affecting 
Europe and France and necessitating autonomy from a diktat of foreign powers like the U.S., 
Macron sets this speech out to be a rough guideline towards further European and French 
engagement with each other and in global affairs. “France and Europe have a historic role to 
play”267, he asserts and links French ambition to necessary European engagement. Following his 
four-pillared solution to the security challenges, namely efficient multilateralism, strategic 
partnerships, European autonomy and national sovereignty, the French President establishes that 
he “firmly believe[s] that Europeans must first and foremost define together what their security 
interests are and sovereignly decide what is good for Europe”268. Macron while implying that 
France is different from the rest of Europe, he also acknowledges that “this ambition of France 
[…] cannot be realized without an extensive network of friendships, strategic partnerships and 
alliances […] because our security interests and responsibilities are global”269 and this network of 
partners and friends must first be strengthened on the European continent. With the goals of 
engaging Russia, as one immediate threat to European stability, disarmament and working towards 
multilateralization of international treaties on arms control, whose abrogation does affect France 
but cannot be influenced by France or Europe at the moment, Macron pledges to follow the path 
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of European autonomy the “European union already set for itself ”270. Macron’s France finds itself 
following a Europeanist vision, as other presidents have set it out to before Macron. While he 
asserts that NATO and European defense do not necessarily compete with each other, but are two 
different elements of European collective defense, he directly speaks to European publics and 
leaders when wondering about why the capabilities on the continent have been in disrepair and 
vastly underfunded. Macron’s determination to lead a change in European security becomes 
especially obvious towards the end of the speech, where he declares:  
“On that point, our independent decision-making is fully compatible with our unwavering 
solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and their defence 
[sic!] is the natural expression of our ever-closer solidarity. Let’s be clear: France’s vital 
interests now have a European dimension.”271  
 
Macron’s France continues to be “fiercely committed to remain master of its own destiny, 
within a refunded Europe for the common good”272  and in this regard mirrors the sentiment 
portrayed in British leadership, in that national sovereignty must be safeguarded at all costs. 
President Macron in his function as the political and strategic lead on French foreign and security 
policy, however, portrays an understanding for the need to cooperatively create and uphold a 
security community on the European continent. In cooperation with Germany he has pushed for 
the EDF and PeSCo, but rather than be content with a status-quo upholding framework that is 
tasked to ensure continued viability of European national armies, he also attempts to push the 
French ambition for global action onto the European partners. France currently leads the Security 
and Defence Committee (SEDE) of the European Parliament, despite a comparatively larger share 
of French seats held in that Committee as compared to the French participation of the related 
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membership of French officials.273 So while there certainly is a comparatively stronger interest in 
SEDE in France than in Germany, keeping in mind the larger share of German MEPs overall, 
bringing defense to the forefront of European parliament has not yet happened.274  
Following the Sorbonne speech, Macron led two initiatives that are set to alter the 
European defense landscape. First, he introduced the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in 
2018, a project for select countries to increase intervention interoperability and develop shared 
strategic culture, and second, he and Merkel signed the bilateral Franco-German Aachen Treaty in 
2019, which agreed on stronger cooperation and even integration of France and Germany in several 
issue areas and among them defense and security. The EI2 is penned as a direct reaction275 to the 
German-led inclusivity of PeSCo and is exclusive to a French invited selection276. Started with a 
small group of nations277 EI2 sits parallel to other multinational initiatives or frameworks but is 
not restricted to only EU or only NATO nations. Entry into EI2 is subject to will, shared point of 
view, ability and “operational added value”278. The ambition of the project is used as a pretext to 
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artificially create boundaries for states that are seen as unwilling or unable or not valuable to the 
strategic outlook of the French-led project. With the outlook on operational participation and the 
tying-in to French military establishments, the potential to focus mostly on French operational and 
strategic realms, a South-centric view not necessarily shared by partners, is high. Not only is this 
initiative focused on a minority of transatlantic security community members, excluding those not 
invited as unreliable, incapable to share an expected burden or incapable of sharing the same 
French vision, it also does not yet provide a common good to the community being built. The 
overall aim is to strengthen European autonomy through cultural, steered convergence, but the 
French lead suggests a bending towards French opinion. Through explicitly not inviting a larger 
part of the transatlantic and European spheres, Macron’s France attests all these nations are not 
trustworthy enough to become a member. Ambitious though it is, but at the same time cannibalizes 
on simultaneous European or NATO efforts, where nations that are member to two or all three 
have to spread their resources, political and economic, in yet another way. The inclusion of the 
U.K. in the initial invitee list on the one hand gives credit to French understanding of British 
capabilities and willingness to intervene, but also undermines potential EU cooperation on Brexit, 
or the convergence of EI2 with similar projects in PeSCo.  
The Aachen treaty mentioned above is the second noteworthy international treaty of the 
past years. In it, France and Germany agree to an additional layer of mutual protection, which 
specifically includes military action, concerted foreign affairs decisions and a new outlook on 
Africa among other things. 279  That the promise of military assistance 280  in a defense case 
 
279 See chapter 2 of: Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die 
deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit und Integration, January 22, 2019, Art. 2 – 8. 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/997532/1570126/fe6f6dd0ab3f06740e9c693849b72077/2019-
01-19-vertrag-von-aachen-data.pdf?download=1.  
280 For a German dissemination of the scope of the assistance paragraphs see: Deutscher Bundestag, “Die 
Beistandsklausel im Aachener Vertrag über die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit und 
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immediately raises the question of nuclear sharing is clear. Nuclear deterrence provided by the 
U.S. is one of the pillars of the transatlantic security sphere and Germany has participated in burden 
and risk sharing through its program of nuclear sharing with the U.S. While the Aachen treaty 
promises any means necessary, the French government has already declared it would not share its 
force de frappe capabilities with Germany.281 While this sentiment has its own long tradition, 
France is not member of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO and does not share information on 
his nuclear program with allies, the current situation and the opportunity of the Aachen treaty-
related dialogue could have been a great entry point for both nations to reassess their relationship 
vis-à-vis each other in nuclear terms, too. With the American will to uphold its deterrence 
commitments wavering, France missed a chance to provide this common good for both its self-
identified closest partner as well as the greater transatlantic area.  
Overall, France exhibits an ambitious, but impatient leadership. Impatience with its 
partners, most notably Germany, leads to French establishment of yet another layer of security 
projects with EI2. France has realized that its global ambition cannot be fulfilled through a solo-
act, thus it now tries to draw in European partners, but with a similar argument as the British is 
ultimately interested sole in French autonomy and sovereignty and the ability to act. Macron links 
France to Europe, through asserting French interests as European interests in his two speeches. 
But as is obvious France has yet to develop a willingness to expand a defense and security common 
 
Integration,“ Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Ausarbeitung WD 2 – 3000 – 136/19, March 22, 2019, 
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/645868/dc4693de6aaff54d814b7a4e9a4a524c/WD-2-036-19-pdf-
data.pdf. 
281 “NON, la France ne va pas partager sa puissance nucléaire avec l’Allemagne“. Government of France, “Traité 
d’Aix-la-Chapelle : qu’en est-il vraiment ? Le vrai du faux,” Frequently asked questions concerning the Aachen 




good to its partners. It is not yet able to trust the vast majority of transatlantic partners in terms of 
means or will or ideal with defense or security issues at its own heart.  
When taken altogether, these three nations exist on a scale from Atlanticist to Europeanist, 
with Germany floating in between with regard to where they wish to lead their own country to. 
But this is not all there is to it. There is also a sliding scale of trust apparent in the leadership 
decisions they have taken so far. On the one hand there is the United Kingdom, whose decision to 
not trust any defense or security relationship where it itself does not pull the levers puts it into the 
corner of least trust in the European partners. Reasserting sovereignty and duplicating many EU 
efforts in order to reseize control portrays a fundamental distrust in the interests and goals of other 
partners and especially Germany and France, as the other major EU players. France, too, values 
its sovereignty in the security realm, but has realized that without cooperation on seemingly equal 
footing, France itself cannot attain all its global goals. France therefore attempts to bring its own 
vision and ambition to the European table. This vision, however, still clearly lacks the European 
point of view. France is not interested in an inclusive security community and would rather only 
select those members most useful for its own goals, than the entire EU, European continent or 
transatlantic area. Germany is the one country least interested in reasserting its own autonomy and 
is willing to lead projects for the public good and take over a larger part of burden sharing for the 
projects than less-able or less affluent, smaller countries can. However, Germany lacks any grand 
vision or ambition for the security community. Instead, Germany pursues a status-quo objective. 
While this is coupled with growing defense investment and more engagement, it does not exceed 
any capability level previously existent. The Federal Republic is set on mending the holes in the 
security carpet, rather than creating a new fabric. 
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To summarize, the leadership positions of all three nations naturally differ, but with 
respect to the level of trust portrayed to the other focus nations or other member states of the 
community, there is a differing amount of mistrust visible. Additionally, a community goal and 
the willingness to provide the bulk of a burden or a unifying, inclusive vision has not emerged 
between the three nations or any single nation. 
A final case study to look at is the non-governmental outlook on defense and the security 
community. Since all three nations are democratic, the public and its shared strategic identity is 
highly relevant for the maneuvering room of the political elite that create or maintain international 
cooperation. 
3.3.3. Visualizing the public 
As the final case study, a step away from official governmental positions and practice is 
necessary to provide a rounded answer to the research question. As the first case study has shown, 
very different security identities are visible in the constitutional and practical arrangements of the 
three focus nations. The image of the three individual identities, however, must be further 
solidified through an investigation of the domestic publics of each nation. Taking a step back from 
the sole focus on governments, constitutions and leadership figures or actions, this case study adds 
another layer to the question about domestic barriers to integration and cooperation. Despite the 
potentially uninhibited powers of the executive in some of the focus nations, they remain 
democracies and need to work with or through the domestic will. Through a look at the 
understanding of the domestic view on security, threat and the ability or necessity to cooperate, 
the findings of the previous two case studies are solidified. First, similarities and differences in 
domestic security outlooks are highlighted. Following this, a more pointed look at confidence and 
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trust is cast. This also includes a look at the greater transatlantic or European public, to gauge 
general tendencies for later analysis.  
A first look at the domestic understanding of the security realm necessarily asks about 
what the perception of threat and its potential differences are. Most recent polls concerning global 
threats have all three publics see similar threats but in different intensities. The biggest threat is 
seen to be climate change in France and Germany and spreading of disease in the United 
Kingdom,282 which is likely a mirror of the devastating effects of the ongoing global pandemic on 
the island nation. The second in line is either terror for France, cyberattacks for Germany or 
Climate Change for the U.K.283  When looking at the polled threats more closely relevant to 
security, namely terrorism, cyber-attacks or the effects and spread of nuclear weapons, while more 
than half of respondents see these as major threats, the French public (80%, 71%, 71% of 
respondents name terrorism, cyberattacks and spread of nuclear weapons as major threats to their 
country is arguably more concerned than both the German (59%, 64%, 64%) and British (65%, 
63%, 50%) one with regard to these specific issues.284 An earlier Pew Research Center study 
included the power and influence of the U.S., Russia and China as potential threats to respondent’s 
countries and here, too, relevant differences in perception are obvious. Both French and German 
publics find the U.S. influence greatly more threatening than the other two with 49% of 
respondents answering this way. For the U.K. this perception is around 37%. Concerning Russia 
and China, the three nations’ publics answered thus: France 40% and 40%, Germany 30% and 
33% and the U.K. 45% and 29%. 285 The raised mistrust over U.S. American influence correlates 
 
282 Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Despite Pandemic, Many European Still See Climate Change as Greatest 
Threat to Their Countries,” Pew Research Center (September 2020), 4. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Poushter and Huang Climate Change as Greatest Threat 2020, 9. 
285 Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Climate Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but Cyberattacks a 
Rising Concern,” Pew Research Center (February 2019), 3.  
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to the Trump presidency. These different nuances in levels of threat and specific threats perceived 
in all three focus nations are relevant for the domestic win-sets of political elites making policy. A 
divergent perception of threat, however, does not mean cooperation or leadership in security 
communities is impossible. As has been stated previously, if states are willing to act on behalf of 
others’ concerns or expand their security umbrella over them these nuances do not factor in as 
much. Therefore, a look at focus nation public perception of the security realm and their nation’s 
position within it is necessary.  
Paired with a general outlook on the necessity or utility of armed conflict showing 
Germany (3% strongly agree, 23% agree in total) distrustful of military means in general and the 
U.K. (10%, 53%) as most in favor with France (6%, 33%) in between286 and a greater level of 
distrust into the national military in Germany than the other two nations287, the German domestic 
public is not only less concerned about military threats but also of a more pacifist outlook than the 
other two states. This correlates with the outlook of all three nations on their specific leadership 
place in global affairs, with the British public most strongly believing in a British responsibility 
for moral leadership (33% strongly believe, 86% believe overall), followed by France (26%, 79%) 
and Germany (21%, 72%).288 Contextualizing this public perception of a responsibility to lead 
with the willingness to employ arms, these three nations have a more nuanced outlook on their 
 
286Darrel Bricker, “World Affairs: Citizens in 27 Countries Assess Engagement in International Affairs for a Global 
Perspective”, Ipsos Global Public Affairs (November 2018), 54, 
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alliance-mandated responsibility to perform in military crises. In a 2019 YouGov poll289, when 
asked whether the home country should or should not take up arms to assist an ally in case of 
Russian attack, there was a clear divide between each nation’s public willingness to step up. 
Additionally, the hypothetical country under attack mattered for the response, showing an overall 
disinclination of all three nations to assist Turkey foremost (31% of Britons, 14% of Germans and 
18% of French supported use of military force), but also visibly less motivation to assist Latvia, 
Romania or Croatia with military means. The U.S. is another country that did not entice clear will 
to protect by Germany and France. When looking at will to protect each other the little over half 
of the respondents answered positively. Consistently, the U.K. public scored highest in using 
military force for allied protection and Germany and France are tied for a low public backing of 
military aid to allied nations and European neighbors. These scores are in contrast to the respective 
countries’ general acceptance of article five, the NATO mutual defense clause, obligations (66% 
U.K., 58% German, 53% French respondents think their country should maintain their article five 
commitment). All three nations have a higher response to the general idea of article five 
commitment, than ready commitment for specific nations. A Pew poll underlines these findings 
showing public perception in both Germany (60%) and France (53%) are against the use of military 
force related to article five. Out of the three, only British respondents committed to the mutual 
defense clause with a majority (55%).290 This public sentiment of a lack of need to adhere to the 
central allied norm of mutual defense must be contextualized with the overall waning of not only 
 
289 All data in this paragraph taken from the Eurotrack and U.S. NATO Survey Results unless otherwise noted. 
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the leadership position of the U.S. within NATO, but NATO itself. Favor for the premier institution 
of the transatlantic security realm has decreased over the last decade markedly in both continental 
European countries, moving from 71% in 2009 to 49% in 2019 in France and from 73% to 57% in 
Germany in the same time frame.291  
Given that two out of three focus nations’ publics have increasing doubts over NATO and 
there is a visible public reluctance to accept the responsibility in case of defense, a more direct 
question concerning trust in focus nations needs to be asked. When asked about the confidence in 
current leaders of Western nations to “do the right thing regarding world affairs”292, 76% of British 
respondents reported trust in Angela Merkel, 64% in Emmanuel Macron and just over half reported 
confidence in their own Prime Minister Boris Johnson. 78%, 52% and 35% of French respondents 
reported trust into the above-mentioned leaders in the same order. Germany’s public response 
turned out to 81%, 71% and 27% of responder’s trusting domestic and foreign leaders.293 The 
study points to long-term dynamics behind these numbers rather than the ongoing pandemic 
situation and has pointed to great continuity, especially considering the view of Chancellor Merkel. 
This public trust in German leadership stands in direct contrast of the above found German 
unwillingness to use arms both in general and in the NATO context. The constrained and pacifist 
German security identity pervasive within the German population does however mean that the 
likelihood of Germany instigating a conflict that would draw in unwilling and unrelated partners 
is smaller than in the United Kingdom with a public perceptive of a British moral responsibility 
and will to engage globally and through military means. 
 
291 U.K. opinion rose by two percentage points from 53% to 55%. Fagan and Poushter, “NATO seen favorably”. 
292 Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf and Mara Mordecai, “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country 
Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Research Report, Pew Research Center September 15, 2020, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-
handled-coronavirus-badly/. 
293 Ibid.  
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Moving away from solely public polls, and looking at international cooperation and 
coalition perception through polls with professionals and academics, it is revealed that Germany, 
followed by France and then the U.K. is perceived as either the most or one of the most important 
partners in security in Europe. 294  When it comes to integrated foreign and security policy, 
Germany is seen by experts to favor an EU level, France a treaty-based approach excluding 
unwanted EU partners and the U.K. only informal cooperation, which would infringe the least 
upon their sovereignty.295 Defense cooperation specifically is perceived to be even more delegated 
away from grand, EU scale cooperation, despite PeSCo and other projects already being in their 
early phases. Germany is seen to prefer smaller, treaty-based cooperation, France is alleged to 
favor informal cooperation and the U.K. mainly favors the national, domestic level.296 In terms of 
wider European cooperation, Germany is seen as the most favored partner, followed by France, 
the U.K. only factors in on seventh place and neither German nor French respondents list Great 
Britain as one of their top three choices.297 Given that U.K. is seen as one of the most disappointing 
EU members298, which certainly links to Brexit, this should come as no surprise. As most members 
of the transatlantic security community are also members of the EU, this disappointment in British 
cooperation is due to Brexit, trust towards the U.K. has been lastingly negatively impacted. 
Another layer of importance is that the U.K. has been viewing Germany and France as the most 
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influential nations within the EU299, Brexit and taking back control can therefore be seen as 
emancipation from German or French rule. Brexit in itself therefore must be understood as a vote 
of no confidence in both of these nations. 
Taken altogether, this case study reveals continuities between German, French and British 
constitutional and practical security and defense behavior and their public opinion. Germans and 
Germany are deeply distrustful of the security realm and are unlikely to have broad public backing 
for the use of arms, even in case of the solidarity of NATO nations manifested in article five. The 
public also comparatively feels less inclined to act and influence on a global scale than do the other 
two nations’ publics. With the apparent level of mistrust in the security realm and burden sharing 
in defense cooperation, a potential increase of responsibility for the German state appears rather 
difficult. Despite this, Germany is perceived to be a central, if not the central player in European 
continental cooperation both in general, as well as in defense affairs. With an unadventurous public, 
Germany can certainly be seen as a safe choice that will not conjure up wars, but its reliability 
must be questioned given the public reluctance to military support. The British public can be said 
to be diametrically opposed on the other end of the spectrum, with a mind of global responsibility 
and public backing for the use of force. With the greatest backing of article five burden sharing, 
its commitment to the alliance appears trustworthy. However, the British public is less inclined to 
cooperate in the defense field on a broader scale and the overall orientation of the public remains 
with the U.S. The brinkmanship of the recent Prime Ministers, additionally, have rendered the U.K. 
as well as the U.K. leadership in form of Boris Johnson as untrustworthy. France meanders in 
between both these nations, being a trusted partner under trusted leadership, but equally 
 
299 For example, U.K. respondents assert that Germany is the EU leader in fiscal and border and migration policy, 
and France the second most influential in fiscal as well as foreign, security and defense policy. Janning et al., “EU 
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disillusioned by NATO and the U.S. as Germany and less inclined to cooperate in the common 
defense in a EU context than Germany. Similar tendencies have been described in the previous 
two case studies.  
With all case studies explored, it remains to condense the findings and apply them to the 
central research question. The following chapter focuses on the integrative analysis of the above 
three case studies and the answering of the research question. 
3.4. Analysis and limitations 
The previous chapters have investigated the state of the transatlantic security community, 
detailing on the dynamic of American retrenchment and which states have the potential to contend 
for an increased responsibility or leadership position within the security community. In the past 
years and decades the U.S. has shifted its focus away from Europe and European defense, a 
dynamic that has been accelerated by the current administration, and for the security community 
to continue existing in a working fashion an increase in cooperation or integration of the other 
member states is paramount. So far, initiatives on the continent have not led to new leadership 
within the community or to a dynamic countering the American shift of focus and the European 
loss of trust in U.S. leadership and the security umbrella. Given what is at stake, namely the future 
existence of the transatlantic security community, the question arises what internal barriers exist 
within Europe that have and will likely continue to hinder security cooperation and integration. 
The chapter above have set out to explore this question. First a choice of essential nations for any 
further cooperation was made. The choice was based on NATO membership, as NATO is the 
oldest institutional manifestation of the security community. Other layers of security that have 
been built, like the European Union and its External Action Service, EU Battlegroups et cetera, 
are based on the base layer of security community that NATO represents, just in a more exclusive 
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format. Within the community, three nations were identified following their engagement with 
NATO itself, their geographic and population size, economic and political weight in security 
community institutions as subjects for further study. These are the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Republic of France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, parameters for the inquiry were set. 
The functioning of security communities, but especially that of a mature pluralistic security 
community, is dependent on a convergence of security identities between members, a leading state 
formulating a community vision, goal or character that other states rally around and get drawn into 
and mutual trust, which enables cooperation and integration. The case studies conducted above 
investigated these elements, in three individual chapters, one focused on the institutionalized forms 
of security identities, one on leadership behavior exhibited by all three nations in the recent past 
and one investigating public opinion, which further rounded out the security identities in question 
and illuminated more deeply on mutual trust. 
This chapter sets out to condense the findings above and apply them to the research 
question of this thesis. Following the three case study focus points on the portrayal and 
manifestation of defense and the security realm in constitutional and practical governmental 
realities and action, the understanding of leadership and the public approach to security, the 
following compiles and synthesizes the case studies to clearly identify the security identities of all 
three nations. Based on this the differences in security identity, the security goals or vision and 
their applicability to the wider security community are discussed. This ultimately leads to the 
foundational dynamic on which a security community is based, trust and responsibility, and a 
discussion of Germany, France, and the U.K. in this context. Following a look at uni-, bi- or 
multilateral non-U.S. leadership of NATO and the transatlantic security community, this chapter 
closes the thesis’ investigation of the lead question on what internal barriers within Europe hinder 
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further cooperation and integration with a discussion of the wider meaning of these results for the 
community at hand and the theory of security communities. 
3.4.1. Identity 
Through all three case studies, different aspects of German, French and British security 
identity have been illuminated. If a spectrum were to be drawn, Germany would find itself on the 
end opposite of both France and the United Kingdom. Institutionalized in the Grundgesetz, the 
German Basic Law or constitution, and pervasive through the German population is a weariness 
and mistrust of the military and its power or political use. The German security identity revolves 
around the image of a civil state and power that does not entangle itself in foreign conflicts but 
cooperates on consensus-based decision-making with a wide basis. This has led to a severely 
limited executive in the defense realm in comparison to the other two nations and with-it 
limitations on cooperation potential. Germany has a decidedly nonglobal perspective of its security 
and shirks away from military use, even if to defend or assist allies, other than for example training 
missions of foreign military which could make further German interference obsolete. The German 
security identity can be described as unambitious and conservative, as in trying to conserve a state 
of being rather than conservative realist, but without a realistic look at the consequent necessities 
to not only reap the benefits but also shoulder the responsibilities. With its attempt at all-
encompassing and low-entry barrier cooperation, Germany portrays an interest in cooperation on 
other states’ terms to a degree of nonaccountability of the others and follows a way of least 
resistance without setting clear ambitions and boundaries. 
France and the United Kingdom appear towards the other end of the spectrum, sharing 
similarities in their security identities without being entirely congruent. With leaders 
institutionalized as nearly all-powerful executive decision-makers in the security and defense 
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realm without civil mechanisms of control, their identity encompasses a high level of trust in the 
military and its use as well as the power of leaders. Both nations understand themselves as global 
players and world powers with different points of focus, Africa for France and the Middle East for 
Great Britain. Defense and security are high on their national agenda, but the French population 
appears to have comparatively more and stronger feelings of threat then both their direct neighbor 
Germany or their insular ally across the channel. Both highly value autonomy and sovereignty, 
seen in French calls for European emancipation from the U.S. and their value of the force de frappe, 
but the question of sovereignty has brought the U.K. to leave the European Union, shirking 
cooperation and integration in the defense field, too. French identity incorporates a European idea, 
imagining Europe and European security as an extension of France and French ambitions. Where 
German identity shows a lack of ambition but a knack for cooperation, France and the U.K. are 
active and ambitious, but show a disregard for the interests of partners and allies, with the U.K. 
seeing itself as in the U.S. global power tradition and, of course, the legacy of the British Empire, 
and France impatiently focusing on formative influence on Europe. 
While a mature security community does not require absolute congruence of the security 
identities of all member states, the identity of the leading state needs to be able to function as an 
umbrella under which the members can and want to fit. For states with the self-image of global 
influence and power and positive outlook on security and defense, fitting under a purely reactive, 
defense-critical security identity to secure the continuation of the transatlantic security community 
and its formerly global outlook must be regarded as unlikely. Similarly, if following a more active 
leader means being drawn into conflicts itself, a status-quo state without interests ranging widely 
outside its own state borders will encounter difficulties both with its own population and with 
partner states.  
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At the same time, larger similarity between security identities does not translate into better 
cooperation either. France and the U.K. arguably show quite similar outlooks on security, with 
their focus on sovereignty, their global interest etc. Yet, the character of their identities complicates 
cooperation. Two states valuing their autonomy cannot but face difficulties integrating their 
diverging priorities and interest in influence into single, cooperative policy. Instead, not the 
amount of similarity of security identities, but rather the compatibility within any given 
cooperative setting is important for functioning community. Even if a wide gap between both 
leaders’ and members’ identities exist a unifying vision or goal regarding the community could 
continue mutual attraction and cooperation if the fulfilment of the vision positively affects all sides. 
Of course, security itself is a unifying core of any security community, but the questions of means, 
ends, boundaries and dissemination of burden remain.  
3.4.2. Community vision 
With the most pressing perceived threats being essentially nonmilitary, as terrorism 
reverberates between the domestic police sphere and military defense through missions against 
nonmilitary adversaries abroad it is difficult to count it as a typical threat in military security, a 
threat such as the Soviet union at the beginning of NATO’s founding is not in existence at this 
point of time. So far dependent on the security guarantee of the U.S., Germany has optically begun 
an intensification of efforts in the defense field. These, however, do not aim to catapult Germany 
into the frontlines of security community agenda-setting. Despite the nominal proclamations of 
leadership interest, Germany’s efforts must be seen as attempts at preserving the status quo. 
Envisioning more cooperation within Europe has led to some success in gathering member states’ 
support, but not to the extent that they overwhelmingly entrust Germany with their defense. 
German efforts as a framework nation also do not consider what partners’ problems and interests 
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are but must be seen as an attempt to even out the holes in the German defense landscape that 
caters to breadth before depth on too small a budget. Foreign engagement is not a national goal 
and taking over responsibility in a European context professed by German political elites has to be 
seen in light of the parliamentary influence potential and the civil negation of military use even in 
an allied context. 
In contrast to this, France has a more outward vision of security. Judging that the global 
standing and agenda France sees itself in and would like to protect will be more and more difficult 
without willing and trustworthy partners, France under Macron actively searches for such partners 
in a European context. French ambition is especially pronounced regarding Africa and intervention 
in African countries which ties into the French counterterrorism agenda and historic, colonial ties 
to the region. France has displayed a will to push for and lead coalitions of the willing and trusted 
as seen with EI2 but is less inclined to tackle wider communities that could potentially disagree 
with or hamper French decision making. Following from this, one could say that France has a 
vision for itself and searches for cooperation to achieve that, but does not have a vision for a 
European dimension of security other than autonomy from the U.S. While it has sought stronger 
partnership with the U.K. and more recently Germany, ultimately it is not willing to provide more 
in terms of security as the partner can. This makes France transactional and a suitable alliance 
partner mostly for states on equal capability footing but collides with the understanding of security 
community leadership and the necessity of burden-sharing imbalance. 
In a similar vein, the U.K. has a global vision of itself and its sphere of influence and 
security interests. Contrary to France, however, this does not include a European component 
anymore. With a strong focus on sovereignty, any potential influence on British decision-making 
and foreign or security policy must be denied and fought. Cooperation is only attempted when the 
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United Kingdom has all decision-making power, leaving other states in the situation as stooges to 
British will without the possibility to shape or influence. The U.K. is willing to go it alone, even 
if that means infringing upon the potential security of NATO allies, through cannibalizing on 
limited defense budgets of partners through duplication of defense efforts. 
This again shows a stratification of all three nations across a spectrum. There is a 
divergence of global versus local outlook, a divergence in European versus non-European self-
image and an active/reactive difference. None of these three nations formulate a vision for either 
NATO or Europe (with or without NATO) that can easily be accepted by the other two, and 
potentially not a majority of the member states of the current transatlantic security community. 
Lack of vision and a divergence in security identity certainly inhibit any form of cooperation or 
even integration over the amount already in place. These two elements, however, could be 
overcome by trust into each nation or the willingness to assume responsibility by each nation. 
3.4.3. Responsibility and trust 
Security communities function through states willing to curb their sovereignty to a degree 
and through placing themselves in a relationship of dependence to each other for the merit of a 
greater good, namely the creation of security for all. That entails the leading states to assume 
responsibility for the interests of the member states and their willingness to be in a way influenced 
by external interests that might go counter to domestic will or that might diminish a country’s own 
decision-making power. When assessing the three focus nations through a look at their security 
identities, their leadership behavior, security vision and popular opinion, it becomes obvious that 




Germany has professed an understanding of the fact that sovereignty needs to be infringed 
upon to a certain degree to keep the transatlantic security community and European security alive. 
Its broad outreach for consensus shows an acceptance of the fact that the interests of others need 
to be taken into account. At the same time, Germany has not only lost confidence in the U.S. but 
the U.K. through Brexit as well, making any meaningful defense cooperation with the insular 
neighbor difficult. If a more benign project like the EU is thwarted by the U.K., how can any 
continental state trust in a British defense commitment. Also, German responsibility does not 
extend further than its own borders. Intensification of defense commitment with France 
notwithstanding, the German security identity portrays an unwillingness to take over military 
responsibility. Executive power over military use is commonly frowned upon and deeply 
mistrusted, which cannot do else but extent to nations with seemingly all-powerful leadership in 
security matters. 
France, too, has begun to value closer cooperation with a caveat. Driven by economic 
necessity rather than trust in other states, France is searching for select and trusted partners for 
their agenda, rather than for the providing of a common good for the community. It partakes in 
large-scale formats like PeSCo in order to extend its influence but favors select coalitions of the 
willing. This points to a lack of trust in the community. Autonomy is a central value to the French 
security sphere, meaning that is does not intend to rely on and trust other states with their security, 
and it also is not willing to extend all their means for the security guarantee, shirking away from 
the responsibility of leadership in the sense of security communities. 
When looking at the U.K. and the issue of trust and responsibility, one cannot move far 
without having to address Brexit. This historic milestone of British foreign policy is certainly very 
important evidence of a general lack of trust in continental partners, especially Germany and 
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France as the most prominent EU nations. The United Kingdom values strategic autonomy, 
sovereignty and global influence so strongly that it actively hinders cooperation. Rather than trust 
in decisions of NATO partners other than the U.S., the U.K. rather establishes their own parallel 
system. While public opinion values the defense commitment within NATO, the U.K. is unwilling 
to shoulder responsibility for allies, since that would mean an impingement on their sovereign 
decision-making and interest. Their relationship to the U.S. is too seen as on equal footing rather 
than in terms of dependence, meaning that the U.K. self-image disregards differences in 
capabilities and hierarchy for the sake of their image of sovereignty. 
Taken altogether, a lack of trust into each other, exacerbated by and representative of 
diverging security identity that is manifested in leadership, constitution and public opinion hinders 
European defense cooperation and integration. Unilateral leadership through any of the three 
nations would require a degree of submission of the other two to the interests and values of the 
one that must be considered as highly unlikely, given the divergences laid out above and the lack 
of trust between all of them. Bi- or trilateral leadership cooperation of these three focus nations is 
complicated by the issues previously investigated as well. Out of all three, the United Kingdom is 
certainly the least trusted and the least interested in taking over responsibility and extending 
security to others at the expense of its own sovereignty. That leaves Germany and France, who 
have shown growing cooperation between each other. Germany certainly has a larger following in 
the security sphere within Europe than does France. Therefore, it could be an essential magnet for 
the security community. However, its stance on the use of military and executive power and 
therefore the credibility of its potential defense guarantee to any partner cannot be seen as 
trustworthy. This could be ameliorated by a partner with a more proactive, regional outlook onto 
security. France has such a more proactive outlook and has formulated a certain vision but shows 
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distrust in partner nations and is not willing to take responsibility to all corners of its abilities, as 
it explicitly refrains from extending the nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the security outlook France 
has placed into the center of the agenda, counterterrorism in Africa, is not shared by Germany and 
others as are their concerns not regarded by France. Trust is again an underlying feature that 
hinders the emergence of a reliable Franco-German bilateral co-lead of the transatlantic security 
community. This lack of trust has efficiently hindered the ascend of any of the three nations onto 
a stronger leadership position.  
3.4.4. Entanglement and loss of trust 
In the past decades Europe has been rocked by several crises that began to show the fault 
lines dividing the EU member states. A number of stumbling blocks between the nations have 
crystallized into a Europe of regions or coalitions, which are pitted against each other in various 
crises and political debates. One continuous stumbling block is fiscal policy in various forms. 
There is a divide between member states using the Euro and those states that purposefully did not 
choose to do so or did not meet the economic threshold to adopt the shared currency. The global 
financial become Euro crisis brought the more frugal states into conflict with the less wealthy 
south, austerity measures as championed by Germany have hurt Greece and other Southern states 
badly. Taxation is an additional layer, where tax havens like Ireland and Luxemburg band together 
against states interested in accessing the tech giants harboring there. Another obvious example of 
inner-European dissent is the migration crisis. Asylum seekers fleeing the Syrian civil war and 
other conflicts disproportionately affect the Southern states, like Italy and Greece, where they 
arrive on European soil and the states with small populations where they go to live, like Hungary 
and Sweden. If and how and where refugees should receive help, and in which form, is highly 
contested and leads to recurring stand-offs between groups of states in the EU context. The north-
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south divide has recently seen a dramatic new element: COVID-19. Frugal nations, like the 
Netherlands or Sweden and Austria, block aid in form of grants, favoring loans. Nations like Italy, 
hard-hit by the virus, initial refusals of help by neighbors at the beginning of the pandemic and 
with a struggling economy, are faced with a united front of richer states unwilling to grant them 
much needed help, as loans might adversely affect their economy. Struggles over influencing 
domestic dynamics, like the growing authoritarianism and populism in Hungary or Poland, 
introduce additional angles. And in all these cases, the EU member states having to reach decisions 
and having direct interests in the topics at stake, trust is left behind piece by piece. Referring to the 
security sphere, one of the best examples of this interstate loss of trust is Brexit. Brexit is not a 
rebuke of only the contended German, French or EU defense cooperation, but rather a rebuke of 
overall foreign interference in any British affair, be it health care, migration, trade, or defense. 
General trends within European nations have shown a north-south regional divide, as well as a 
center-east one, affluent versus struggling, proactive vs reactive. The stratification within the EU 
is mirrored in the three nations chosen for the case studies above. 
Europe, through its very tight net of interaction means the stakes of each single nation in 
each other’s decision making are higher than between partners or allies more distant and less 
interconnected. More contact in more areas of interest equates to more potential for conflicting 
interests. Consequently, more conflicts of interest mean trust is contested and eroded with every 
adverse decision. When other areas of clashing interest are removed and cooperation could be 
reduced to solely the security sphere, trusting a partner would be based on a less complex and 
varied common experience. This means a security guarantee from a state otherwise less interested 
in shaping one another’s domestic policy through European affairs, could have higher hopes for 
continued and wider followership than a state deeply entangled in all manners of contentious and 
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wide-ranging policy with direct effect on its partners. The United States of America have been 
such a state. While they were and are of course involved in European affairs, extending their 
influence through the United Kingdom, using sanctions to influence European decision-making, 
as happens in the case of Nordstream 2, or the multitude of other ways employed by a global power 
in international affairs, they have arguably been less entangled than any EU member state simply 
by nature of their membership. Trusting in the actions of a state with a lower stake and less interest 
in one’s own affairs can be considered easier than trusting another with whom one has been in 
continuous debate and conflict over all manner of policies. It is therefore safe to say that the United 
States have had a better position to have feelings of trusts developed towards them than any of the 
three focus nations in this study.  
3.4.5. Barriers to cooperation 
Given the loss of trust and the introduction of transactionality and conditionality into the 
transatlantic security community in between the U.S. and its partners, especially the three big 
European players, the question a rises what a further reduction of U.S. engagement, up to an overall 
exit from NATO, could mean for the transatlantic security community. The U.S. is already scaling 
back commitments, which has been met with some efforts to equal out said losses. Germany, for 
example has pledged to raise its expenditure for NATO to the reduced American level, France and 
the U.K. are increasing their defense budget and the development of new combat systems is 
intended to address capability shortfalls that would be exacerbated by further American 
retrenchment. But a growing disengagement of the U.S. from NATO necessitates more 
cooperation on the part of the remaining partners, especially from leaders, to even sustain the status 
quo. With a return of geopolitics and increasingly assertive Russia and China, conflicts close to 
Europe and potentially involving EU and NATO members, like unrest in Belarus inviting Russian 
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action to Polish dismay or Armenian conflict with Azerbaijan that could involve Turkey, and 
destabilizing effects of continued climate change leading to growing migration towards Europe as 
well as resource conflicts, NATO is faced with the need to make decisions that are increasingly 
outside the preservation of the status quo. The current dynamic shows the need for more 
coordination and more action, meaning there is a need for more unified security goals and foreign 
policy convergence within the security community. This necessitates even further cooperation and 
integration, and therefore trust, between the remaining interested and involved members of NATO. 
If the current level of cooperation cannot be increased due to the inherent lack of trust and the 
divergence of security identity between the nations most important for the future of the security 
community over the amount that has been reached, NATO cannot function. The transatlantic 
security community, without an anchor grounding it in policy and a magnet to hold it together, 
would likely fracture further as disfunction begets mistrust. Without a concerned, trusted and 
responsible leader or group of leaders a security community is unable to halt its decay. Until at 
least the collapse of the Soviet Union, this position was filled by the United States. Less entangled 
in the intricacies of EU or European affairs, trusted, concerned about partner’s security and willing 
to bear an outsize burden, the U.S. was the essential ally in European security. The future of the 
transatlantic security community depends on a repetition of this kind of leadership, and the image 
of European security illuminated in this thesis shows that internal barriers bar Germany, France 
and the U.K. to take up that mantle. These barriers are their security identity differences, lack of 
leadership, responsibility and, ultimately, trust. 
3.4.6. Stratified security community 
The study results above must also be taken a step further. As identity manifests over a 
long period of time is only changes slowly, the stark ideational differences between all focus 
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nations are not a product of these past years. The problems arising from these different security 
identities have existed before and they only move into stronger focus now that the U.S. is heading 
down a different path and turning away from leadership in the transatlantic security community.  
As was shown, the most prominent members of the community not only have different 
security identities and dependent interests, but also do not universally share mutual trust. As the 
premier example of a mature pluralistic security community the revelation of internal lack of trust 
coupled with a discernable hierarchy of these three states in the view of other members, diverging 
security identities and interests and no uniform understanding of threats or visions for the future 
one must wonder whether the expectations of collective identity, shared way of life, uniform trust 
are not too idealistic to be applicable to the transatlantic security community. If the collective 
identity steered by the U.S. but uniformly carried by all members were as universal as the theory 
expects, one could expect to see more trust between the members next in line and the problem at 
hand, namely why there is no furthering of cooperation or integration above the status quo, would 
not be as dire as it is. Instead it appears that within the community several different identities exist, 
attracting more or less other states. Trust, too, is not shared on an equal basis, but was higher 
towards the U.S. as a leader and differing degrees of lower towards other European partners. 
Similar security identities, like with France and the U.K., do not necessarily lead to growing 
cooperation, instead similar interests, like between France and Germany in the case of the Aachen 
treaty, support cooperation. Outside of these shared interests, competition persists within the 
transatlantic security community. This competition has so far not led to the disappearance of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change, which is one of the main signifiers of the existence 
of a security community. While member states do not necessarily trust each other with acting in 
one’s own interest, they also have not begun to fear each other again. U.S. underhanded threats of 
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potentially leaving NATO have diminished trust into its leadership, but not into its membership in 
the security community. As the community persists, but identity and trust are not as mutual and 
uniform as has to be expected following the theory, the central value of both for the continued 
existence needs to be adjusted.  
Adler and Barnett’s security communities exist on a three-step ladder from nascent over 
ascendant to mature, and within the mature category on a sliding scale from tightly to loosely 
coupled. Once the mature stage is reached, which is defined as reaching dependable expectations 
of peaceful change and having attained a degree of collective identity, the degree of integration 
becomes their identifier. Some authors use this to classify the EU as more tightly coupled as NATO, 
despite the EU being entirely dependent on the NATO security guarantee. This classification 
seems to serve as a tool to highlight the nations pathway towards ultimate amalgamation, but 
glosses over the fact that, as was shown above, even tight couplings have diverging identities and 
disregarding the convergence of interests and the role of leadership and hierarchy of trusts within 
the workings of security communities.  
While interests are dependent on identity, this thesis not only points to a greater role of 
interests in the degree and success of cooperation. European nations and the U.S. were able to form 
this community based on mutual interests, but the identities of the nations involved did not change 
substantially over time. This thesis, too, shows that a widely shared and very congruent collective 
identity cannot be taken for granted within security communities. In order to better focus on the 
prevalence of diverging identities, as well as on the relevance of interests, highlighting the degree 
of stratification of security communities must be relevant and illuminating. As in the case of the 
transatlantic security community, dividing it into tightly coupled and loosely coupled communities 
is not target-oriented, as one would not exist without the other. Understanding the transatlantic 
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security community as a widely stratified security community, one can both incorporate the 
different mosaic pieces of cooperation that have grown within the community, like the EU, 
different FNCs or bilateral treaties, and at the same time point to the dynamics of competition and 
differences in trust or collective identity. Understanding security communities in terms of 
stratification also makes room for the idea of hierarchy. The extant theory admits to the existence 
and importance of leadership within security communities but does not further define it and does 
not detail about hierarchy between non-leading members. Yet, the differing levels of trust vis-à-
vis each other show that member states do understand each other in terms of a hierarchy. 
Stratification also serves to highlight clustering of nations within security communities around 
certain issue areas or identities, making identity not only a check point to be reached but an issue 
that needs to be understood and highlighted separately to better understand the dynamics of 
security communities.  
Introducing stratification as a measurement of mature security communities does not 
mean trust, leadership, and identity as the pillars of security communities are irrelevant. They are 
still important thresholds to be reached to attain maturity in the sense set out by Adler and Barnett. 
However, once these thresholds are reached previous theory lost interest in them and only focused 
on the degree of cooperation and integration. As these are dependent on these pillars, 
understanding a security community as a stratified system of groups of states, trust, leadership, 






This thesis has set out to answer the question what internal barriers exist hindering further 
European security cooperation and integration. Given the mounting external pressure and the 
apparent abdication of leadership by the U.S. answering this question helps understanding a major 
problem in the alliance dynamic of NATO and the general transatlantic security community. 
Following an exploration of the theoretical background on security communities and their 
development and necessary conditions as well as dynamics of decay, variables important for the 
continued functioning of a mature, pluralistic security community were identified as the existence 
of leadership, responsibility, a vision, compatible security identities and first and foremost trust 
between the members and especially towards the states in a leadership position. Looking at 
contenders for such a position, Germany, France, and the U.K. were identified as focus nations 
and then subsequently illuminated in three case studies. These case studies on the standing of 
defense, both in constitution and in practice, understanding leadership of each nation as well as 
highlighting the public opinion have shown distinct differences in the security identities and 
follow-up behavior by all three states. When contrasting these results it became apparent that the 
factor of trust was missing, effectively disabling all three nations to ascend to a more relevant 
position within the security community and intensifying cooperation and integration in a way 
necessary to counter American retrenchment. Without American leadership reminiscent of earlier 
decades, the transatlantic security community is likely to continue fraying.  
Whether it could be salvaged in smaller versions largely depends on the development of 
trust and the willingness to take up responsibility by any of the three focus nations. Franco-German 
cooperation is less disadvantaged than British leadership participation but still necessitates major 
changes in either or both nations.  
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While this study has only illuminated the identities of the three major players, cooperation 
of which is necessary for the continuation of NATO, other member states have had to be 
disregarded for the sake of the length of the study. However, even with a new leadership, the 
potential acceptance of this relies on the wider member audience. A look at transatlantic trust 
towards France, Germany and the United Kingdom could help shed another light on the potential 
effects of their leadership. For the sake of the European project and one of if not the only mature 
pluralistic security community in existence, that has enabled Europe to be free of violent interstate 
conflict for decades and brought about the post-modern sphere in which millions thrive, one must 
hope the die has not yet fallen.  
For the wider literature on security communities, this thesis has shown that mutual trust 
and shared identity within mature security communities cannot be taken for granted. Integration 
and cooperation being dependent on these variables, a focus must be reapplied to these elements. 
Therefore, this thesis has proposed to introduce the study of stratification of mature security 
communities. Stratified security communities reilluminate internal dynamics and shift the focus 
back to the pillars of security community instead of seeing them as mere milestones in the 
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Albania 3057220 15,1 0,178 1,178807947 8800 0,0841 0,0908 
Belgium 11570762 536 4,98 0,929104478 26550 1,9492 2,1043 
Bulgaria 7057504 63,7 0,991 1,555729984 31300 0,3387 0,3656 
Canada 35881659 17300 21,4 0,123699422 66600 6,372 6,8789 
Croatia 4270480 60 0,781 1,301666667 15200 0,2774 0,2995 
Czech 
Republic 10686269 245 2,74 1,118367347 23200 0,978 1,0558 
Denmark 5809502 355 4,25 1,197183099 14500 1,2149 1,3116 
Estonia 1244288 29,5 0,624 2,115254237 6600 0,1156 0,1248 
France 67364357 2790 50,7 1,817204301 203900 10,4913 10,4913 
Germany 80457737 4030 49,7 1,23325062 179400 14,7533 16,3444 
Greece 10761523 218 4,9 2,247706422 142350 0,9794 1,0573 
Hungary 9825704 156 1,7 1,08974359 27800 0,7035 0,7595 
Iceland 343518 26,7 0,0408 0,152808989 250 0,0596 0,0642 
Italy 62246674 2090 25,1 1,200956938 171050 8,1341 8,7812 
Latvia 1923559 34,3 0,684 1,994169096 6210 0,1477 0,1595 
Lithuania 2793284 52,5 1,04 1,980952381 19850 0,2377 0,2566 
Luxembour
g 605764 69 0,381 0,552173913 900 0,1568 0,1693 
Montenegro 614249 5,39 0,085 1,576994434 1950 0,027 0,0291 
Netherlands 17151228 910 12,7 1,395604396 35400 3,1963 3,4506 
North 
Macedonia 2118945 12,4 0,125 1,008064516 8000 0,0721 0,0778 
Norway 5372191 441 7,11 1,612244898 23250 1,6461 1,7771 
Poland 38420687 549 10,9 1,985428051 117800 2,766 2,9861 
Portugal 10355493 238 3,24 1,361344538 27200 0,9718 1,0491 
Romania 21457116 239 4,63 1,937238494 69300 1,1374 1,2279 
Slovakia 5445040 107 1,29 1,205607477 15850 0,478 0,516 




Spain 49331076 1440 13,5 0,9375 120350 5,5493 5,9908 
Turkey 81257239 714 11,9 1,666666667 355200 4,3783 4,7266 
United 
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